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Abstract 
 
This research applies both quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate the 
sustainable development (SD) benefits of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects. The results of cluster analysis confirm that the carbon market is separated into 
two sub-markets: a premium market; and a normal market or may be defined as “One 
CER Two Markets”. A willingness to pay study revealed that buyers are willing to pay a 
price premium of €1.12 per tonne of CO2e for carbon credits with high quality 
sustainability benefits. 56.4% of the buyers are willing to pay a price premium for Gold 
Standard carbon credits. The probability of the willingness to pay a price premium is 
affected positively by the four factors: (i) Buyer’s perception of the SD benefits; (ii) 
Buyer’s perception of return on investment (ROI); (iii) An involvement in CDM 
sustainability label; and (iv) Buyer’s attitude towards an importance of CDM 
sustainability labels.  
The CDM’s contribution to SD is explored in the context of a biomass (rice husk) case 
study conducted in Thailand. The results of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) show 
that stakeholders ranked ‘increasing the usage of renewable energy’ as the most 
important SD benefit, whereas they considered air pollution problems associated with 
dust as the most significant social cost. Qualitative results, suggest that rice husk CDM 
projects contribute significantly to SD in terms of employment generation, an increase 
in usage of renewable energy, and transfer of knowledge. However, rice husk biomass 
projects create a potential negative impact on air quality. Finally, these results indicate 
that the results of a sustainability assessment conducted by host countries may be 
inadequate, suggesting an inability of host countries to ensure the sustainability of CDM 
projects. In order to ensure the environmental sustainability of CDM projects, 
stakeholders suggest that Thailand should cancel an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) exemption for CDM projects with an installed capacity below 10 MW and apply 
it to all CDM projects.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 ii
Acknowledgements 
 
It was the great moment to study here, International Centre for Island Technology 
(ICIT), Institute of Petroleum Engineering, Heriot-Watt University. All ICIT staffs have 
provided me warm supports from the first day I arrived Orkney Islands until the day I 
finished my thesis.  
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and deep appreciation to my 
supervisor, Dr. Sandy A. Kerr, who kindly gave me valuable advice, guidance, and 
encouragement throughout and help me shaped up this research with his years of 
experience. I am also grateful to Professor Dr. Jonathan Side, my co-supervisor, for his 
guidance, comments, and encouragement. They were never lacking in support and 
kindness.  
This research work is supported by the Ph.D. studentship funded by the Energy 
Conservation Promotion Fund (ENCON Fund) of the Royal Thai Government, 
Thailand. Without this studentship, this research would not have been started. 
Therefore, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the organization. 
I am also wish to acknowledge the meaningful challenges of the creative criticisms for 
statistical methods provided by Dr. Michael Bell, ICIT. These led to elaborate 
refinement in all statistical parts of this thesis. I wish to extend my deep gratitude to Dr. 
Kate Johnson, ICIT, for the critical comments about stakeholder preferences towards 
the sustainable development (SD). Additionally, I would like to express sincere thanks 
to all ICIT staffs and friends for their friendship, advices, and encouragement.  
Special recognition and thanks are extended to the carbon credit traders; Dr. Tauni 
Lanier (EcoCapital Ltd.); Mr. Siam Phoolcharoen (South Pole Carbon Asset 
Management Ltd. ); Mr. Boonrod Yaowapruek (Eneco Energy Trade B.V.); and Mr. 
Narongchai Prapakornwiriya (GDF Suez Energy Services Ltd.), for improving 
willingness to pay (WTP) questionnaires.    
My sincere thanks go to Mr. Payut Kriktanasakul, Head of Regional Energy 
Coordination Office 6, and Mr. Wichai Laithong, Bannsamednoi Villager, for helping 
me distributing the pairwise questionnaires. I extend my thanks to my boss, Dr. Gosah 
Arya and Mrs. Suwatjana Pengjun, who values higher education and also my colleagues 
at Walailak University for their friendship and encouragement.  
 iii
I would like to express sincere thanks to my mother, Mrs. Somjai Benjamanukorn, my 
father, Mr. Benjapon Benjamanukorn, and other family members that cannot be 
announced to here, for their entirely care and love.  
Last, but not least, I am extremely grateful to my wife, Mrs. Wilawan Dungtripop, who 
resigned from her work and went to Orkney Islands with me, for her everlasting love 
and care, encouragement, and understanding throughout my studies. All value and 
benefits of this thesis are sincerely dedicated to those whom I have mentioned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 v
Contents 
 
 
Abstract……………………………………………………………………….......     i  
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………….    ii 
Declaration Statement…………………………………………………………….   iv 
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………..  xiii 
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………….  xvi 
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations……………………………………………xviii 
List of Publications Related to PhD Thesis………………………………………   xx 
 
1. Introduction     1 
1.1 Background and Motivation………………………………………………..     1 
1.2 Research Objectives, Research Questions, and Research Hypotheses…….     4 
1.3 Research Methods………………………………………………………….     6 
1.4 Scope of the Study…………………………………………………………     7 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis……………………………………………………..     8 
 
2. The Globalization of Environmental Agenda   10 
2.1 The Open Economy, the Closed Economy, and the Causes of  
 Climate Change…………………………………………………………….   10 
2.2 The Formation of Environmental Cooperation: From Local to Global……   15 
2.3 The International Conference on Global Environmental Agenda…............     19 
2.3.1 The UN Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization        
of Resources (UNSCCUR)………………………………………….     19 
2.3.2 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment      
(UNCHE)……………………………………………………………   19 
2.3.3 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)…………….     22 
2.3.4 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED)……………………………………………………………   24 
2.4 Conclusions………………………………………………………………..   28 
 
 
 vi
3. The Kyoto Protocol   30 
3.1 Background on the Kyoto Protocol……………………………………….   30 
3.2 The Development of the Kyoto protocol………………………………….   31 
3.2.1 The Pre-Kyoto Era (From COP-1 to COP-3)………………………   32 
3.2.2 The Mid-Kyoto era (From COP-4 to COP-10)…………………….   38 
3.2.3 The Post-Kyoto era (From COP-11 to COP-15)…………………...   40 
3.3 The Kyoto Mechanisms…………………………………………………...   42 
3.3.1 Emission Trading (ET)……………………………………………..   43 
3.3.2 Joint Implementation (JI)…………………………………………...   45 
3.3.3 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)…………………………...   47 
3.4 Conclusions………………………………………………………………..   47 
 
4. The CDM Regulatory Framework   50 
4.1 Background on the Clean Development Mechanism………………………   50 
4.2 Institutional Framework of Clean Development Mechanism………………   52 
4.2.1 The Conferences of the Parties (COP)………………………………   52 
4.2.2 The CDM Executive Board (EB)……………………………………   52 
4.2.3 Designated National Authority (DNA)………………………………   52 
4.2.4 Designated Operational Entity (DOE)……………………………….   53 
4.2.5 Stakeholders………………………………………………………….   53 
4.3 The CDM Project Cycle………………………………………………….…   53 
4.4 The Key Aspect of CDM Projects: Baseline, Additionality, and Crediting 
Period……………………………………………………………………….   58 
4.4.1 Baseline and Additionality…………………………………………..   58 
4.4.2 Crediting Period……………………………………………………...   63 
4.5 Transaction costs of the CDM project……………………………………...   65 
4.6 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………   69 
 
5. A Methodological Approach and Framework for Sustainability Assessment     
of CDM Projects   72 
5.1 A Brief History of Sustainable Development………………………………   72 
5.2 The Concept of Sustainable Development Applied to the CDM Project…..   76 
5.2.1 Environmental Criteria………………………………………………   78 
5.2.2 Economic Criteria……………………………………………………   79 
 vii
5.2.3 Social Criteria………………………………………………………..   80 
5.3 An Example of CDM Sustainability Criteria Used by Asia-Pacific       
Countries…………………………………………………………………..   82 
5.3.1 Countries with No Specific Sustainability Criteria…………………   82 
5.3.2 Countries with CDM Sustainability Criteria………………………..   83 
5.3.3 Summary of SD Criteria…………………………………………….   89 
5.4 Methodologies for assessing the sustainability of CDM projects…………   91 
5.4.1 Checklists……………………………………………………………   91 
5.4.2 Multi-criteria Analysis (MCA)………………………………………   92 
5.5 The Problem of CDM’s Contribution to Sustainable Development……….   97 
5.5.1 A Conflict between the Twin Objectives of CDM Projects…………   98 
5.5.2 A Lack of Consistency in the Application of the Host Countries’    
Duties to Ensure the Sustainability of CDM Projects……………….   99 
5.6 CDM Sustainability Labels: Paving the Way to Sustainability Path……… 101 
5.7 An Example of CDM Sustainability Labels: The Gold Standard Label….. 102 
5.8 Conclusions………………………………………………………………..  106 
 
6. An Analysis of Current CDM Portfolio 109 
6.1 Demand Side……………………………………………………………… 109 
6.1.1 The Kyoto Obligation……………………………………………… 110 
6.1.2 The European Union  Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)……... 111 
6.1.3 The U.S. Cap-and-Trade Program…………………………………. 111 
6.1.4 The other trading schemes…………………………………………. 115 
6.2 Supply Side……………………………………………………………….. 116 
6.2.1 Overview of the CDM Projects…………………………………….. 116 
6.2.2 Distribution of Registered Projects by Host Region and                      
Host Country………………………………………………………... 117 
6.2.3 Distribution of CDM Project Types………………………………… 120 
6.2.4 Distribution of Renewable Energy CDM Projects………………….. 123 
6.3 Conclusions………………………………………………………………... 125 
 
7. A Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology for Classifying CER 
Buyers and Valuing the Sustainable Development Benefits of CDM Project 127 
7.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 127 
 viii
7.2 Research Objectives, Research Questions, and Research Hypotheses…… 128 
7.3 An Application of Cluster Analysis to Classify CER Buyers……………. 129 
7.3.1 Clustering Variables……………………………………………….. 130 
7.3.2 Additional Variables………………………………………………. 132 
7.4 An Application of Contingent Valuation to Investigate the Value of SD 
benefits…………………………………………………………………… 134 
7.4.1 An Econometric Model of Willingness to Pay……………………. 138 
7.4.2 The Independent  Variables……………………………………….. 140 
7.5 Survey design and data Collection………………………………………. 142 
7.6 Data Analysis……………………………………………………………. 144 
 
8. Research Results: Classifying CER Buyers and Willingness to Pay a Price 
Premium for CDM Sustainability Label 145 
8.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………. 145 
8.2 The Reliability of Questionnaires………………………………………… 145 
8.3 Demographic and Organizational Characteristics of Respondents………. 146 
8.3.1 Nationality and Type of Organization……………………………... 146 
8.3.2 Organization’s Experience in the Carbon Market…………………. 147 
8.3.3 The Paid Up Capital……………………………………………….. 148 
8.4 Participation in the Voluntary Carbon Market…………………………… 149 
8.5 Ethical Purchasing Policy for Carbon Credits…………………………… 150 
8.6 An Overall Image of Gold Standard Label………………………………. 151 
8.7 Buyers’ Knowledge in CDM Sustainability Labels……………………… 152 
8.8 Involvement in the Gold Standard Label…………………………………. 155 
8.9 The Attitude towards an Importance of the Gold Standard Label………... 155 
8.10 Classification of CER Buyers by Cluster Analysis………………………. 157 
8.10.1 Cluster 1: Buyers Favoring CERs with Sustainability Labels…… 160 
8.10.2 Cluster 2: Buyers Favoring Non-Labeled CERs………………… 160 
8.11 Profiling the Cluster Members on Additional Variables…………………. 161 
8.11.1 Organization Type……………………………………………….. 163 
8.11.2 The Paid up Capital……………………………………………… 164 
8.11.3 An Overall Image of the GS Label………………………………. 164 
8.11.4 Buyers’ Perception of SD Benefits Generated by the GS Project... 164 
 ix
8.11.5 Buyers’ Perception of Return on Investment (ROI) of CERs from      
the GS Project……………………………………………………. 165 
8.11.6 Buyers’ Participation in the Voluntary Carbon Offset Market….. 165 
8.11.7 The Project Priority for Purchasing Carbon Credits…………….. 166 
8.11.8 Buyers’ Knowledge in the GS Label……………………………. 166 
8.11.9 Buyers’ Attitude towards the Host Country’s Duty to Assess the 
Sustainability of CDM Projects…………………………………. 166 
8.11.10Buyers’ Willingness to Pay a Price Premium for the Label…….. 167 
8.12 WTP Responses………………………………………………………….. 167 
8.12.1 WTP Responses in Relation to Organization Type……………… 168 
8.12.2 WTP Responses in Relation to Overall Image of Gold Standard    
Label……………………………………………………………... 169 
8.12.3 WTP Responses in Relation to Knowledge in the Gold Standard   
Label……………………………………………………………... 170 
8.13 Reasons for the Willingness to Pay………………………………………. 172 
8.14 Reasons for the Unwillingness to Pay……………………………………. 172 
8.15 WTP Values………………………………………………………………. 173 
8.16 An Analysis of the WTP Values in Relation to the Independent Variables 175 
8.16.1 WTP Values in Relation to Nationality of Organization………… 175 
8.16.2 WTP Values in Relation to Type of Organization……………….. 176 
8.16.3 WTP Values in Relation to Overall Image of Gold Standard Label 177 
8.16.4 WTP Values in Relation to Buyer’s Perception of ROI………….. 177 
8.16.5 WTP Values in Relation to Buyer’s Perception of the SD Benefits 178 
8.16.6 WTP Values in Relation to Knowledge in Gold Standard Label… 179 
8.17 Factor affecting WTP for the Gold Standard Label………………………. 180 
8.17.1 Test for Multicollinearity………………………………………… 182 
8.17.2 Estimated Binary Logistic Regression Model for Determining    
Factors of the Buyers’ Willingness to Pay……………………….. 183 
8.17.3 Goodness of Fit of the Model………………………….…………. 189 
8.18 Conclusions……………………………………………………………….. 190 
8.18.1 Classification of CER Buyers by Cluster Analysis………………. 190 
8.18.2 The Willingness of Buyers to Pay a Price Premium for CERs with 
CDM Sustainability Label………………………………………... 191 
 
 x
9. A Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology for Assessing the 
Sustainability of CDM Projects 192 
9.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………..…… 192 
9.2 Research Objectives, Research Questions, and Research Hypotheses…… 193 
9.3 Prior Literature………………………………………………………….... 193 
9.4 Research Methodologies…………………………………………………. 197 
9.4.1 Selecting SD Benefits and Social Costs for the Stakeholder Survey 198 
9.4.2 Qualitative Method………………………………………………… 199 
9.4.3 Quantitative Method: The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)……. 199 
9.4.4 Identification of Stakeholders……………………………………… 205 
9.5 Country Context: The Kingdom of Thailand…………………………….. 208 
9.6 Thailand’s Energy Policy and Situation………………………………….. 210 
9.7 CDM Implementation in Thailand………………………………………... 216 
9.8 The Sustainable Development Criteria and Indicators for Assessing CDM 
projects in Thailand……………………………………………………….. 219 
9.8.1 Environmental Objective…………………………………………… 219 
9.8.2 Social Objective……………………………………………………. 220 
9.8.3 Technological Objective…………………………………………… 221 
9.8.4 Economic Objective……………………………………………….. 221 
9.9 Background on a Case Study: Biomass CDM Projects in Thailand……... 223 
9.10 Study Area………………………………………………………………... 224 
 
10. Research Results: The Sustainability of CDM Projects in Thailand: A Case 
Study of Biomass (Rice Husk) Project 232 
10.1 Qualitative Analysis and Results…………………………………………. 232 
10.1.1 Theme I: Generating Extra Income for the Farmers…………….. 233 
10.1.2 Theme II: Employment Creation………………………………… 236 
10.1.3 Theme III: Increasing the Usage of Renewable Energy and Transfer   
of Knowledge in Renewable Energy……………………………. 238 
10.1.4 Theme IV: Environmental Risk…………………………………. 241 
10.1.5 The Roots of Environmental Problems Generated by Biomass       
CDM Projects………………………………………………….... 247 
10.2 Quantitative Analysis and Results………………………………………. 249 
10.2.1 Stakeholder Preferences towards the SD Benefits……………… 250 
 xi
10.2.2 Stakeholder Concerns in the Social Costs………………………. 252 
10.2.3 Test of Statistical Differences…………………………………... 252 
10.3 Discussion and Conclusions…………………………………………….. 253 
 
11. Conclusions and Recommendations 256 
11.1 Conclusions……………………………………………………………… 256 
11.1.1 The Concept of SD Applied to CDM Projects and the Contribution     
of the CDM to SD (Objective One and Objective Five)………... 256 
11.1.2 Classification of CER Buyers: One CER Two Markets (Objective 
Two)……………………………………………………………… 260 
11.1.3 The Willingness of Buyers to Pay a Price Premium for CERs with 
CDM Sustainability Label (Objective Three and Objective Four).. 261 
11.1.4 The Disparity between the Claimed Carbon Emission Reductions     
and the SD Benefits: A Synthesis of Results from the Contingent 
Valuation and Cluster Analysis (Objective Two and Objective     
Three)……………………………………………………….…… 263 
11.1.5 Stakeholder Preferences towards the SD of Biomass CDM Projects     
in Thailand (Objective Five)……………………………………. 265 
11.1.6 Integrating Stakeholders’ Views on the Sustainability of CDM  
Projects…………………………………………………………..     266 
11.2 Recommendations………………………………………………………... 268 
11.2.1 Recommendations for International Regulations under                       
the UNFCCC…………………………………………………….. 268 
11.2.2 Recommendations for Thai Government………………………… 270 
11.2.3 Recommendations for CDM Sustainability Labels……………… 271 
11.2.4 Recommendations for Further Study……………………………. 272 
 
References 273 
 
Appendices 284 
 
A   WTP Questionnaire 284 
 
B   Pairwise Questionnaire (First Version) 290 
 xii
C   Pairwise Questionnaire (Final Version) 293 
 
D  P. Parnphumeesup, S.A. Kerr, Stakeholder preferences towards the            
sustainable development of CDM projects: Lessons from biomass                     
(rice husk) CDM project in Thailand, Energy Policy, 39, 3591-3601,                   
(2011) 299 
 
E    P. Parnphumeesup, S.A. Kerr, Classifying carbon credit buyers              
according to their attitudes towards and involvement in CDM sustainability  
labels, Energy Policy, 39, 6271-6279, (2011) 311 
 
F    P. Parnphumeesup, S.A. Kerr, Willingness to pay for Gold Standard          
carbon credits, Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy,                 
In press, (2011) 321 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii
List of Tables 
 
 
2.1 The examples of national environmental groups founded in 19th century..   16 
2.2 The examples of the international environmental organization founded or    
lead by Van Tienhoven……………………………………………………   18 
2.3 The responsibilities of UNEP and the major results of UNEP activities…   23 
2.4 The responsibilities of UNEP and the major results of UNEP activities    
(Cont.)…………………………………………………………………….   24 
3.1 The example of different individual emission targets for Annex I countries   34 
3.2 The initial and final EU burden-sharing agreements……………………..   35 
3.3 The highlight COP and its outcomes……………………………………..   48 
4.1 Registration fee……………………………………………………………   66 
4.2 Transaction costs incurred in the project preparation phase………………   67 
4.3 Transaction costs incurred in the project implementation phase………….   68 
4.4 Impact of transaction costs on the IRR of the CDM project………………   68 
4.5 The key issues and the responsible institution in each stage of the CDM     
cycle……………………………………………………………………….   70 
5.1 Environmental criteria suggested by the UN………………………………   79 
5.2 Economic criteria suggested by the UN……………………………………   80 
5.3 Social criteria suggested by the UN……………………………………….   81 
5.4 Countries with CDM sustainability criteria……………………………….   84 
5.5 The structure of sustainability criteria……………………………………..   85 
5.6 The top seven most widely used environmental criteria in Asia-Pacific     
region………………………………………………………………………   86 
5.7 The top five most widely used social criteria in Asia-Pacific region………   87 
5.8 The top five most widely used economic criteria in Asia-Pacific region….   88 
5.9 The top three most widely used technological criteria in Asia-Pacific region  89 
5.10 Singapore’s sustainable development criteria……………………………..   92 
5.11 The sustainability criteria and SD indicators designed for assessing the CDM 
projects in the South African and Indian………………………………….   95 
5.12 Results of the criteria weighting done by participants in India……………   96 
5.13 The CDM project types eligible to the Gold Standard………………….. 103 
 xiv
5.14 The sustainable development assessment matrix……………………….. 104 
5.15 The definition of a scoring system………………………………………. 105 
6.1 An example of state emission reduction targets…………………………. 112 
6.2 State CO2 emissions (Year 2004) under the three cap-and-trade programs 114 
6.3 The distribution of registered projects by host region……………………. 117 
6.4 The distribution of registered projects by host country…………………… 118 
6.5 The distribution of CERs by host country………………………………… 119 
6.6 The distribution of CDM project types…………………………………… 122 
6.7 The distribution of CERs by project type………………………………… 123 
6.8 The distribution of renewable energy CDM projects…………………….. 124 
6.9 The distribution of CERs by type of renewable energy………………….. 125 
7.1 Additional variables for cluster profiling………………………………… 133 
7.2 Additional variables for cluster profiling (Cont.)………………………… 134 
8.1 The statements are evaluated by the Cronbach method………………….. 146 
8.2 Nationality and organization type………………………………………… 147 
8.3 Organization’s experience in the carbon market…………………………. 148 
8.4 The paid up capital……………………………………………………….. 149 
8.5 Participation in the voluntary carbon market…………………………….. 150 
8.6 Project priority……………………………………………………………. 151 
8.7 An overall image of Gold Standard label………………………………… 152 
8.8 Statistical results of an overall image of Gold Standard label……………. 152 
8.9 Statistical results of knowledge in Gold Standard label………………….. 154 
8.10 Paired Samples Test……………………………………………………… 154 
8.11 Paired samples correlations………………………………………………. 154 
8.12 Involvement in the Gold Standard label………………………………….. 155 
8.13 Buyers’ attitude towards an importance of the Gold Standard label……… 156 
8.14 Classification table………………………………………………………... 158 
8.15 Results of cluster analysis for CER buyers……………………………….. 159 
8.16 Additional variables for cluster profiling…………………………………. 161 
8.17 Profile of the two buyer clusters on a set of additional variables…………. 162 
8.18 Profile of the two buyer clusters on a set of additional variables (Cont.)…. 163 
8.19 WTP responses by organization type……………………………………… 168 
8.20 WTP responses by overall image of Gold Standard label………………… 170 
8.21 WTP responses by level of knowledge in label…………………………… 171 
 xv
8.22 WTP values……………………………………………………………….. 174 
8.23 Mean WTP in relation to nationality……………………………………… 175 
8.24 Mean WTP in relation to buyer’s perception of the SD benefits…………. 179 
8.25 The independent variables for regression model………………………….. 181 
8.26 Testing for multicollinearity………………………………………………. 182 
8.27 Estimated binary logistic regression model……………………………….. 185 
8.28 Classification table………………………………………………………… 189 
9.1 The 9-point comparison scale……………………………………………... 201 
9.2 The 5-point comparison scale……………………………………………... 203 
9.3 The pairwise comparison reciprocal matrix………………………………. 204 
9.4 The normalized scores…………………………………………………….. 204 
9.5 List of stakeholder organizations…………………………………………. 206 
9.6 List of stakeholder organizations (Cont.)…………………………………. 207 
9.7 Thailand Poverty Index…………………………………………………… 209 
9.8 Thailand’s economic structure in 2007…………………………………… 210 
9.9 Share of fuels used for power generation in Thailand……………………. 212 
9.10 Goals of the 15-Year ADEP………………………………………………. 215 
9.11 The principles of Thailand’s climate change policy………………………. 216 
9.12 Thailand’s objective hierarchy for CDM project………………………….. 222 
10.1 Overview of the participants……………………………………………... 233 
10.2 Renewable energy potential in Surin…………………………………….. 238 
10.3 The priority weights for the SD benefits and social costs……………….. 249 
10.4 The statistically significant mean weight differences……………………. 252 
11.1    CDM stakeholders’ views on the sustainability of CDM       
projects……………………………………………………………………  267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xvi
List of Figures 
 
 
2.1 The closed economy……………………………………………………….   12 
2.2 The causes of climate change……………………………………………..   13 
4.1 Illustration of CDM project……………………………………………….   51 
4.2 The CDM project cycle…………………………………………………....   54 
4.3 The time required for each stage in the CDM project cycle……………….   58 
4.4 The GHG emission reductions…………………………………………….   60 
4.5 A fixed crediting period……………………………………………………   64 
4.6 A renewable crediting period………………………………………………   65 
5.1 The structure of the well defined sustainability criteria……………………   78 
5.2 The SD Criteria used by countries with their own SD criteria…………….   90 
5.3 The 3 sub-goals of sustainable development and the 12 SD criteria are used    
in the South African and Indian cases……………………………………...   94 
5.4 The two fundamental problems of CDM’s contribution to SD……………. 107 
6.1 Gaps between the Kyoto targets and current emission projections………... 110 
6.2 The growth of total expected accumulated 2012 CERs…………………… 116 
6.3 The distribution of registered projects by host region…………………….. 117 
6.4 The distribution of registered projects by host country…………………… 119 
6.5 The distribution of CERs by host country………………………………… 120 
6.6 The distribution of CDM project types…………………………………… 122 
6.7 The distribution of CERs by project type………………………………… 123 
6.8 The distribution of renewable energy CDM projects…………………….. 124 
6.9 The distribution of CERs by type of renewable energy………………….. 125 
7.1 WTP value………………………………………………………………… 136 
8.1 Knowledge in CDM sustainability labels………………………………… 154 
8.2 Jointing-tree cluster analysis output: Dendrogram……………………….. 157 
8.3 Mean values of clustering variables……………………………………… 159 
8.4 WTP responses from CER buyers……………………………………….. 168 
8.5 WTP responses in relation to type of organization……………………… 169 
8.6 WTP responses in relation to overall image of Gold Standard label……. 170 
8.7 WTP responses in relation to knowledge in Gold Standard label……….. 171 
 xvii
8.8 The distribution of WTP values………………………………………….. 174 
8.9 The WTP values in relation to each nationality………………………….. 176 
8.10 The WTP values in relation to type of organization……………………… 176 
8.11 The WTP values in relation to overall image of Gold Standard label……. 177 
8.12 The WTP values in relation to overall image of Gold Standard label……. 178 
8.13 The WTP values in relation to knowledge in Gold Standard label……….. 180 
8.14 Binary logistic regression model (B > 0)………………………………….   184 
9.1 Map of Thailand…………………………………………………………... 208 
9.2 The historical prices of rice husk and oil palm shell……………………… 213 
9.3 CDM Approval Procedure in Thailand…………………………………… 218 
9.4 Mungcharoen Green Power Project………………………………………. 225 
9.5 Bannsamednoi village behind the CDM project………………………….. 226 
9.6 Bannsamednoi village behind the CDM project………………………….. 226 
9.7 Rice growing area behind the CDM project………………………………. 227 
9.8 Rice growing area behind the CDM project………………………………. 228 
9.9 Chaipakoom temple……………………………………………………….. 229 
9.10 Bannsamednoi School…………………………………………………….. 230 
9.11 A nursery school………………………………………………………….. 230 
9.12 A two-lane concrete road in the village…………………………………… 231 
10.1 The historical prices of rice husk………………………………………… 235 
10.2 The ash dumped in the open field……………………………………….. 243 
10.3 The ash dumped in the open field……………………………………….. 243 
10.4 The first pond in the village……………………………………………... 244 
10.5 The second pond in the village………………………………………….. 244 
10.6 The public water purifiers installed in the village………………………. 246 
10.7 Villagers were taking the drinking water from the public water purifiers 246 
10.8 Comparison of the priority weights for the SD benefits by stakeholder     
group…………………………………………………………………….. 250 
10.9 Comparison of the priority weights for the social costs by stakeholder     
group…………………………………………………………………….. 250 
11.1 The benefits of buyers and sellers in the premium carbon market……… 264 
 
 
 
 
 xviii
 
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 
 
 
AEDP   The Alternative Energy Development Plan 
AHP   The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
CBD   The Convention on Biological Diversity 
CCB   The Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance  
CDM   The Clean Development Mechanism 
CERs   Certified Emission Reductions 
CH4   Methane 
CO2   Carbon Dioxide 
COP   Conferences of the Parties 
CSD   The Commission on Sustainable Development 
CV   Contingent Valuation 
DNA   A Designated National Authority 
DOE   A Designated Operational Entity 
EB   The Executive Board 
EIA   Environmental Impact Assessment 
ERUs   Emission Reduction Units 
ET   Emissions Trading  
EU   The European Union 
EU ETS  The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GEMS  The Global Environment Monitoring System 
GHG   Greenhouse Gas 
GNP   Gross National Product 
GS   The Gold Standard 
HFCs   Hydrofluorocarbons 
IPCC   The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IRR   The Internal Rate of Return 
JI   Joint Implementation 
LFE   Canadian Large Final Emitters system 
MA   The Midwest Accord 
 xix
MAUT  Multi-Attributive Utility Theory 
MCA   Multi-criteria Analysis 
MGP   Mungcharoen Green Power Project 
NGO   Non-governmental Organization 
N2O   Nitrous Oxide 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PDD   Project Design Document 
PFCs   Perfluorocarbons 
PIN   Project Idea Note 
RGGI   The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
ROI   Return on Investment 
SD   Sustainable Development 
SEP   Surin Electric Project 
SF6   Sulphur Hexafluoride 
SPSS   Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
TGO   Thailand Greenhouse Gas Management Organization 
UN   The United Nations 
UNCED  The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
UNCHE  The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
UNEP   The United Nations Environmental Programme 
UNFCCC  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNSCCUR  The UN Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of 
Resources  
VIF   The Variance Inflation Factor 
WCED  The World Commission on Environment and Development 
WCI   The Western Climate Initiative 
WSSD  The World Summit on Sustainable Development 
WTA   Willingness to Accept 
WTP   Willingness to Pay 
 
 
 
 
 
 xx
List of Publications Related to PhD Thesis 
 
 
[1] P. Parnphumeesup, S.A. Kerr, Stakeholder preferences towards the sustainable 
development of CDM projects: Lessons from biomass (rice husk) CDM project in 
Thailand, Energy Policy, 39, 3591-3601, (2011) 
[2] P. Parnphumeesup, S.A. Kerr, Classifying carbon credit buyers according to their 
attitudes towards and involvement in CDM sustainability labels, Energy Policy, 39, 
6271-6279, (2011) 
[3]  P. Parnphumeesup, S.A. Kerr, Willingness to pay for Gold Standard carbon credits, 
Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy, In press, (2011) 
 
 
 1
Chapter 1 
  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1   Background and Motivation 
 
Climate change is widely accepted as the most serious environmental problem facing 
humankind. Not only does climate change directly affects humans, but it also directly 
affects all other environmental and ecological processes. The scientific community now 
agrees that the climate change is real and already happening. Ganeshan and Diamond 
[30] predict that, by 2015, on average over 375 million people per year are likely to be 
affected by natural disasters resulted by the climate change. This is over 50 per cent 
more than were affected in an average year during the decade 1998–2007. Moreover, 
many scientific evidences on climate change, especially the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) report, strongly confirm the effect of climate change and 
contradict the uncertainty in climate change. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
published in 2007 reveals that: 
 
• World temperature will rise by between 1.1 and 6.4 °C (2.0 and 11.5 °F) during 
the 21st century. This is a wider range than the 1.4 – 5.8 °C increase given in the 
2001 report. 
• Sea levels will rise by 18 to 59 cm (7.08 to 23.22 in) during the 21st century. 
• There will be an increase in tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes), high 
tides, droughts and flood. 
• There will be an increase in the severity of heat waves and rainfall. 
 
Considering the impact of climate change on the economy, the costs of climate change 
will increase rapidly because the increase in temperature will lead to an acute increase 
in extreme weather events such as storms, floods, droughts, and heatwaves (Stern 
[106]). Stern predicts that UK costs of floods could reach 0.2-0.4% of UK gross 
domestic product (GDP) if world temperatures rise by 3-4°C.  
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The climate change problem therefore appears inevitable and there is too late for all 
humans to avoid this problem. In order to solve the climate change problem the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been created to set 
the international framework for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, the third 
Conferences of the Parties (COP-3) held in Tokyo in 1997 gave birth to the most 
influential climate change agenda known as the Kyoto Protocol. The objective of the 
Kyoto Protocol is to establish all legally binding obligations to reduce GHG emissions. 
However, the costs of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions vary across countries. 
In order to achieve the cost effectiveness of emission reductions, the Kyoto Protocol 
designed the three flexibility mechanisms.  These mechanism rely on the important 
assumption that GHG emission reductions taking place anywhere in the world will have 
the same environmental effects. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of 
these three flexibility mechanisms aimed at helping Annex I countries meet their 
emission reduction targets at least cost. The CDM is a project-based mechanism which 
allows Annex I countries to invest in emission reduction projects in developing 
countries. Annex I countries will get emission credits which are called “Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs)” and can directly use CERs to meet their own Kyoto 
target or sell CERs in the emission trading market. The objectives of CDM projects are 
defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. This Article state that:    
 
“2. The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not 
included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in 
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3”. 
   
This Article clearly shows the twin objectives of “ensuring cost-effectiveness of GHG 
emission reductions” and “promoting sustainable development (SD)”. In order to 
examine whether CDM projects can attain both twin objectives, a Designated National 
Authority (DNA) is identified in host countries and tasked with fulfilling this function. 
This implies that the UNFCCC trusts the capacity of each host country to assess CDM 
projects. In other words, the UNFCCC believe that each host country can guarantee the 
sustainability of CDM projects and carbon credits originated from each host country 
have the same quality in terms of SD benefits. However, it is very difficult for a host 
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country to assess the SD benefits because there are no rules on the host country 
approval processes and the host country SD criteria. The SD criteria for approval of 
projects are not clearly defined. This contrasts sharply with GHG emissions monitoring 
where units of measure and monitoring protocols are clearly defined. Consequently, the 
host countries’ duties to assess the SD benefits of CDM projects are inconsistently 
applied and SD criteria vary widely.  
Burian [10] and Erion [26] have suggested that host countries cannot guarantee the SD 
benefits of CDM projects. Moreover, Kolshus et al. [59] found that industrial gas 
projects (including hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and nitrous 
oxide (N2O) projects) produce fewest SD benefits compared to other types of CDM 
project. Therefore, these results indicate that the quality of carbon credits should be 
different in terms of SD benefits, arguing against the original concept of the UNFCCC. 
A number of articles have argued that the carbon market cannot offer the same quality 
of CERs in terms of the SD benefits (Grandpre [38], Meyrick [73]). Moreover, the 
carbon market does not know how the buyers value the quality of CERs in terms of SD 
benefits. Therefore, it is now necessary to validate the concept of non-homogeneous 
carbon credits. There is clearly a need for more research to investigate how CER buyers 
view the SD benefits of CDM projects. This research focuses on the in-depth analysis of 
the quality of carbon credits in terms of SD benefits.    
This research will also investigate the contribution that CDM projects make to SD. 
Although CDM projects require successful DNA approval, the CDM’s contribution to 
SD is now openly questioned. There are many researchers trying to examine the CDM’s 
contribution to SD, for example, Nussbaumer [79], Sutter [108], and Sutter and Parreno 
[109] used Multi-Attributive Utility Theory (MAUT) to assess the sustainability of the 
CDM projects. However, these studies are mostly based on the reviews of the project 
design documents (PDDs), whereas the in-depth interviews with stakeholders were not 
widely used for data collection. Moreover, research on stakeholder preferences towards 
the SD benefits of CDM project is limited to only two small studies. Given this context, 
there is a need for more research to be done in understanding what the preferences of 
the stakeholders for the SD of CDM projects are and how CDM projects generate SD 
benefits at the project level. Therefore, the research presented here aims to shed 
additional light on the nature of SD benefits of CDM projects.   
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1.2 Research Objectives, Research Questions, and Research Hypotheses 
 
This research is an attempt to increase the understanding of the sustainable development 
benefits of CDM projects. The research adopts systematic approach involving CDM 
stakeholders. Therefore, this study explores the issue of CDM and SD from various 
perspectives including international stakeholders, national stakeholders, carbon market 
stakeholders, and local stakeholders. There are five explicit objectives of the research: 
 
1. Create an understanding of the concept of sustainable development applied to 
CDM projects and the methodology for assessing the sustainability of CDM 
project. 
This objective is achieved by pursuing two research questions: 
 
• How did the Kyoto Protocol develop? 
• How is the sustainable development defined and assessed within the CDM 
Framework? 
 
2. To classify CER buyers according to their attitudes towards and involvement in 
CDM sustainability labels. 
This objective is achieved by pursuing two further research questions: 
 
• Is the carbon market comprised of multiple groups based on their attitudes 
towards and involvement in CDM sustainability labels? 
We can evaluate this research question by formulating a hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: CER buyers can be classified into distinct groups based on their 
attitudes towards and involvement in CDM sustainability labels. 
   
• What are the key characteristics of each buyer cluster? 
We can evaluate this research question by formulating a second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The buyer clusters are significantly different in: organization 
type; level of paid up capital; perception of sustainable development benefits; 
perception of return on investment; perception of image of the sustainability 
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labeling; participation in the voluntary market; the project priority; knowledge 
in the sustainability label; attitude towards the host country’s duty; and their 
willingness to pay.     
 
3. Investigate the value of sustainable development benefits generated by CDM 
projects through the willingness of buyers to pay a price premium for CERs with 
CDM sustainability label. 
This objective can be achieved by pursuing two research questions: 
 
• Are the buyers willing to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM 
sustainability label in recognition of the contribution to sustainable 
development? 
We can evaluate this research question by formulating Hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Buyers are willing to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM 
sustainability label.   
 
• How much are the buyers willing to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM 
sustainability Label in recognition of the contribution to sustainable 
development? 
 
4.  Identify the factors influencing buyers’ willingness to pay a price premium for 
CERs with CDM sustainability labels. 
This objective can be achieved by pursuing the following research question: 
 
• What are the factors influencing the willingness of CER buyers to pay a price 
premium for CERs with CDM sustainability label?  
We can evaluate this research question by formulating the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Expected sustainable development benefits, expected return on 
investment, involvement in the Gold Standard label, importance of the Gold 
Standard label, and the attitude towards the host country’s duty are significantly 
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related to the probability of the willingness to pay a price premium for CERs 
with CDM sustainability label.    
 
5. Investigate the contribution of the CDM to sustainable development. 
This objective can be achieved by pursuing these four research questions: 
 
• Are the expected SD benefits described in the PDD actually realized? 
• How does CDM project distribute benefits and social costs to stakeholders? 
• What are the preferences of the stakeholder for the sustainable development of 
CDM projects? 
• Are the group’s preferences substantially different from each other, on which 
criteria they differ? 
We can evaluate this research question by formulating the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The inter-group preference weights are different. 
 
1.3 Research Methods 
 
The first section aims to provide an up-to-date understanding of the concept of 
sustainable development applied to CDM projects. Also, this part will also investigate 
the methodology for assessing the sustainability of CDM project. In this part we will 
also begin the study of the international and national frameworks for CDM, so we will 
understand how the international regulators and the host countries interpret the SD 
benefits of CDM projects. Consequently, this section is based on an extensive literature 
review to answer question 1.  
The second part of the study aims to investigate how the buyers view the SD benefits of 
CDM projects. In this part quantitative methods will be used to answer question 2, 3, 
and 4. This analysis is largely based on the data collection from the carbon credit 
buyers. Online questionnaires were developed and circulated to CER buyers in the 
primary market. Firstly, this section uses cluster analysis to classify CER buyers 
according to their attitudes towards and involvement in CDM sustainability labels. 
Then, discriminant analysis was conducted to statistically test the validity of the cluster 
solution. Finally, cross tabulation and chi-square analysis were used to investigate 
 7
whether the clusters are significantly different in a set of additional variables not 
included in the clustering variables. Moreover, in this part the contingent valuation 
method (CVM) is applied to quantitatively measure buyers’ willingness to pay (WTP) a 
price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability labels. Finally, we employ binary 
regression to investigate which factors might contribute positively and negatively to the 
probability of the buyers’ WTP a price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability 
labels.  
The final sections aim to investigate how local stakeholders view the SD benefits of 
CDM projects. In this section both qualitative and quantitative methods are applied in 
order to investigate the sustainability of CDM projects. Qualitative and quantitative 
methods are used to answer question 5. Methods used include, in-depth interviews with 
stakeholders to tell us more about the SD benefits experienced by communities. 
Moreover, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used to assess the sustainability 
preferences of CDM stakeholders. Finally, both qualitative and quantitative results will 
be combined to describe the contribution of the CDM to SD.       
 
1.4 Scope of the Study 
 
As previously noted, the second part aims to investigate how the buyers value the 
quality of CERs in terms of SD benefits. However, some CERs are worth more (or less) 
than others in terms of the SD benefits (Meyrick [73]). Therefore, this study has chosen 
CERs with the Gold Standard label as representative of the high quality CERs in terms 
of their SD benefits. This is because CERs generated by GS projects generate higher SD 
benefits than non-labelled projects Nussbaumer [80]. Consequently, the study 
questionnaire is designed to measure the participants’ perceptions of the GS label. For 
this analysis the study population is defined as CER buyers in the carbon market, so the 
questionnaires were sent to these buyers. The lists of CER buyers were taken from the 
UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database. The unit of measurement in this 
research is the organization, not the individual, so one respondent represents one 
organization in the carbon market. We asked that participants answer the questions from 
the perspective of their organization. This market survey was carried out during 
September to November 2009.  
The final part will focus on the contribution of CDM to SD. The issue of CDM’s 
contribution to local SD will be addressed in the context of a case study conducted in 
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Thailand. We have selected the biomass CDM project in Surin province, Thailand as a 
case study. As for qualitative method, all data and information are obtained from the in-
depth interviews with 20 stakeholders including experts and local residents. As for 
quantitative method, face-to-face interviews were carried out by using a pairwise 
questionnaire. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 96 stakeholders including 
experts and local residents. This stakeholder survey was carried out during January to 
March 2010. However, the possibility to carry out in-dept interviews with CDM 
consultants in Bangkok was limited by the anti-government protests in Bangkok.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is organized into five parts which follow the research objectives and 
questions defined above. The first part (chapter 1) presents general background, 
research objectives, research questions, research hypotheses, research methods, and 
scope of the study. The second part (chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) is a literature review 
which discusses background on climate change regulatory framework, critical 
perspectives on the CDM, and a methodological approach and framework for 
sustainability assessment of CDM projects. The third part (chapters 7 and 8) 
investigates how the CER buyers value the quality of CERs in terms of SD benefits. 
The fourth part (chapters 9 and 10) examines how the CDM generates local SD benefits 
and social costs. Finally, the results are discussed and recommendations are made in the 
fifth part (chapter 11). Study questionnaires are illustrated in the appendices. An outline 
of each chapter is as follows: 
 
Chapter 1: Background and motivation. Research objectives, research questions, and 
research hypotheses. Research methods. Scope of the study.  
 
Chapter 2: The open economy and the causes of climate change. The formation of 
environmental cooperation: from local to global. The international conference on global 
environmental agenda.  
 
Chapter 3: Background on the Kyoto Protocol. The development of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Kyoto mechanisms. 
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Chapter 4: The regulatory framework for CDM projects. The CDM project cycle. 
Transaction costs of CDM projects. 
 
Chapter 5: History of sustainable development. A host country’s duty to assess the 
sustainability of CDM projects. The SD criteria applicable for CDM projects. 
Methodologies for assessing the sustainability of CDM projects. The problem of 
CDM’s contribution to SD. CDM sustainability labels.   
 
Chapter 6: Demand for CERs. Supply of CERs. An analysis of the CDM portfolio.   
 
Chapter 7: A conceptual framework for valuing the SD benefits of CDM projects. 
Cluster analysis applied to classify CER buyers. An application of contingent valuation 
for exploring the monetary value of SD benefits of CDM projects. An econometric 
model of willingness to pay.   
 
Chapter 8: Profile of respondents. Classification of CER buyers by cluster analysis. The 
key characteristics of each buyer cluster. Willingness to pay a price premium for CERs 
with Gold Standard label in recognition of its contribution to SD. Reasons for 
willingness to pay and unwillingness to pay. Factors affecting CER buyers’ willingness 
to pay a price premium for CERs with Gold Standard label. 
 
Chapter 9: The qualitative method for assessing the sustainability of CDM projects. An 
application of AHP for assess the sustainability preferences of CDM stakeholders. 
Background on case study. Thailand’s energy policy and situation. CDM 
implementation in Thailand.   
 
Chapter 10: Qualitative analysis and results. Quantitative analysis and results. A 
synthesis of qualitative and quantitative results. 
 
Chapter 11: Summary of findings. Recommendations for international regulations under 
the UNFCCC. Recommendations for Thai Government. Recommendations for CDM 
sustainability labels. Recommendations for further study.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Globalization of the Environmental Agenda 
 
 
Prior to discussing the CDM framework, it is first necessary to provide greater 
background context of international environmental cooperation. This will be done 
through the literature review. This chapter aim to create an understanding of the 
development of international environmental cooperation via international environmental 
organizations and international environmental conferences. Firstly, we will apply the 
concept of “closed economy” defined by Kenneth E. Boulding (The Economics of the 
Coming Spaceship Earth) for explaining the causes of climate change. Then the 
literature review will give an understanding of transformation from national cooperation 
to international cooperation. The last past of literature review concentrate on 
international environmental organizations and international environmental conferences 
related to the climate change regulatory framework.  
    
2.1 The Open Economy, the Economy within a Closed Earth , and the Causes of 
Climate Change 
 
We will apply the term of “the open economy” and “the economy within a closed earth 
” defined by Kenneth E. Boulding in his paper, The Economics of the Coming 
Spaceship Earth, for explaining the causes of climate change (Boulding [6]). This 
concept within this work is important foundations to the emerging field of 
environmental economics in the late 1960s and ecological economics in 1990s. 
Boulding published The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth in 1966. This 
literature considerably aroused economist to add environmental outputs into economic 
growth. Until Boulding Growth theory was almost universally accepted by economist.  
Growth theory measured the economic success by the increase in value of goods and 
services produced by an economy. Moreover, Growth theory ignores the value of 
environmental outputs produced by an economy for measuring the economic success. 
Thus, the primary economic objective of government was to maximize the consumption 
and production for their economic success. Because of the unconcern for (or lack of 
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value placed upon) environmental outputs, the increased production and consumption 
lead to more pollution. This old economic concept using Growth theory was named as 
“the open economy of the past” or “the cowboy economy” in The Economics of the 
Coming Spaceship Earth. In this essay, Boulding explained “I am tempted to call the 
open economy the “cowboy economy,” the cowboy being symbolic of the illimitable 
plains and also associated with reckless, exploitative, romantic, and violent behavior, 
which is characteristic of open societies”. The cowboy economy wastefully used 
nonrenewable resources to produce goods and services. Moreover, there were illimitable 
resources in the concept of cowboy economy. When the cowboy economy maximized 
consumption and production, the cowboy also maximized the polluted outputs produced 
by economic activities. Consequently, Boulding suggested that the cowboy economy 
must ultimately be replaced by “the economy within a closed earth  of the future” or 
“the spaceman economy”.  
In a closed economy, there are inputs from outside and leakages to outside. The outside 
of a closed economy refers to the environment. Consequently, society receives inputs 
from the environment and gives off outputs, often in the form of waste and pollution, to 
environment. Humans have to receive inputs from outside in the shape of air, food, 
water, energy, fossil fuels and other natural resources and give off outputs to 
environment in the form of waste and pollution. Like biological systems, the economy 
within a closed earth needs to use environmental inputs to transform materials into 
goods and services. This transformation will also give off outputs to environment in the 
form of waste and pollution. Consequently, the economy within a closed earth will 
concentrate on environment. Besides commodity outputs, humans can produce 
environmental outputs by consuming environmental inputs. Environmental output is the 
important output affecting human life. Consequently, humans and environment depend 
on each other. We can see the economy within a closed earth  from Figure 2.1: 
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Figure 2.1: The economy within a closed earth  
 
We may use the economy within a closed earth from Figure 2.1 for explaining the 
causes of climate change. In closed economy, we can minimize negative outputs such as 
waste, pollution, etc. by minimizing the input consumption. For example, if we 
minimize the use of forest, we could also minimize the negative outputs including loss 
of wildlife habitat, loss of open space, and impaired water quality. Why don’t people 
minimize the use of natural resources for the best environment? The answer is that the 
Growth theory teaches us to maximize the input consumption for maximizing the 
outputs to our economy. When we can maximize outputs, we can maximize the Gross 
National Product (GNP) of our economy by the Growth theory which related to the term 
“the open economy” defined by Boulding.  
By contrast, the open economy ignores the term of outside which refers to environment. 
There are no inputs from outside and no outputs to outside in this concept. 
Consequently, this economic concept teaches us to maximize inputs and outputs for our 
economic success. In order to get economic success, we will consume high-level inputs 
for producing high-level outputs. Finally, the more usage of natural resources will lead 
to the more environmental problems as we can see from the climate change problem. 
The reason for US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol is a clear example of the Growth 
theory. President George W. Bush announced that he would not ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol “because it exempts 80% of the world, including major population centers 
such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US 
economy” (White House [140]). For another reason, Bush said that the Kyoto Protocol 
“would cause serious harm to US economy” (White House [140]). Clearly, the US view 
that the Kyoto commitments will decrease its economic outputs, so its decision on the 
Kyoto Protocol is based on the Growth theory or the concept of “the cowboy economy”. 
Inputs: 
 
Air 
Food 
Water 
 
 
 
Humans 
 
 
Outputs: 
 
Waste 
Pollution 
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It is argued that open economy inevitably leads to unsustainable consumption behavior 
because it ignores environmental costs. The open economy strongly influences human 
behaviour from the Industrial Revolution Age. People consume more natural resources 
for maximizing economic outputs. Energy and fossil fuels are one of the main input 
consumption.  Fossil fuel consumption is  the primary cause of climate change because 
the more fossil fuel consumption will create more CO2 output to environment. Finally, 
the unsustainable consumption has resulted in the climate change problems including 
heatwaves, floods, droughts, heavy rains, storms, and sea-level rise. We can conclude 
the causes of climate change by using the concept of closed economy from Figure 2.2:               
         
Figure 2.2: The causes of climate change 
 
From Figure 2.2, the climate change problem is caused by the unsustainable pattern of 
input consumption. Under the concept of closed economy, the unsustainable 
consumption will create the outputs which are the climate change problems. We may 
conclude the causes of climate change by consuming the following inputs in the 
unsustainable manner: 
 
• Land Use: When humans remove trees for agriculture, transportation, and 
housing, the land clearing will affect climate system. Trees help to reduce 
greenhouse effect by absorbing CO2. Because of the removal of trees, this will 
significantly increase the amount of CO2 in the climate system, and then this 
Inputs: 
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will lead to climate change problem. Consequently, the more humans consume 
land input, the more humans confront climate change problem.  
• Livestock: Livestock, the decomposition of animal manure, and paddy rice 
farming will significantly release methane into the atmosphere. The use of 
fertilizers for agricultural activities will also release nitrous oxide into the 
atmosphere. Both methane and nitrous oxide are main greenhouse gases which 
lead to climate change problems. Thus, more livestock activities will lead to 
more climate change problems.      
• Fossil Fuels: Currently, fossil fuels are widely used to support our lives. Fossil 
fuels include coal, oil and gas. Every day we burn large amounts of coal, oil, and 
gas for transportation, heating, cooling, manufacturing, electricity, and other 
applications. Burning these fossil fuels will also release tremendous CO2 into the 
atmosphere. The use of fossil fuels accounts for 80 to 85% of the CO2 being 
added to the atmosphere [110]. At present, we consume more and more fossil 
fuels as if there are abundant fossil fuels and we can use these fuels indefinitely. 
This unsustainable consumption makes our environment worse. Consequently, 
the more humans consume fossil fuels, the more humans confront climate 
change problem.  
• Aerosols: Aerosols are tiny particles suspended in the air. Aerosols originate 
both from natural and man-made sources. Man-made aerosol particles are 
produced in industrial areas around the world. The aerosols have been used 
widely since the end of the Second World War because of the increase in 
industrial activities. Black carbon, a major component of soot, is an aerosol that 
has a warming effect on the atmosphere by absorbing sunlight, influencing cloud 
formation and darkening snow and ice on the ground. Black carbon particles are 
produced by incomplete combustion in cars and trucks, and by forest fires and 
some industrial facilities, and are known to have a negative effect on human 
health (UNEP and WMO [128]). A recent assessment estimated that the 
warming contribution of 1 gram of black carbon could be anything from 100 to 
2000 times that of the same amount of carbon dioxide (UNEP and WMO [128]). 
Therefore, black carbon can lead to the climate change problem.       
• Cement Manufacture: The rise in cement manufacture is largely because of the 
industrial revolution. Cement-making is responsible for about 2.5% of total 
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worldwide emissions from industrial sources. CO2 is produced by the cement 
manufacturing process. Cement absorbs CO2 as it matures. Therefore high 
cement production will lead to the climate change problem. 
    
These above causes of climate change are related to the unsustainable consumption in 
the economy within a closed earth. Finally, Boulding’s literature really changes from 
old human views on environment to new human views on environment. Firstly, 
Boulding make people view that natural resources are finite and can be depleted by 
unsustainable consumption. Secondly, maximizing consumption and production is not 
the best way to economic success. Thirdly, GNP should be generated by renewable 
resources. Consequently, Boulding suggested that the economy within a closed earth the 
consumption and production should be minimized rather than maximized because the 
spaceman economy should be concerned about polluted outputs produced by economic 
activities.  
In order to solve the environmental problems, humans finally form the environmental 
cooperation at local, national, and global level. They need to create the rules and 
regulations for operating the integration body. Therefore, it is necessary to study the 
evolution of environmental integration via international organization and international 
conferences. These will be presented in the next topic.  
 
2.2 The Formation of Environmental Cooperation: From Local to Global 
 
Humans start realizing the environmental problems from small points at individual 
level, and later at local level, so they start forming environmental cooperation at local 
level for solving local environmental problem. Then, they perceive that the 
environmental problem affect the whole nation, so the local cooperation transform to 
national cooperation. In this analysis, the national cooperation is membership 
organization whose members came from within one nation, whereas, the international 
cooperation has a membership from more than one nation. We can see many national 
environmental groups which were founded in the Industrial age. The Sierra Club 
founded by John Muir and Robert Underwood Johnson is one of the obvious examples 
of the first environmental groups in Industrial age. Table 2.1 show the examples of 
other national environmental groups founded in 19th century. 
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Year Environmental Group Country 
1843 Manchester Association for the Prevention of Smoke UK 
1865 Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society  UK 
1867 East Riding Association for the Protection of Sea Birds UK 
1870 Association for the Protection of British Birds UK 
1883 American Ornithologists Union US 
1883 Natal Game Protection Association South Africa 
1886 Audubon Society US 
1889 Society for the Protection of Birds UK 
1892 Sierra Club US 
1895 National Trust UK 
1898 Coal Smoke Abatement Society UK 
 
Table 2.1: The examples of national environmental groups founded in 19th century; (source: McCormick 
[72])    
     
Most national environmental groups in 19th century were founded to protect birds (see 
Table 2.1).  When the environmental problem affected not only one country but also 
many countries, the national cooperation had not enough power to solve the 
international environmental problem. They need an international governing body to 
solve their mutual environmental problem. Consequently, the international 
environmental problem drove many nations to create the international environmental 
organization.  
The pollution of the River Rhine in Europe is a simple example of a transboundary 
environmental problem which through cooperation lead to the formation of international 
pollution controls (Maler [70]). The River Rhine is one of the longest rivers in Europe. 
It runs for over 1,300 kilometers from its source in Switzerland. The River Rhine is 
used for household, industry, and agriculture in the Rhine bordering countries. 
Bordering countries have faced the problem of water pollution associated with waste 
discharge since the Industrial Revolution. Consequently, one European nation could not 
solve the pollution of Rhine on its own. An international cooperation was the best 
solution for this case. Finally, in 1950 the Rhine bordering countries have formed the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPR) to 
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solve the Rhine pollution [94]. Therefore, this organization is the most obvious example 
of international cooperation. 
The transformation from national cooperation to international cooperation is traced back 
to the Pinchot’s idea for an international conference on the conservation of natural 
resources and P.G. Van Tienhoven’s idea for the creation of an international 
organization for the protection of nature (McCormick [72]). Pinchot’s idea and the Van 
Tienhoven’s idea strongly drove national cooperation to transform to international 
cooperation. 
P.G. Van Tienhoven is the Netherlands naturalist credited with promoting the 
international cooperation movement. His interest in international cooperation was 
inspired by the Boone & Crockett Club members whom he met in his trip to Java, 
Japan, and the United States in 1917 (Jepson and Whittaker [53]). The Boone & 
Crockett Club was founded in 1887 by President Theodore Roosevelt. This club was 
founded to promote the guardianship and provident management of big game and 
associated wildlife in North America and maintain the highest standards of fair chase 
and sportsmanship in all aspects of big game hunting. This initiative made Van 
Tienhoven consider international environmental cooperation and he played an important 
role in the formation of several international environmental organizations. In 1925, he 
founded the Netherlands Commission for International Nature Protection which aimed 
to gather data on endangered species and transmit such data to conservation 
organizations in other countries. Moreover, he founded elite nature protection 
committees in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in 1925. These committees worked 
together for international wildlife protection.      
In 1927, Van Tienhoven went to New York to encourage the Boone & Crockett Club to 
get more directly involved in international wildlife protection. Ultimately, he made the 
Boone & Crockett Club to create American Committee for International Nature 
Protection. Van Tienhoven was the founder or leader of several international 
environmental organizations which we can see in Table 2.2.            
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Year International Environmental Organization 
1914 International Consultative Commission for the Protection of Nature 
1925 The Netherlands Commission for International Nature Protection 
1925 The elite nature protection committees in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
France 
1928 International Bureau of Information and Correlation on Nature 
Conservation 
1930 American Committee for International Nature Protection (Tienhoven 
help the Boone & Crockett Club to create this organization) 
 
Table 2.2: The examples of the international environmental organization founded or lead by Van 
Tienhoven  
 
Van Tienhoven helped make people change from local thinking to global thinking. 
Furthermore he encouraged national environmental cooperation to transform to 
international environmental cooperation. 
Another key figure in the early development of the international environmental 
movement was Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot intended to make conservation policy change 
from local conservation issue to international conservation issue by using an 
international conference on the conservation of natural resources. He proposed his idea 
for international conference to Theodore Roosevelt. The key detail of international 
conference proposed by Pinchot included the creation of an international organization to 
promote resource conservation, the fair access to raw materials by all countries, and the 
writing of an inventory of natural resources and a set of principles on their conservation 
(McCormick [72]). His idea for international conference received a tepid response from 
the White House, and the project was suspended following Roosevelt’s death in April 
1945. However, his idea did not die and it was ultimately inspiration for the United 
Nations (UN) to create the UN Scientific Conference on the Conservation and 
Utilization of Resources (UNSCCUR) which was the first UN body to address natural 
resource conservation.  
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2.3  The International Conference on Global Environmental Agenda 
 
2.3.1 The UN Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources 
(UNSCCUR) 
 
The beginning of international conferences on global environmental agenda is traced 
back to the UNSCCUR which was inspired by the Pinchot’s idea. The UNSCCUR was 
organized by FAO, UNESCO, the World Health Organization, and the International 
Labour Organization. The UNSCCUR took place at Lake Success, New York, the 
United States, between 17 August and 6 September 1949. The UNSCCUR was attended 
by over 530 representatives attending from 49 countries.           
This conference was intended to provide an opportunity for experts around the world to 
exchange ideas and experience on resource conservation techniques. The major theme 
of this conference was the balance between the demand and supply of natural resources. 
At the conference, the representatives discussed global resource scarcity, the 
development of new resources, education in developing countries, and the integrated 
development of river basins. The representatives made no binding decisions, nor even 
recommendations to their governments. Although the UNSCCUR did not make any 
binding agreements, it was the first step towards global environmental policy.  
 
2.3.2 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) 
 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) was held in 
Stockholm, Sweden from 5 to 16 June 1972. The UNCHE marked a turning point in the 
development of international environmental agenda. The UNCHE was attended by the 
representatives of 113 countries, 19 inter-governmental agencies, and more than 400 
inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations. The UNCHE was a first in 4 
respects (Najam and Cleveland [76]): 
 
1. It was the first meeting which took several nations around the world to discuss 
the future of environment. 
2. It was the first UN conference on a single global issue. 
3. It was the first global meeting that saw a large presence and influence of 
nonstate actors. 
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4. It was the first meeting to seek global policy consensus on issues related to the 
environment.   
 
The UNCHE agreed that reducing human impact on the environment required 
international cooperation and should be the responsibility of all countries. The 
Declaration, the Principles, and an Action Plan are the fruitfulness of the UNCHE. 
Firstly, the UNCHE created the Declaration to act as an introduction to the Principles 
and to sketch broad goals and objectives. The Declaration can be concluded as follow: 
 
1. Man is both creature and molder of his environment, which gives him physical 
sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social, and 
spiritual growth. Both aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the man-
made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights 
the right to life itself. 
2. The protection and improvement of the human environment is the urgent desire 
of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments. 
3.  Man’s capability to transform his surroundings can bring the benefit or loss to 
peoples, but there is growing evidence of man-made loss in many regions of the 
earth. 
4. In the developing countries most of the environmental problems are caused by 
under-development. Therefore, the developing countries must direct their efforts 
to development, bearing in mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and 
improve the environment. For the same purpose, the industrialized countries 
should make efforts to reduce the gap themselves and the developing countries. 
5. The natural growth of population continuously presents the problems for the 
preservation of the environment. Therefore, adequate policies and measures 
should be adopted to face these problems. 
6. To defend and improve the human environment for present and future 
generations has become an imperative goal for mankind-a goal to be pursued 
together with, and in harmony with, the established and fundamental goals of 
peace and of worldwide economic and social development.  
7. To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of responsibility 
by citizens and communities and by enterprises and institutions at every level.     
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Moreover, the UNCHE created the 26 Principles which could be combined into the key 
conclusion as follow: 
 
1. The resources of the earth including natural resources, renewable resources, and 
non-renewable resources must be carefully treated with the following way: 
• The natural resources of the earth must be protected for the benefit of present 
and future generations.    
• Man must keep producing the renewable resources of the earth. 
• Man must carefully use the non-renewable resources of the earth with the 
concern of resource depletion and the non-renewable resources must be shared 
by all mankind.     
2. Financial and technological assistance from the industrialized countries, the 
stability of prices, and adequate earnings for primary commodities and raw 
materials are essential to environmental management in the developing 
countries. 
3. States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies, but must not endanger other states. 
4. Environmental planning must be applied to obtain maximum social, economic, 
and environmental benefits. Environmental protection should be done by: 
• Using science and technology to control environmental risks and solve 
environmental problems. 
•  Promoting education in environmental matters to broaden the concept of 
environmental protection. 
•  Promoting the national and multinational scientific research in the context of 
environmental problems. 
• Developing the international law regarding liability and compensation for the 
victims of pollution and other environmental damage. 
• Developing international cooperation through multilateral or bilateral 
arrangements or other appropriate means for controlling, preventing, reducing, 
and eliminating the environmental problems. 
   
Finally, the UNCHE developed an Action Plan which is a more comprehensive 
document consisting of 109 separate recommendations. The 109 recommendations were 
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redistributed into the three components of an Action Plan which included the global 
environmental assessment program, the environmental management activities, and the 
supporting measures. Although the global climate change isn’t a topic in this 
conference, the UNCHE can pave the way of further understanding of climate change 
by the research collaboration proposed in this conference. The UNCHE ultimately lead 
to the creation of global and regional environmental monitoring networks and the 
creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 
 
2.3.3 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
 
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was founded as a result of the 
UNCHE. The creation of the UNEP was the most tangible outcome of the UNCHE. The 
mission of UNEP is “to provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the 
environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their 
quality of life without compromising that of future generations”. 
UNEP is the designated entity of the United Nations system for addressing 
environmental issues at the global and regional level. UNEP is governed by a 
Governing Council which include 58 members elected for four-year terms by the 
General Assembly. The UNEP Governing Council is responsible for assessing the state 
of the global environment, approving the budget, and developing policy guidelines for 
the UN environmental programs. The responsibilities of UNEP and the major results of 
UNEP activities can be shown in the Table 2.3 and 2.4. 
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The Responsibilities of UNEP The Major Results of UNEP Activities 
• Promoting international cooperation in 
the field of the environment and 
recommending appropriate policies.  
• Monitoring the status of the global 
environment and gathering and 
disseminating environmental information 
• Catalyzing environmental awareness and 
action to address major environmental 
threats among governments, the private 
sector and civil society. 
• Facilitating the coordination of UN 
activities on matters concerned with the 
environment, and ensuring, through 
cooperation, liaison and participation, 
that their activities take environmental 
considerations into account. 
• Developing regional programs for 
environmental sustainability. 
• Helping, upon request, environment 
ministries and other environmental 
authorities, in particular in developing 
countries and countries with transition 
economy, to formulate and implement 
environmental policies. 
• International arrangements to 
enhance environmental protection. 
• Periodic assessments and 
scientifically sound forecasts to 
support decision making and 
international consensus on the main 
environmental threats and responses 
to them. 
• Support for more effective national 
and international responses to 
environmental threats, including 
policy advice to governments, 
multilateral organizations and 
others to strengthen environmental 
protection and incorporate 
environmental considerations into 
the sustainable process. 
• More effective coordination of 
environmental matters within the 
UN system. 
• Greater awareness and capacity for 
environmental management among 
governments, the private sector and 
civil society. 
 
Table 2.3: The responsibilities of UNEP and the major results of UNEP activities; (source: [123])     
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The Responsibilities of UNEP The Major Results of UNEP Activities 
• Providing country-level environmental 
capacity building and technology 
support. 
• Helping to develop international 
environmental law, and providing expert 
advice on the development and use of 
environmental concepts and instruments. 
• Better understanding of the nexus 
between environment and human 
security, poverty education, and 
preventing and mitigating natural 
disasters.   
 
Table 2.4: The responsibilities of UNEP and the major results of UNEP activities (Cont.); (source: [123]) 
 
UNEP has the most notable success in promoting the 1987 Montreal Protocol of the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. However, in the first 20 
years, UNEP faced four main problems which were shown as follows: (McCormick 
[72]): 
 
1. Insufficient funds to operate projects. 
2. UNEP’s management systems were based on bureaucratic approaches rather 
than on professional approaches. 
3. UNEP’s location in Nairobi made it difficult to recruit highly qualified staff. 
4. UNEP’s relations with other UN agencies were poor. 
 
UNEP started studying on the topic of climate change by implementing the Global 
Environment Monitoring System (GEMS) which is one component of the Stockholm 
Action Plan. The UNEP use GEMS to set up a network of atmospheric stations in 
remote areas. These stations are used to determine the status and trends of key 
environmental issues, including climate change. Moreover, the UNEP and the World 
Meteorological Organization collaborated to create the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. 
 
2.3.4 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from 3 to 14 June 1992. The UNCED was attended by the 
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representatives of 172 countries (108 countries sent their heads of state or government 
to attend this conference) and 2,400 representatives of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). After the UNCHE, the global environment continued to deteriorate and there 
were growing global concerns about global warming, species extinction, and threats to 
biodiversity. These problems ultimately lead to the UNCED. The principal themes of 
this conference were the environment and sustainable development. 
The primary goals of the UNCED were to come to an understanding of development 
which would support socio-economic development and prevent the degradation of the 
environment, and to provide the basis for a global partnership between the developing 
and the industrialized countries, based on mutual needs and common interests, that 
would ensure a healthy future for the planet. The UNCED created the five agreements 
to promote environmental protection and sustainable development - summarized as 
follow:  
 
I ) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The UNFCCC is the legally binding agreement which was signed by 154 countries in 
1992. The UNFCCC was intended to set the international framework for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. The UNFCCC objective is “to achieve stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Greenhouse gas 
emission reduction was aimed primarily at the industrialized countries. The UNFCCC 
successfully created a national greenhouse gas inventory which was developed to set 
strategies and policies for emission reduction and to track the progress of these policies. 
For example, the countries that are Parties to the UNFCCC must send annual 
inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks to the 
UNFCCC. The institutional body of the UNFCCC includes the Conference of the 
Parties (COP), Secretariat, Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), Subsidiary Body 
for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), and Financial Mechanism operated 
by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The COP is the main policy-making body. 
Parties meet annually at the COP to review the implementation of the Convention and 
access progress in dealing with climate change. The first meeting of COP held in Berlin 
in 1995 agreed on the need for a binding commitment even after the year 2000. Finally, 
the third COP held in Tokyo in 1997 lead to the development of the most influential 
climate change action which was the Kyoto Protocol. By the creation of the UNFCCC, 
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the UNCED evidently make the cornerstone of global cooperation to solve the climate 
change problem.        
 
II ) The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)  
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is a similarly legally binding agreement 
as the UNFCCC adopted at the UNCED. It was signed at the UNCED by 155 countries. 
However, the United States has not yet ratified the treaty because the CBD posed a 
threat to the US biotechnology industry and to American jobs. The CBD is developed to 
sustain the diversity of life on Earth. The definition of biodiversity used by the CBD is 
"the variability among living organisms from all sources, including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems, and the ecological complexes of 
which they are part: this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems". The CBD has three main goals which include the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources. The treaty used the concept of natural 
resource scarcity to set out a philosophy of sustainable use. Like the institutional body 
of the UNFCCC, the COP is the highest decision-making authority. The COP review 
progress under the Convention, set work plans for member nations, and work together 
with other international organizations and agreements. Many signatory countries have 
adopted Biodiversity Action Plans to implement the convention. For example, the 
European Community adopted the European Community Biodiversity Strategy in 1998 
to collectively implement the convention.    
 
III ) Agenda 21 
Agenda 21 is an international action plan for SD. The Agenda 21 form the basis for SD 
strategies which was taken globally, nationally, and locally by the UN, governments, 
businesses, and individuals. Agenda 21 has 40 chapters which can be divided into four 
sections: 
 
• Social and economic dimensions. This section includes developing countries, 
poverty, consumption patterns, population, health, human settlements, 
integrating environment and development. 
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• Conservation and management of resources. This section includes atmosphere, 
land, forests, deserts, mountains, agriculture, biodiversity, biotechnology, 
oceans, fresh water, toxic chemicals, hazardous radioactive and solid waste and 
sewage. 
• Strengthening the role of major groups. This section includes women, children 
and youth, indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations, local 
authorities, workers, business and industry, farmers, scientists and technologists.  
• Means of implementation. This section includes finance, technology transfer, 
science, education, capacity-building, international institutions, legal measures, 
information.  
Agenda 21 also made local communities to develop their action plan for SD which was 
known as “Local Agenda 21”. The main concept of Local Agenda 21 is that the agenda 
should be set by the community itself rather than by central or local government. It 
believes that the agenda set by the community is most likely to be successful. By 
creating Agenda 21, the UNCED successfully implement the concept of SD at global, 
national, and local level.       
IV ) The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development is a series of principle which 
define the rights of States to development, and their responsibilities to protect the 
environment. The Rio Declaration was developed by the ideas from the Stockholm 
declaration at the UNCHE. The Rio Declaration consisted of 27 principles which guided 
action on environment and development. The 27 principles focus on these following 
topics: 
 
• The rights of States to exploit their own resources and the rights of States to 
development 
• The concept of SD 
• International cooperation in the field of environment and SD 
• Promoting SD through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge 
• Encouraging public awareness and participation in environmental issues by 
making information widely available 
• Developing national and international environmental law 
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• Promoting the internationalization of environmental costs and economic 
instruments 
• The role of women, indigenous people, and local communities in environmental 
management and development   
 
V ) The Forest Principles 
The Forest Principles are the first global consensus on forests. The Forest Principles are 
the non-legally binding statement of principles for sustainable management of forests. 
These principles were adopted to apply to all types of forests, both natural and planted, 
in all geographical regions and climate zones. The objectives of the Forest Principles are 
to contribute to the management, conservation and SD of forests and to provide for their 
multiple and complementary functions and uses.  
These five agreements which include both the non-legally binding agreement and the 
legally binding agreement can bring the issues of environmental protection and SD into 
the international agenda. The UNFCCC is the most obvious outcome of the UNCED 
which can lead to the international climate change action.    
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we apply the term of “the open economy” and “the economy within a 
closed earth” defined by Boulding for explaining the causes of climate change. We find 
that the unsustainable consumption in the economy within a closed earth resulted in the 
climate change problems. The more natural inputs we consume, the more negative 
outputs we give to environment. Finally, Boulding suggested that the polluted outputs 
should be added to measure the economic success and GNP should be generated by 
renewable resources.  
This chapter continued by studying the development of international environmental 
cooperation via international environmental organizations and international 
environmental conferences. Finally, we can find that the transformation from national 
cooperation to international cooperation was inspired early the early work of Pinchot 
and Van Tienhoven. Van Tienhoven successfully formed the international 
environmental cooperation by creating national committees for nature protection in 
several countries. These branches worked together to create international environmental 
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cooperation in several countries. Thus, Tienhoven initiated international environmental 
cooperation by creating a bottom up networked organization. Pinchot is another key 
person who promoted international cooperation. He believed that an international 
conference could encourage environmental cooperation. Which approach determined 
the global environmental agenda - Tienhoven’s or Pinchot’s?  On balance the answer 
has to be Pinchot because his idea inspired a series of UN led conferences which have in 
effect set the global environmental agenda. Thus, we can conclude that the international 
conference gives birth to the global environmental agenda, particularly the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
The international conference on environmental issues can be traced back to the 
UNSCCUR. Although the UNSCCUR cannot make a binding agreement on global 
environmental issue, the UNSCCUR can make local environmental issue become global 
environmental issue by taking the experts around the world to discuss the global 
environmental problem. After, the UNSCCUR, the UNCHE made more tangible 
outcomes than the UNSCCUR because the UNCHE developed an Action Plan and 
created the UNEP. Then, the UNEP bring us closer to climate change agenda by 
implementing the Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS) and creating the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Finally, the UNCED set thet 
international climate change policy agenda by creating the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC 
was created to set the international framework for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
The UNFCC ultimately lead to the development of the most influential climate change 
action which was the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Kyoto Protocol 
 
 
The climate change problem is now inevitable and it is too late for humanity to avoid 
this problem (Stern [106]). As this problem is too large to be solved by unilateral 
national action, we need global cooperation. The principal vehicle for this cooperation is 
the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol now ratified by almost every country in the 
world. The question now becomes how this protocol is developed and is implemented.  
We will investigate these questions in this chapter. 
 
3.1 Background on the Kyoto Protocol 
 
As previously noted, the UNCED gave birth to the climate change agenda by creating 
the UNFCCC. Then, the UNFCCC create the most influential climate change action 
which is the Kyoto Protocol. The UNFCCC aims at stabilizing greenhouse gas 
concentrations for avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system. The UNFCCC was signed by 154 countries on 12 June 1992. Then, the 
UNFCCC came into force on 21 March 1994. The UNFCCC assigned different 
mitigation commitments for different signatory nations which can be divided into three 
groups: Annex I countries, Annex II countries, and Non-Annex I countries. The 
mitigation commitments under the UNFCCC are concluded as follows:   
 
• Annex I countries: 
Annex I countries consist of the industrialized countries that were members of 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992 and 
countries designated as Economies-in-Transition (the EIT countries). Annex I countries 
were assigned to adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the 
mitigation of climate change by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. In addition, 
Annex I countries were required to reduce their emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse 
gases, which are not governed by the Montreal Protocol, to 1990 levels by the year 
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2000. Annex I countries were also required to prepare annual GHG inventories and 
submit to the UNFCCC Secretariat. Moreover, they are required to submit National 
Communication reports to the COP every three years.          
 
• Annex II countries  
Annex II countries consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT countries. 
Annex II countries are required to provide financial and technological assistance to 
enable developing countries to meet the full costs of preparing GHG inventories and 
National Communication reports. Moreover, Annex II countries must help developing 
countries that are vulnerable to climate change impacts to meet the costs of adaptation.  
 
• Non-Annex I countries 
Non-Annex I countries are developing countries. Non-Annex I countries were required 
to prepare GHG inventories and national programs addressing climate change but have 
no GHG emission reduction obligations. Moreover, they are currently not allowed 
participating in the international emission trading market. 
 
The UNFCCC created the Conferences of the Parties (COP) serving as the supreme 
body of the regime. Parties meet annually at the Conferences of the Parties to review the 
implementation of the Convention and access progress in dealing with climate change. 
The COP gradually developed the climate change agenda. Ultimately, the third COP 
(COP-3) held in Tokyo in 1997 lead to the most influential climate change agenda 
known as the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
3.2 The Development of the Kyoto protocol 
 
The development of the Kyoto Protocol can be divided into three phases: the Pre-Kyoto 
era, the Mid-Kyoto era, and the Post-Kyoto era. The idea of the Kyoto Protocol was 
shaped in the Pre-Kyoto era. Later, the Mid-Kyoto era is the periods for paving the way 
for entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties take decision on the unfinished 
details of the Kyoto Protocol in the Mid-Kyoto era. After its entry into force, the parties 
continued to negotiate the second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol (2013-2017). 
Consequently, the Post-Kyoto era will focus on the negotiation on the post-2012 
framework. 
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3.2.1 The Pre-Kyoto Era (From COP-1 to COP-3) 
 
After the creation of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was gradually developed from 
COP-1 to COP-3. Although the Rio Earth Summit recommended the parties to set 
policy for taking their GHG emissions to their 1990 levels, no signatory was committed 
to meet any particular target. Therefore, the parties agreed that the commitments in the 
UNFCCC for Annex I countries were inadequate to solve the climate change problem. 
Ultimately, the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) held in Berlin in 1995 agreed on 
the need for a binding commitment even after the year 2000. COP-1 adopted the Berlin 
Mandate which was a first step to strengthening the commitments under the 
Convention. Moreover, the industrialized countries agreed to the negotiation of 
quantitative CO2 emission ceilings within specified time frames such as 2005, 2010, and 
2020. Importantly, the Berlin Mandate specified that the binding obligations to reduce 
GHG emissions were assigned to only the industrialized countries, but the developing 
countries were exempted from the binding obligations. The principle of differentiated 
responsibilities proposed by the Berlin Mandate ultimately leads to the climate change 
politics. The principle of differentiated responsibilities was grounded in shared notions 
of fairness (Harris [44]). According to Harris, there were two reasons for the exemption 
of developing countries from binding obligations. Firstly, the industrialized countries 
have been industrializing and emitting greenhouse gases for many more centuries than 
the developing countries and therefore the industrialized countries should be responsible 
for historical GHG emissions. Secondly, the industrialized countries have the greater 
capacity to act on climate change than developing countries.  
Another important result of the Berlin Mandate was the development of Joint 
Implementation (JI) Pilot Phase. The JI Pilot Phase was developed to help the 
industrialized countries to access cost-effective opportunities to reduce emissions. The 
Berlin Mandate believed that the GHG emissions could be reduced in a more cost-
efficient way through cooperation with the Central and Eastern European or developing 
countries than through taking measures in an industrialized country (Richels et al. [95]). 
Consequently, the Berlin Mandate developed JI Pilot Phase. The JI Pilot Phase was 
implemented among Annex I countries and Non-Annex I countries that take an interest 
in it. During the pilot phase, the party could not be credited with emission reductions 
achieved through pilot projects in other countries. 
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The Parties discussed more stringent commitments at the second Conference of the 
Parties held in Geneva in 1996. COP-2 stated that the parties intended to negotiate a 
legally-binding protocol or other legal instrument to be approved at the third 
Conference of the Parties (Giorgetti [34]). The United States changed its view on 
binding commitments and it took the lead in supporting a timetable of emissions 
reductions at COP-2. Moreover, COP-2 strongly accepted the scientific findings on 
climate change done by the Second Assessment Report (SAR) and the IPCC. 
Finally, the third Conference of the Parties held in Kyoto in 1997 lead to the Kyoto 
Protocol. It was attended by over 125 Ministers from several countries. Although there 
are many conflicts among the Parties at COP-3, COP-3 successfully made the Parties to 
agree on the legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gases within a specific 
time-frame. The Kyoto Protocol has the same ultimate objective as the UNFCCC, 
which is the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. More 
importantly, the Kyoto Protocol establishes the following principles: 
 
• The GHG Emission Reductions Targets for Annex I Countries 
Annex I countries have to reduce their GHG emissions to at least 5% below 1990 levels 
in the commitments period 2008-2012. This is a collective target for Annex I countries. 
This emission reduction target cover a basket of six main greenhouse gases which 
include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Moreover, the 
Protocol set different individual emission targets for each Annex I country. The 
different Annex I countries have different emissions targets as shown in Table 3.1. 
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Country Target (1990 - 2008/2012) 
Eu-15 
US 
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland 
Croatia 
New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine 
Norway 
Australia 
Iceland 
-8% 
-7% 
-6% 
-5% 
0 
+1% 
+8% 
+10% 
 
Table 3.1: The example of different individual emission targets for Annex I countries 
 
The Protocol allocates these individual emission targets by the grandfathering method. 
Under a grandfathering method, the emission targets allocated to any individual country 
are based on historic emission data. The purpose of applying a grandfathering method to 
allocate emission targets is to create incentives for large emitting countries to participate 
in the Protocol (Vesterdal and Svendsen [135]). If any Annex I country fails to meet its 
Kyoto obligation during the first commitment period, it will be penalized during the 
second commitment period by having to make up 1.3 times of the excess amount of 
greenhouse gases they have emitted during first period. 
Considering the emission target for the European Union (EU), the EU has not 
negotiated an individual target for each member state under the protocol, but the EU has 
decided to negotiate a target for its overall reduction target and then has redistributed 
this target among its member states through a burden-sharing agreement (Pittock [92]). 
The burden-sharing agreement is developed from the Triptych Approach which studied 
the GHG emissions of each member state and the method for setting individual 
emission targets of member states. The Triptych approach distinguished three emission 
sectors including the power sector, the sector of energy-intensive industries and the 
'domestic' sectors (residential and transport emissions). The Triptych Approach suggests 
that the national circumstances which include population size and growth, standard of 
living, economic structure, energy efficiency in power generation, and climate should be 
taken into account in the settlement of individual emission targets (Marklund and 
Samakovlis [71]). The Triptych Approach help member states to reach agreement on the 
initial EU burden-sharing agreement in the March 1997 Environment Council Meeting 
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by providing a technical justification for differentiating targets between member states. 
In the March 1997 Environment Council Meeting, The environment ministers also 
agreed to reduce three greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O) emissions by 15% less 
than 1990 levels by 2010.  However, the initial EU burden-sharing agreement had to be 
redistributed because of the results of the third COP. In the third COP, the scope of 
GHG gases was expanded from the three gases proposed by the EU to six gases. 
Consequently, the EU reduction target was changed to a target of 8% reduction below 
1990 levels by 2008 to 2012. The initial EU burden-sharing agreement also had to be 
adapted to a target of 8% reduction. The final EU burden-sharing agreement was 
reaffirmed by joint ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on May 31, 2002. The initial and 
final EU burden-sharing agreements are given in Table 3.2. 
 
Country Member state targets under 
the initial EU burden-sharing 
agreement (%) 
Member state targets under 
the final EU burden-sharing 
agreement (%) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands  
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
-25 
-10 
-25 
0 
0 
-25 
+30 
+15 
-7 
-30 
-10 
+40 
+17 
+5 
-10 
-13 
-7.5 
-21 
0 
0 
-21 
+25 
+13 
-6.5 
-28 
-6 
+27 
+15 
+4 
-12.5 
 
Table 3.2: The initial and final EU burden-sharing agreements; (source: Lefevre [66]) 
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The different member states have different emission targets which span from a 28% 
reduction to a 27% increase. Under the final burden-sharing agreement, Germany and 
Denmark have to reduce their emissions by 21%, whereas Portugal is allowed to 
increase its emissions by 27%.  
Besides the EU burden-sharing agreement, the member states have their own climate 
change policies. The UK has a strong climate change policy which aims to reduce CO2 
emissions by 20% on 1990 levels by 2010 and by 80% on 2000 levels by 2050. 
Moreover, France has national objective for 25% reduction from 1990 levels of GHG 
gases by 2020. Germany and Italy have their national objectives to increase share of 
electricity from renewable sources. Germany set an objective to increase share of 
electricity from renewable sources to 20% by 2020, whereas Italy set a 20% increase by 
2010 (Stern [106]). More recently, in 2007 EU leaders endorsed an integrated approach 
to climate and energy policy and committed to transforming Europe into a highly 
energy-efficient, low carbon economy. They made a unilateral commitment that Europe 
would cut its emissions by at least 20% of 1990 levels by 2020 (Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change [91]).  
 
• The Kyoto Mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol establishes the Kyoto Mechanisms to help Annex I countries to 
reduce the costs of meeting their emission targets. The Kyoto Mechanisms are divided 
into three mechanisms: Emissions Trading (ET), Joint Implementation (JI), and Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). The details of these mechanisms will be described in 
the next topic. 
 
• The Eligibility Requirements for Entering the Protocol into Force 
The Kyoto Protocol can enter into force when it meets all the eligibility requirements. 
These eligibility requirements are: 
(i) It must be ratified by more than 55 member countries, and 
(ii) It must be ratified by Annex I countries which accounted for at least 55 
percent of total carbon dioxide emissions in 1990     
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The ratification by Russia on 18 November 2004 represented 61.6 percent of total 
carbon dioxide emissions in 1990, so this ratification brought the Protocol into force. 
The Kyoto Protocol came into force on 16 February 2005. 
Although COP-3 successfully created the Kyoto Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol is not 
absolutely perfect. In COP-3, the Parties did not discuss how the Parties could meet 
their Kyoto obligation during the first commitment period. Moreover, many business 
representatives complained that these reductions under the Protocol were not 
economically feasible. Consequently, the parties have continued to discuss the Protocol. 
COP-3 left three serious issues which need to be solved quickly by the Parties. These 
three serious issues are concluded as follows: 
 
(i) Hot air trading: The Kyoto Protocol set limits on GHG emissions for the 
commitments period 2008-2012 and the limits of several countries exceed their 
actual emissions. These countries have excess emission rights which are called 
“hot air” and they can sell their hot air to other Annex I countries which search 
for low-cost emissions targets. The bulk of tradable hot air largely comes from 
Russia and other countries in transition to a market economy. By hot air trading, 
Annex I countries could get credits without taking any actions to reduce their 
GHG emissions. Thus, these trades would not lead to actual emission reductions 
from the baseline (Vrolijk [137]). 
(ii) The method for assessing sinks: The sinks refer to a carbon dioxide reservoir on 
earth. Forests are one of the main natural sinks because they absorb the carbon 
dioxide from the air as they grow. Consequently, the Kyoto Protocol allows 
countries that have large areas of forest to deduct a certain amount from their 
emissions. However, there is no consensus on the best method for assessing 
sinks in the Kyoto Protocol. 
(iii)A basket of main greenhouse gases: There were many arguments against a 
basket of main greenhouse gases applied to the Kyoto targets (Toth et al. [119]). 
A basket of main greenhouse gases defined in the Protocol include six 
greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6), but some countries 
preferred to cover only three greenhouse gases including CO2, CH4, and N2O 
rather than cover all six greenhouse gases. Thus, the Parties continued to discuss 
whether the Kyoto targets should include CO2, CH4, and N2O or just only CO2, 
CH4, N2O.              
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Although the Kyoto Protocol leave many unresolved issues, the Kyoto Protocol is 
considered to be the most far-reaching agreement on environment and SD ever adopted 
because it has been ratified by almost every country around the world. As of November 
2007, a total of 175 countries and other governmental entities have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
3.2.2 The Mid-Kyoto era (From COP-4 to COP-10) 
 
 
After COP-3, there were many unresolved issues that the Parties continued to discuss. 
In COP-4 held in Buenos Aires (2-13 November 1998), the Parties expected to get 
achievement in the resolution of all issues unresolved in COP-3. Unfortunately, it was 
too difficult to find agreement, and they could still not terminate all unresolved issues.. 
However, COP-4 created the Buenos Aires Plan of Action which aimed to resolve the 
outstanding issues, particularly the rules and guidelines for the Kyoto Mechanisms, by 
the end of 2000, at COP-6. Later, the parties still could not make a decision on the 
unfinished details of the Kyoto Protocol at COP-5. COP-6 was split into two meetings. 
COP-6 was firstly held in the Hague, Netherlands. The goal of COP-6 was to reach 
agreement on all the unfinished details of Kyoto Protocol. The first meeting held in the 
Hague was unable to reach agreement because of a dispute between the European Union 
and a group including the United States, Japan, Russia, and Canada over the terms for 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Following this meeting, the United States rejected the 
Protocol in March 2001. President George W. Bush announced that he would not ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol “because it exempts 80% of the world, including major population 
centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the 
US economy” (White House [140]). After its rejection of the Protocol, the US 
government was pressured by other member countries which had ratified the Protocol 
because the effect of international climate treaty would be limited without the 
participation by the US which was the largest single emitter of carbon dioxide from the 
burning of fossil fuels as of 2005. 
The second meeting of COP-6 was held in Bonn, Germany. The United States only 
accepted observer status at this meeting because of its rejection of Kyoto. The meeting 
successfully culminated in the Bonn Agreements. These key issues resolved by the 
Bonn Agreements were: 
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I. The use of carbon sinks: The Protocol allows developed countries to receive 
credit for activities that absorb carbon from atmosphere or store it. These 
eligible activities include revegetation and the management of forests, croplands 
and grazing lands. 
II. The Kyoto Mechanisms: The Protocol allows the developed countries to receive 
credit through the ET, JI, and CDM. The eligible projects qualified as CDM 
projects are energy efficiency, renewable energy, and forest sink projects. 
Importantly, there is no quantitative limit on the credit which the developed 
countries can claim from the use of these mechanisms. (See 3.3 for more detail)  
III. The Compliance: At the second part of COP-6, the Parties discussed compliance 
mechanisms for the Protocol which focused on the functions of the compliance 
bodies and the penalties for noncompliance. Ultimately, the Parties agreed that a 
compliance committee should be established. Moreover, the Parties set the 
penalty on Parties that fail to meet their emissions targets. These Parties would 
be penalized during the second commitment period by having to make up 1.3 
times of the excess amount of greenhouse gases they have emitted during first 
period. In addition, these Parties were suspended from selling credits under 
emissions trading until they return to compliance.  
IV. Financing: The developed countries agreed to provide financial resources to 
developing countries to help them to limit the growth in their emissions and 
adapt to climate change impacts. Consequently, the Parties created three new 
funds to help developing countries. These three new funds are:                      
• A special climate change fund: This fund was established to finance projects 
relating to adaptation, technology transfer and capacity building, energy, 
transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management, and 
economic diversification. 
• A least developed country fund: This fund was established to support 
National Adaptation Programs of Action in Least Developed Country Parties 
(LDCs).   
• A Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund: This fund was established to finance 
concrete adaptation projects and programs in developing countries which 
were Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.     
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The Bonn Agreements were hugely important because the Agreements covered all 
unresolved issues. However, the Agreements created only the draft decision on all 
unresolved issues. The draft decision remained to be ratified and converted into legal 
texts. Therefore, the Parties need the COP-7 to complete these remaining tasks. The 
Bonn Agreements can pave the way for completing the Buenos Aires Plan of Action at 
COP-7 by making the draft decision on all unresolved issues.          
COP-7 was held in Marrakech, Morocco from 29 October to 10 November 2001. COP-
7 could complete the work of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. The complete decisions 
were known as the Marrakech Accords. COP-7 easily translated the draft decision 
created by the second part of COP-6 into legal texts. Thus, COP-7 could finalize all 
unresolved issues of the Kyoto Protocol. The COP-7 is the fulfillment of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Ultimately, the COP-7 successfully paves the way for entry into force of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol came into force on 16 February 2005 
 
3.2.3 The Post-Kyoto era (From COP-11 to COP-15) 
 
After its entry into force, the parties start negotiating on a new round of emission 
reduction targets for the second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol (2013-2017). 
The Post-Kyoto era focus on the negotiation on the post-2012 framework. A process to 
consider further commitments by Annex I Parties for the post-2012 period must be 
initiated, in accordance with Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol. Article 3.9 state that 
“Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be 
established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the 
consideration of such commitments at least seven years before the end of the first 
commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above.” Consequently, the Parties start 
negotiating on the second commitment at COP-11 held in Montreal, Canada from 28 
November to 9 December 2005. In COP-11, the United States still opposed to new 
process under the Kyoto Protocol. However, the United States was left isolated on COP-
11. Importantly, the Parties agreed to extend the treaty on emission reduction targets 
beyond its 2012 deadline. One of the important goals of COP-11 was to initiate a 
process to consider a second round of emission reduction target for the second 
commitment. This process set at COP-11 is responsible for ensuring that there is no gap 
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between the end of the first commitment period (2008-2012) and the start of the second 
commitment period (2013-2017). Ultimately, COP-11 established the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG) which was 
responsible for the discussion on the second commitment. However, COP-11 did not set 
the deadline for completing the negotiation on the second commitment. Another key 
outcome of COP-11 was the strengthening of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). COP-11 strengthened the CDM by enabling developed countries to invest in 
SD projects in developing countries. 
Later, COP-13 was attended by more than 10,000 delegates at Bali, Indonesia from 3 
December 2007 to 15 December 2007. COP-13 was intended to pave the way to the 
second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol.  The primary goal of COP-13 was to set 
the timetable for completing the negotiation on the second commitment. COP-13 
established the Bali Roadmap which developed the process to work on the key building 
blocks of a future climate change regime, including adaptation, mitigation, 
technological cooperation, and financing the response to climate change. The Bali 
Roadmap comprised several important elements. The Bali Action Plan recognized that 
“deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate objective of the 
Convention and emphasizing the urgency to address climate change as indicated in the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.” The 
Bali Action Plan provided a two-year process to finalize a binding agreement in 2009. It 
also set timetable for AWG negotiations. Under the Bali Action Plan, AWG must 
complete its work in 2009 and present the outcome of its work to COP-15. In COP-13, 
EU countries wanted to contain a commitment that industrialized nations will cut their 
emissions by 25-40% compared to 1990 levels by 2020 in the Bali Roadmap, but no 
specific emission reduction targets were included in the Bali Roadmap. Another 
fruitfulness of COP-13 is the development of Adaptation Fund which is used to provide 
funding to the developing countries to help them adapt to the effects of climate change. 
COP-14 took place on 1-12 December 2008 in Poznan, Poland. This conference 
represents the midpoint between Bali (COP-13) and Copenhagen (COP-15). COP-14 
made little progress. The clear achievement of conference was the authorization for 
the Adaptation Fund to begin operations in 2009. This fund comes from a 2% levy on 
carbon trading under the CDM. 
Most recently, COP-15, widely known as the Copenhagen Summit, was held at 
the Bella Center in Copenhagen, Denmark, between 7 and 18 December 2009. The goal 
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of COP-15 is to establish a legally binding agreement for the period from 2012 when 
the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires. Despite widely held 
expectations that COP-15 would produce a legally binding agreement, the conference 
was ultimately unsuccessful in reaching an agreement for the post Kyoto period. 
However, the main outcome of COP-15 was a political agreement known as “the 
Copenhagen Accord”. The Accord was drafted by the US, China, Brazil, India, and 
South Africa. The Copenhagen Accord recognized that climate change is one of the 
greatest challenges of the present day and that actions should be taken to keep any 
temperature increases to below 2°C (UNFCCC [131]). However, this is not legally 
binding and does not contain any legally binding commitments for reducing 
CO2 emissions. Moreover, the Accord agreed to raise $30 billion from 2010 to 2012, to 
help the developing nations adapt to climate change. Finally, it can be clearly seen that 
there was little prospect of reaching final agreement on a post-Kyoto agreement at the 
COP15 meeting.  
 
3.3 The Kyoto Mechanisms 
 
The Kyoto Mechanisms are designed under the concept that GHG emission reductions 
taking place anywhere in the world will have the same environmental effects. The 
Global GHG emission mitigation will be less expensive overall if the actual emission 
reductions are implemented at the regions that have the lowest mitigation costs 
(Pasoyan [89]). The costs of reducing GHG emissions vary across countries. Annex I 
countries tend to have higher mitigation costs than developing countries. If Annex I 
countries implement their GHG emission reduction projects in their own countries, they 
would face high costs, relative to projects making equivalent reductions in developing 
countries. Consequently, Kyoto Mechanisms enable Annex I countries to access cost-
effective opportunities to reduce emissions, or to remove carbon from the atmosphere, 
in other countries. The purposes of Kyoto Mechanisms are to reduce the cost incurred 
by Annex I countries in meeting their targets and to encourage Non-Annex I countries 
to reduce GHG emissions. There are three Kyoto Mechanisms: (i) Emissions Trading 
(ET); (ii) Joint Implementation (JI); and (iii) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Without the Kyoto Mechanisms, the Parties would not have been able to reach 
agreement at COP-6. Compared with carbon taxes, the Kyoto Mechanisms are seen as a 
more effective approach. For example, if the environmental regulator uses carbon taxes 
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to penalize the polluters, some polluters may find it easier to pay carbon taxes rather 
than reduce emissions. Consequently, the carbon taxes cannot guarantee a 
predetermined carbon reduction. Annex I countries must meet the following eligibility 
requirements for participating in the Kyoto Mechanisms.   
 
• They must have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
• They must have calculated and recorded their assigned amount. 
• They must have in place a national system for estimation of greenhouse gas 
emission and removals of greenhouse gases within their territory. 
• They must have in place a national registry. 
• They must annually report information on emissions and removals of 
greenhouse gases 
 
3.3.1 Emission Trading (ET) 
 
Emission Trading is defined in Article 17, Article 3.10, and Article 3.11 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. These Articles state that: 
 
Article 17: 
“The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules 
and guidelines, in particular of verification, reporting and accountability for emissions 
trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the 
purpose of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under that Article”  
 
Article 3.10: 
“Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party 
acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 
17 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party”   
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Article 3.11: 
“Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party 
transfers to another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 
shall be subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring Party” 
 
ET allows Annex I countries to buy and sell excess emissions allowances among 
themselves to meet their emission reduction targets. The concept of emission trading is 
simple. The Protocol set a total amount of allowable emissions which are called “the 
cap” for all Annex I countries. The Protocol also allocates portions of emissions 
allowances over a given period to each of Annex I countries. The emissions allowance 
for each Annex I country has been widely known as “an assigned amount” or “a 
national cap”. A national cap represents the right of Annex I country to emit a specific 
amount. The actual emission of each Annex I country is not allowed to exceed its 
national cap. If Annex I country emit above its national cap, this country must buy 
additional emission allowance. The cost of buying emission allowance represents a 
charge for emitting over the target. On the other hand, if an Annex I country emits 
below its national cap, this country can sell surplus emission allowance. The revenue of 
selling emission allowance represents a reward from having reduced emissions. The 
emission allowances can be traded through international carbon credit market. The 
countries with low abatement costs will choose to reduce their emissions below their 
national cap and sell their excess emission allowances, whereas countries with high 
abatement costs will choose to buy emission allowances. Therefore, ET can bring the 
lowest emission reduction cost to society. We can see how ET can bring the lowest 
emission reduction cost to society from following simple example. 
We assume that there are two Annex I countries in the world: Country A, and Country 
B. Country A emits 500 tons of CO2 each year, and Country B emits 400 tons of CO2 
each year. Thus, there is an annual total of 900 tons of CO2 in the world. The 
environmental regulator set a 10 percent reduction for the world. This setting forces the 
world to reduce its emissions to 810 tons per year. By this setting, both countries must 
reduce their emissions by 10 percent. Country A must reduce its emissions to 450 tons 
per year, whereas Country B must reduce its emissions to 360 tons per year. Country A 
can reduce its emission at a cost of $20 per ton and Country B can reduce its emission at 
a cost of $40. Without emission trading, Country A must reduce 50 tons per year with a 
cost of $20 per ton and Country B must reduce 40 tons per year with a cost of $40 per 
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ton. Thus, the world’s total emission reduction cost is $2,600. By emission trading, 
Country B will choose to buy an allowance of 40 tons of CO2 from Country A because 
Country B has higher reduction cost than Country A. Country A will reduce 90 tons of 
CO2 with a cost of $20 per ton and sell 40 tons of CO2 to Country B. Thus, the world’s 
total emission reduction cost is $1,800. Finally, ET helps the society to save $800 on 
emission reduction cost 
 
3.3.2 Joint Implementation (JI) 
 
Joint implementation is defined in Article 6, Article 3.10, and Article 3.11 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Article 6 states that “any Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire 
from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at 
reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by 
sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy”. 
In other words, under Article 6, JI allows Annex I countries to undertake an emission-
reducing project in another Annex I countries where they cost less than at home. The 
investing country will receive emission credits equal to the amount of emissions that 
were reduced as a result of JI project, and then apply these credits for its reductions 
towards its commitment goal. The emission credits generated from JI projects are called 
“Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)” and are issued by the host country. For example, if 
a UK company invests in an emission-reducing project in Japan, then the emission 
credits generated from JI project must be allocated to a UK company. Consequently, JI 
is the project-based mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. JI was developed from the AIJ 
pilot phase. AIJ was developed to serve as a learning-by-doing mechanism for 
investments. The AIJ project focused on the countries in transition to a market economy 
and the developing countries that lacked experience so far.   
Emission reductions are measured from a JI project baseline representing the emissions 
that would occur in the absence of the JI project. The difference between the actual 
emission level of JI project and the project baseline is awarded ERUs. The investing 
country can use ERUs to meet its own Kyoto target. These emission reductions can be 
claimed for the first commitment period (2008-2012). A project baseline is very 
important for claiming emission reductions units. If the project baseline is too tough, the 
investing organizations may be discouraged, but if the project baseline is too mild, the 
Kyoto target may not be met (OECD [81]). 
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There are two procedures for JI project. These are called Track 1 and Track 2.  
 
I ) Track 1: Track 1 will be applied when the host Party fully meets all the 
eligibility requirements under the Kyoto Protocol. These eligibility requirements 
are: 
• They must be Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
• They must have a national system for identification of GHG emissions from 
sources and storage using sinks. 
• They must have a computerized national registry compliant with the 
international requirements. 
• They must have submitted a report for determining their initial assigned 
amounts. 
• They must annually submit a current inventory protocol fully compliant with 
Kyoto requirements.   
Under track 1, the host Party uses its own approaches for setting JI project 
baselines. Moreover, the host Party uses its own processes to verify reduction in 
anthropogenic emissions and issue the appropriate quantity of ERUs. The host 
Party transfers the agreed amount of ERUs through the system of national 
registry.     
 
II ) Track 2: Track 2 will be applied when the host Party does not meet all the 
eligibility requirements which are set for track 1, but meet all these minimum 
requirements: 
• They must be Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
• They must have a computerized national registry compliant with the 
international requirements. 
• They must have submitted a report for determining their initial assigned 
amounts. 
Under track 2, the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC) set 
international rules and procedures for baselines, verification of emission 
reductions, and other procedures. JI track 2 procedures are similar to CDM 
procedures.  
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3.3.3 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
 
The clean development mechanism allows Annex I countries to invest in emission 
reduction projects in developing countries (Non-Annex I countries) which is called 
“host countries”. The investing country will get emission credits which are called 
“Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)” and can directly use CERs to meet its own 
Kyoto target or can sell CERs in the emission trading market. CDM projects have twin 
objectives. Firstly, to assist Non-Annex I countries achieve SD. Secondly, to assist 
Annex I countries achieve their emission reduction targets in a cost effective way. 
Similar to JI, the types of project which can be implemented under the CDM project are  
renewable energy, energy efficiency improvement, fuel switching, transport, 
afforestation/reforestations, and methane capture and reuse from coal mines, landfills 
and industrial wastewater. The details of CDM framework will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
  
3.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter studies the development of the Kyoto Protocol which is divided into three 
phases: the Pre-Kyoto era, the Mid-Kyoto era, and the Post-Kyoto era. Although the 
Protocol came into force and an emission reduction targets for the first commitment 
period is implemented, the Parties have continued to negotiate on many issues of the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, not all COP are successful in reaching the resolution of these 
issues. The highlight COP and its outcomes are concluded in Table 3.3 
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Event Year Location Key Outcomes 
COP-1 1995 Berlin, 
Germany 
The Berlin mandate: 
• Assigning the binding obligations to reduce 
GHG emissions to only the industrialized 
countries 
• The development of JI Pilot Phase 
COP-3 1997 Kyoto, Japan • The GHG emission reductions targets 
(Annex I countries have to reduce their 
GHG emissions to at least 5% below 1990 
levels in the commitments period 2008-
2012) 
• The development of the Kyoto Mechanisms 
COP-6 2001 Bonn, Germany The Bonn Agreements: 
• The developed countries receive carbon 
credits through the Kyoto Mechanisms 
• Setting the penalty on Parties that fail to 
meet their emission targets 
• Developing the funds to help the developing 
countries adapt to the effects of climate 
change 
COP-11 2005 Montreal, 
Canada 
An agreement to extend the treaty on emission 
reduction targets beyond its 2012 deadline 
COP-13 2007 Bali, Indonesia The development of Adaptation Fund 
COP-15 2009 Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
The Copenhagen Accord which propose to 
keep the global temperature increase below 
2°C (not legally binding commitments) 
 
Table 3.3: The highlight COP and its outcomes 
 
In every era of the Kyoto negotiation, the most contentious issue has been the 
exemption of developing countries from the binding obligations of the Protocol. This 
issue was a key reason for the United States to deny the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The argument in favour of exempting developing countries from binding 
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obligations is based on the principle of fairness. By the principle of fairness, developed 
countries have emitted the majority of GHG emissions historically and the developing 
countries get more severe impacts from climate change than the developed countries, so 
the developed countries should be responsible for historical GHG emissions.  
The grandfathering method applied to allocate emission permits is another problem of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Under a grandfathering method member countries are given 
emission permits based on historical emission data. If a member country emits below its 
permits, this country can sell the surplus for generating revenue. On the other hand, if a 
member country emit above its permits, this country must buy the extra permits. The 
point of applying a grandfathered system is to create incentives for large emitting 
countries to participate in the Protocol (Vesterdal and Svendsen [135]). However, the 
grandfathering method has many disadvantages which include high transaction cost, 
lack of effectiveness through the update of the historical reference period, and barriers 
to entry for firms into a market.  Consequently, the Parties try to find new method for 
allocating emission permits in the second commitment period. 
Annex I countries face higher abatement costs than developing countries. Consequently, 
the Kyoto Protocol design the Kyoto Mechanisms to help Annex I countries meet their 
emission reduction targets at least cost. The Kyoto Mechanisms include ET, JI, and 
CDM. However, these mechanisms are not absolutely perfect. JI and the CDM have 
higher transaction costs than ET because JI and the CDM are project-based mechanisms 
of which the transaction costs will associate with each project. JI and the CDM are 
limited to reduce emissions in certain sectors such as energy, transport, agriculture, etc., 
whereas ET can reduce emissions in every sector. Therefore, ET can reduce emission in 
a wide range of sectors. Finally, the abatement costs will be optimal only in ET (Grazzi 
[39]). Compared with JI, CDM is more cost efficient than JI because the CDM is 
applied in developing country where has lower abatement costs than industrialized 
country.  
It is very hard to predict the future of the Kyoto Protocol. The future of negotiation 
continues to depend mostly on the Protocol's exemption of developing countries.    
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Chapter 4 
  
The CDM Regulatory Framework 
 
 
The Kyoto Protocol incorporates three flexibility mechanisms underpinned by the 
principle that GHG emission reductions anywhere in the world have the same 
environmental benefits. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of these 
three mechanisms which allows Annex I countries to invest in emission reduction 
projects in developing countries. As previously noted, CDM projects themselves have 
twin objectives: (1) to assist Non-Annex I countries achieve Sustainable Development 
(SD); and (2) to assist Annex I countries achieve their emission reduction targets in a 
cost effective way. This chapter continues to investigate the implementation of CDM 
projects. Consequently, the objectives of this chapter are: (1) to examine the CDM 
governance and regulations; and (2) to examine the key aspect of the CDM project 
including baseline, additionality, and crediting period. 
 
4.1 Background on the Clean Development Mechanism 
 
Clean development mechanism is defined in Article 12 and Article 3.12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. These Articles state that: 
 
Article 12 (Paragraph 2 and 3): 
 “2.The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not 
included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in 
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3.”  
“3.Under the clean development mechanism: 
Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities resulting in certified 
emission reductions; and 
Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions accruing from 
such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission 
 51
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, as determined by the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.”   
 
Article 3 (Paragraph 12): 
“Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount for 
the acquiring Party.” 
 
In other words, under Article 12.3, the clean development mechanism allows Annex I 
countries to invest in emission reduction projects in developing countries (Non-Annex I 
countries) which is called “host countries”. The investing country will get emission 
credits which are called “Certified Emission Reductions” (CERs) and can directly use 
CERs to meet its own Kyoto target or can sell CERs in the emission trading market. For 
example, if a UK company invests in an emission-reducing project in India, then CERs 
generated from CDM project must be allocated to a UK company. Like JI, the CDM is 
the project-based mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. Certified Emission Reduction is 
calculated by comparing the actual emission level of CDM project with the emission 
level of a hypothetical baseline scenario (see Figure 4.1). Currently, each CER is 
equivalent to one tonne of CO2e. An illustration of CDM project is given in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Illustration of CDM project 
 CERs CERs 
invest in CDM 
project 
Non-Annex I 
(Host Country) 
Annex I 
Country get emission 
credits 
from CDM project 
Project 
Scenario 
Baseline 
Scenario 
The difference 
between baseline 
scenario and 
project scenario 
 52
4.2 Institutional Framework of Clean Development Mechanism 
 
CDM projects must be approved by the institutional framework of CDM. Moreover, the 
institutional framework of CDM project within a country is an important factor for 
investment decision making in CDM project (Ellis and Kamel [23]). The institution 
structure of the CDM has several bodies: 
 
4.2.1  The Conferences of the Parties (COP) 
 
The Conferences of the Parties (COP) is the supreme body of the Convention and it is 
the highest decision-making authority. The COP consists of 10 members comprising: 
the President, Vice-Presidents, the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies and the Rapporteur. 
The COP has authority over and provides guidance to the CDM. Moreover, the COP 
reviews the regional and sub-regional distribution of designated operational entities 
(DOE), CDM project activities, and annual reports of the CDM Executive Board (EB). 
   
4.2.2 The CDM Executive Board (EB) 
 
The CDM Executive Board (EB) is appointed by the COP. The EB comprise 10 
members including: one member from each of the five United Nations regional groups, 
two other members from the Parties included in Annex I, two other members from the 
Parties not included in Annex I, and one representative of the small island developing 
States. The CDM EB elects its own chair and vice-chair. The CDM EB supervises the 
CDM, under the authority and guidance of the COP. The CDM EB is also responsible 
for the registration of CDM projects and for the issuance of CERs. 
 
4.2.3   Designated National Authority (DNA) 
 
Designated National Authority (DNA) is appointed by the government of the Parties to 
UNFCCC. The DNA is responsible for undertaking the review and approval of CDM 
projects. The DNA of the host country must give the definition of SD criteria to CDM 
projects and confirm that the CDM project can promote the SD in the host country 
under the criteria used by the DNA of the host country.       
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4.2.4   Designated Operational Entity (DOE) 
 
Designated Operational Entity (DOE) is either a domestic legal entity or an international 
organization accredited and designated, on a provisional basis until confirmed by the 
COP, by the CDM EB. The DOE validates and subsequently requests registration of a 
proposed CDM project activity; verifies emission reduction of a registered CDM project 
activity; and certifies as appropriate and requests the CDM EB to issue CERs 
accordingly. 
 
4.2.5 Stakeholders 
 
Stakeholders are invited for comments and reviews in the design phase and the 
validation phase of the CDM project. The project stakeholders are the individuals, 
groups and communities who are affected by projects such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), local residents, and employees. In the design phase of the CDM 
project, the stakeholder participation focuses on the impacts of the CDM project and the 
project’s contribution to SD. In the validation phase of the CDM project, stakeholders 
comment on whether the project qualifies as a CDM project. 
 
4.3 The CDM Project Cycle 
 
The CDM project cycle is the series of project activity for implementing a CDM project 
and finally getting CERs from project. All bodies of the institution structure of the 
CDM will participate in the CDM project cycle. The CDM project cycle can be divided 
into 7 major stages which can be shown in the flow chart below (Figure 4.2). Each stage 
will be then described in more detail. 
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Figure 4.2: The CDM project cycle 
 
Stage 1: Project identification 
During the first stage, the project developer will identify a project activity and examine 
whether the project is eligible under the CDM. Moreover, many project developers 
search for potential buyers of CERs in this stage. The project developer will also 
develop a Project Idea Note (PIN) which provides a summary of project description to 
the potential buyers. The PIN will provide primary information on: type and size of 
project, the location of project, a first estimate of GHG emission reductions, crediting 
life time, the anticipated financing plan, the anticipated CERs price, and socioeconomic 
and environmental benefits of project. The PIN will help the project developer to 
1. Project Identification 
2. The Project Design Document 
3. Host Country Approval 
4. Validation 
5. Registration 
6. Implementation and monitoring 
7. Verification, certification and 
issuance of credits 
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inexpensively get market feedback without engaging the entire CDM process. The 
feedback will represent whether or not the project is of interest to potential buyers.     
 
Stage 2: The Project Design Document (PDD)  
In this stage, the project developer will develop the PDD which provide comprehensive 
and accurate information on the CDM project. The project developer must submit the 
complete PDD to the host country for project approval. The PDD is a key document 
which will take the CDM project into the approval, the validation, the registration, and 
the verification. The objectives of the PDD are to demonstrate the GHG emission 
reductions from project activity and to demonstrate the host country’s SD resulted from 
the CDM project. The common components of the PDD include: 
 
• A general project description 
• Baselines methodology 
• Assessment of additionality 
• SD benefits 
• A crediting period 
• Monitoring methodology and plan 
• Calculation of GHG emissions by sources 
• Assessment of environmental impacts 
• Stakeholder comments 
 
Stage 3: Host Country Approval 
The CDM project must be obtained written approval from the DNA of the host country 
for the registration by the CDM EB. The DNA will examine whether the CDM project 
will provide the host country with SD and examine whether the CDM project can help 
the host country to reduce GHG emissions. However, different countries use the 
different SD criteria for evaluating the CDM project because there is still no clear 
definition of the SD in the Kyoto Protocol. The DNA of the host country is responsible 
for giving the definition of SD criteria to CDM projects and confirming that the CDM 
project can promote the SD to the host country. Consequently, the project developer 
must consider the SD criteria defined by the host country and then follow this guideline 
for developing the CDM project. The issue of SD will be discussed in the next topic. An 
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official letter of approval from the DNA will ultimately represent as an evidence of host 
country acceptance.  
 
Stage 4: Validation 
The DOE is responsible for validation process. The project developer must submit the 
PDD and an official letter of host country approval to the DOE for validation. This 
stage will provide assurance that the CDM project comply with all CDM and host 
country requirement. The DOE will evaluate all relevant documents for the CDM 
project activity against the requirements for the CDM project. The DOE will examine 
the following key issues in the validation process: 
 
• Stakeholders are invited to comment on the CDM project, and then stakeholder 
comments are summarized and reviewed. 
• Environmental impact analysis is performed according to the requirements of 
host country. 
• The baseline and monitoring methodologies applied by the CDM project are 
accurate and reasonable. 
• The project activity is in accordance with all other requirements by the 
UNFCCC, the CDM EB, and host country. 
 
Ultimately, the DOE will decide whether the CDM project can be validated. After the 
DOE review and approve the project documents for validation, the DOE will prepare a 
validation report. Then the DOE must submit a validation report together with the PDD, 
an official letter of host country approval, and a request for project registration to the 
CDM EB.   
 
Stage 5: Registration 
This stage is the process of formal acceptance of the validated CDM project. The CDM 
EB is responsible for registration process. The project developer is required to pay the 
registration fee to the CDM EB. Once all documents are sent to the CDM EB by the 
DOE, the CDM EB will put a validation report and the PDD on the UNFCCC website 
for 30 days and collect comments from the general public on these documents. The 
CDM EB will examine whether a validation report is accurate. The registration with the 
 57
CDM EB must be final after a maximum of eight weeks after validation and the 
submission of the project to the CDM EB. Besides the mandatory registration with the 
CDM EB, some host countries may also require the CDM project to be registered with 
host country.       
 
Stage 6: Implementation and monitoring 
After the CDM project is registered, the CDM project can be implemented. In this stage, 
the project developer must monitor and record technical project performance which 
includes GHG emissions from project activity, environmental impacts, and leakage 
effects of the project. The project developer must submit the monitoring report to the 
DOE for verification. Finally, the GHG emission reductions from project activity can be 
calculated and submitted for verification as CERs. 
 
Stage 7: Verification, certification and issuance of credits 
The DOE is responsible for verification and certification of the CDM project, whereas 
the CDM EB is responsible for issuance of credits. For verification, the DOE must 
verify the authenticity of the data recorded by the project developer according to the 
monitoring report. The DOE will use the following criteria for verifying the monitoring 
report. 
 
• The monitoring report must meet the requirements of the registered PDD. 
• The monitoring methodologies must be correctly applied. 
• The actual GHG emission reductions must be correctly calculated. 
 
The DOE will prepare a verification report and a certification report, both of which will 
be submitted to the CDM EB for issuance of credits. Certification is the written 
guaranty by the DOE that the CDM project achieved the GHG emission reductions as 
stated and verified during the specified time period. Consequently, the verification 
report will state the verified amount of GHG emission reductions from project activity. 
Once the CDM EB receive a verification report, a certification report, and a request to 
issue CERs, the CDM EB will review a verification report and a certification report. If 
the CDM EB is satisfied with these reports, the CDM EB will issue the certified amount 
of CERs within 15 days. 
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The time required for each stage in the CDM project cycle can be shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3: The time required for each stage in the CDM project cycle; (source: UNEP-Risoe and 
EcoSecurities [127]) 
 
4.4 The Key Aspect of CDM Projects: Baseline, Additionality, and Crediting 
Period 
 
4.4.1 Baseline and Additionality 
 
The GHG emission reduction from the CDM project is the important issue for CDM 
implementation. Article 12.5C states that: 
 
“Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified by 
operational entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, on the basis of reductions in emissions that are 
additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.” 
 
Consequently, the CDM projects must really reduce GHG emissions in the host country. 
Moreover, the CDM regulator must examine whether the CDM project can really 
reduce GHG emissions in the host country. If the project developer overestimates the 
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GHG emission reductions for maximizing its revenues from CERs, this project will lose 
credibility and ultimately the world could not really get the benefits from the CDM 
project (Boyd et al. [7]). Consequently, the Kyoto Protocol tries to develop 
methodologies to correctly evaluate the GHG emission reductions from the CDM 
projects. Finally, a baseline methodology is developed to evaluate the GHG emission 
reductions from project. A baseline methodology is an important tool for ensuring the 
credibility of the CDM project. A baseline for the CDM project is defined as “the 
scenario that reasonably represents the anthropogenic emissions by sources of 
greenhouse gases that would occur in the absence of the proposed project activity” 
(UNFCCC [129]). In other words, a baseline for the CDM project is the business-as-
usual scenario representing the current level of GHG that would be emitted if the 
proposed CDM project is not implemented. A baseline is also used to determine the 
volume of GHG emission reductions from project activity. Figure 4.4 show an example 
of the GHG emission reductions. Our discussion will assume that the baseline emissions 
slowly decrease overtime because resulting from business-as-usual efficiency 
improvements. However, the baseline scenario will vary depending on specific 
circumstances. The GHG emission reductions can be determined by the difference 
between the emissions in the baseline scenario and the emissions in the project scenario 
(see Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.4: The GHG emission reductions 
 
This concept can be rewritten as the equation below: 
 
 
 
 
These emissions reduced through the CDM project are also known as the certified 
emission reductions (CERs). One CER is equivalent to one tonne of CO2e reduced 
through the CDM project. The certified emission reductions can be traded in the carbon 
market.  
The emission reductions must be beyond what would have happened in the absence of 
the project (Aalders [1]). This basis is called “additionality”. Additionality is defined in 
international rules on CDM as follows: “A CDM project activity is additional if 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below those that 
would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity (UNFCCC 
The emissions level in  
the project scenario 
The emissions level in  
the baseline scenario 
 
GHG Emission Reductions = Baseline Emissions – Project Emissions 
GHG emissions 
Time 
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The GHG emission reductions 
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[129]).” Additionality is quantified by measuring the change in GHG emissions 
observed when comparing the emissions in the baseline scenario with the emissions in 
the project scenario. Additionality is used as criteria to determine whether GHG 
emission reductions are real, measurable, reasonable, and in addition to what would 
have happened. Moreover, additionality is also used as criteria to ensure that GHG 
emission reductions are not counted more than once. We can conclude the relationship 
between a baseline and additionality as follows (Aalders [1]): 
 
• Additionality is closely related to a baseline. A baseline must be established in 
order to determine additionality for the CDM project. A baseline is used to 
determine whether the CDM project activity is additional. 
• Project emissions must be lower than baseline emissions. 
   
Consequently, the accuracy of a baseline methodology is the important issue for 
implementing the CDM project because the GHG emission reductions and additionality 
are determined by a baseline methodology. The project developer is responsible for 
establishing a baseline for the CDM project. However, the DOE and CDM EB will 
examine whether a baseline methodology set by the project developer is accurate and 
reasonable. The project developer can establish a baseline for the CDM project by using 
one of three baseline approaches created in the Marrakech Accords. These three 
baseline approaches are:  
 
i) Existing, actual or historical emissions. 
ii) Emissions from technology that represents an economically attractive course of 
action, taking into account barriers to investment. 
iii) The average emissions of similar project activities undertaken in the previous 
five years, in similar social, economic, environmental and technological 
circumstances, and whose performance is among the top 20 percent of their 
category. 
 
Only one in three approaches will be selected to establish a baseline for the CDM 
project.  
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Currently, the concept of additionality is one of the most widely debated issues in the 
aspect of the CDM project because there is no clear definition of additionality in the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, there are currently two concepts of additionality which are (i) 
environmental additionality; and (ii) project additionality. 
 
i ) Environmental additionality 
This concept of additionality covers only environmental additionality. The CDM project 
will focus only on environmental additionality. According to this concept, a project is 
additional if the project emissions are lower than the baseline emissions. The 
environmental additionality can be assessed by comparing the emissions in the baseline 
scenario with the emissions in the project scenario.     
 
ii ) Project additionality 
Project additionality is a broader concept than environmental additionality because it 
covers multiple concepts of additionality. According to this concept, a project is 
additional if a project meets these three criteria: environmental additionality, financial 
additionality, and technical additionality. These three criteria can be discussed below: 
 
• Environmental additionality: A project is environmentally additional if a project 
can generate net GHG emission reductions that would not have occurred in the 
absence of the CDM project (Leining [67]). 
• Financial additionality: A project is financial additionality if the CERs revenues 
can turn a project that was not financially viable into a project that is financially 
viable (Ringius [96]).  
• Technical additionality: There are three options for defining technology 
additionality. A project is technical additionality if a project meets only one of 
the following three options (Leining [67]): 
Option 1: A project is technical additionality if a project employs technologies 
that were appropriate for non-Annex I countries and met best available 
technology standards. 
Option 2: A project is technical additionality if a project involve technology 
transfer that was additional to the non-CDM technology transfer obligations of 
Annex II countries giving non-Annex I countries access to needed technologies. 
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 Option 3: A project is technical additionality if a project employs technologies 
that were the best available for the circumstances of the host party. 
 
4.4.2 Crediting Period 
 
Crediting period represent the period over which the project developer will get the 
emission credits. The crediting period has a direct impact on the value of the CDM 
project. The crediting period is always different from the project lifetime. Normally, the 
project lifetime is longer than the crediting period. There are two options for 
determining the crediting period. These two options are: 
 
i) A fixed crediting period 
For a fixed crediting period, the length and starting date of the period is determined 
once for a project activity with no possibility of renewal or extension once the project 
activity has been registered. The length of a fixed crediting period can be a maximum of 
ten years. A fixed crediting period is shown in the figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: A fixed crediting period 
 
ii) A renewable crediting period 
For a renewable crediting period, a crediting period can be a maximum of seven years, 
but a crediting period can be renewed at most two times. For each renewal, the DOE 
must determine that the original project baseline is still valid or has been updated taking 
account of new information. A renewable crediting period can be shown in the figure 
4.6. 
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Figure 4.6: A renewable crediting period 
 
4.5 Transaction costs of the CDM project 
 
Transaction costs associated with the CDM project can be incurred in the two phases: 
the project preparation phase, and the project implementation phase. In the project 
preparation phase, the transaction costs include: 
 
• Initial assessment costs: These costs are incurred prior to project document 
preparation. The project developer must conduct preliminary study to ensure that 
the CDM project would be eligible under international and national guidelines.  
• Project design costs: These costs represent the costs for developing a project 
design document in the CDM project cycle. Project design costs account for the 
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largest transaction costs which are incurred in the project preparation phase. (See 
table 4.2) 
• Validation costs: The CDM project must be validated by the DOE. These costs 
are incurred in validation stage in the CDM project cycle.  
• Costs for developing the Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA): The 
costs for developing the ERPA involves legal and contractual costs related to 
drafting of the contract, risk management and negotiations (The Climate Change 
Projects Office [17]).   
• Registration fee: The project developer is required to pay the registration fee to 
the CDM EB. The registration fee depends on the size of the CDM project. The 
registration fee can be shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Average tones of CO2 equivalent reductions 
per year over the crediting period 
(estimated/approved) 
USD ($) 
<= 15,000 5,000 
> 15,000 and <= 50,000 10,000 
> 50,000 and <= 100,000 15,000 
> 100,000 and <= 200,000 20,000 
> 200,000  30,000 
 
Table 4.1: Registration fee; (source: Dornau [22]) 
 
These five transaction costs for developing a large-scale project and a small-scale 
project can be concluded in Table 4.2 below.   
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Transaction costs Large-Scale Small-Scale 
Initial assessment costs £5,000-£15,000 £3,000-£4,000 
Project design costs £15,000-£54,000 £6,000-£12,500 
Validation costs £4,000-£18,000 £3,500-£5,500 
Costs for developing the ERPA £3,000-£35,000 £1,500-£5,000 
Registration fee £6,000-£18,000 £3,000 
Total transaction costs £33,000-£140,000 £17,000-£30,000 
 
Table 4.2: Transaction costs incurred in the project preparation phase; (source: The Climate Change 
Projects Office [17]) 
 
The costs of creating a new CDM methodology can be also substantial (if such is 
required). Moreover, transaction costs are also incurred in the project implementation 
phase. These costs include: 
 
• Monitoring and verification costs: Monitoring and verification must be carried 
out regularly. The CDM project must be monitored by the project developer, and 
then it must be verified by the DOE. These costs are incurred in monitoring and 
verification stage.       
• Costs of the sale of carbon credits: The sale of carbon credits can be done 
directly to the buyer or through an intermediary. In the latter case a fee is usually 
paid and can be based on a certain percentage of the selling value (The Climate 
Change Projects Office [17]). 
• Adaptation fee: Adaptation fee aim to help developing countries with weaker 
economies adapt to adverse effects of climate change. This fee must be paid to 
UN and it is equivalent to 2% of CERs generated by the CDM project. 
 
These three transaction costs incurred in the project implementation phase can be shown 
in Table 4.3. 
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Transaction costs Estimated costs 
Monitoring and verification costs £3,000-£10,000 (per audit) 
Costs of the sale of carbon credits 5%-20% 
Adaptation fee 2% 
 
Table 4.3: Transaction costs incurred in the project implementation phase; (source: The Climate Change 
Projects Office [17]) 
 
When project developers, lenders, and investors evaluate the financial viability of the 
CDM project, they will calculate the overall profitability of the project. Therefore, 
transaction costs can strongly affect the financial viability of the CDM project. 
Examples set out below in Table 4.4 demonstrate how transaction costs of the CDM 
project affect investment decision-making.  
 
Project type Total Cost 
(£million) 
IRR 
without 
CERs 
Transaction 
Costs 
Revenues 
from CERs 
(£million) 
IRR 
With 
CERs 
Hydro (26MW) 20.2 9.2% £94,500 2.2 10.4% 
Landfill (15MW) 21.8 13.8% £94,500 4.4 18.7% 
Wind (8.6MW) 10.1 9.7% £79,500 0.3 10.6% 
 
Table 4.4: Impact of transaction costs on the IRR of the CDM project; (source: The Climate Change 
Projects Office [17]) 
 
Table 4.4 shows that different project types will incur different costs and returns on 
investments. The IRR of a project with CER revenue is higher than the IRR of a project 
without CER revenue. Thus, CERs can help the energy projects to raise the IRR of the 
projects. Normally, CERs can help the traditional renewable energy projects (e.g., wind, 
hydro, biomass) to boost their return by 0.5-2.5 percent, whereas CERs have an even 
higher financial impact on the methane projects (The Climate Change Projects Office 
[17]). The methane projects achieve higher financial returns than the renewable energy 
projects. This is because the methane projects generate more CERs than the renewable 
energy projects.     
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
The first step to running CDM projects is the study of the CDM regulations and the 
institution structure of the CDM. The CDM regulations and the institution structure of 
the CDM are the heart of CDM project. In every stage of the CDM cycle, the institution 
structure of the CDM will control and approve CDM projects under the CDM 
regulations. The CDM regulations also affect the supply of CDM projects directly. 
There are two key questions related to the CDM cycle: What are the key issues 
considered in each stage of the CDM cycle? Who is the main responsible person in each 
stage of the CDM cycle? The answers of these questions are shown in Table 4.5. 
From table 4.5, the GHG emission reduction is the key issue which is examined in 
almost every stage of the CDM cycle, whereas the CDM’s contribution to SD is 
examined in only the third stage (host country approval). This clearly show that the 
CDM assessment mainly focus on the GHG emission reduction. More clearly, SD 
benefits are not required to be monitored during the operating period. Host countries are 
required to conduct only one sustainability assessment of CDM project before the 
operation of the project. This contrasts sharply with the rigorous monitoring of GHG 
emission reductions. Consequently, this reflects the weakness of SD assessment.  
Moreover, we found that the SD criteria for approval of projects are not clearly defined; 
in contrast to GHG emissions whose assessment and monitoring protocols are clearly 
defined. Different countries use the different SD criteria for evaluating the CDM 
project. Consequently, it is more difficult for the responsible institutions to evaluate the 
sustainability than to evaluate the GHG emission reductions.      
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Stage The main responsible 
institution 
The key issue considered by the 
responsible institution 
Project identification The project developer • A general project description 
• GHG emission reductions 
• Crediting period 
• Financing plan 
• The socioeconomic and 
environmental benefits 
The project design 
document 
The project developer • A general project description 
• Baselines methodology 
• Additionality 
• Crediting period 
• Monitoring plan 
• GHG emission reductions 
• Environmental impacts 
Host country 
approval 
The DNA • GHG emission reductions 
• The project’s contribution to 
sustainable development 
Validation The DOE • Environmental impacts 
• Baselines methodology 
• Monitoring plan 
Registration The CDM EB • The authenticity of a validation 
report 
Implementation and 
monitoring 
The project developer • GHG emission reductions 
• Environmental impacts 
• Leakage effects of the project 
Verification, 
certification and 
issuance of credits 
The DOE  
The CDM EB 
• GHG emission reductions 
 
 
Table 4.5: The key issues and the responsible institution in each stage of the CDM cycle 
 
Finally, we found that the aspect of SD is not applied to the concept of additionality. 
The concept of additionality focuses on GHG emission reductions, whereas the SD 
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benefits do not appear in this concept. We found only environmental additionality, 
financial additionality, and technical additionality addressed in the PDDs, whereas 
sustainability additionality does not appear in the PDDs. Ultimately, we can conclude 
that the CDM is facing the problem of SD assessment, so the next chapter will focus on 
the CDM project’s contribution to SD.  
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Chapter 5 
 
A Methodological Approach and Framework for Sustainability 
Assessment of CDM Projects 
 
 
Currently, the use of CDM projects, as a step towards mitigation of global warming, is 
growing rapidly. As of April 2008, 1,033 projects were registered as CDM projects and 
a further 169 projects were in the registration process (UNEP-Risoe [124]). Do all these 
CDM projects really contribute to SD? The CDM’s contribution to SD is one of the two 
objectives of the CDM project, but uncertainty prevails as to whether the CDM project 
can really contribute to SD. As previously discussed, we found that CDM projects are 
facing the problem of SD assessment. Consequently, this chapter will discuss the 
project’s contribution to SD. The objectives of this chapter are: (1) to investigate the 
concept of SD applied to CDM projects; and (2) to investigate the methods for assessing 
the sustainability of CDM projects. 
 
5.1 A Brief History of Sustainable Development 
 
The concept of SD sparkle a voluminous and expanding literature. There are different 
interpretations of SD found in many literatures. However, the SD remains an elusive 
concept and its implementation has proven difficult (Overton [86], UN [133]). There is 
no single universally accepted definition of SD. Most people’s thoughts about the 
meaning of sustainability are about human survivability and the avoidance of ecological 
disaster, but the real meaning of sustainability is complex and technical (Jamieson [51]). 
For many people, the basic idea of sustainability focuses greatly on the depletion of 
resources, conservation of nature, environmental and ecological aspects, the aspects of 
quality of human life, and the human well-being (Kerk and Manuel [56]). The most 
widely quoted definition of SD is defined by the 1987 report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development (WCED), entitled “Our Common Future” (also 
known as the Brundtland Report). The Brundtland Report firstly coined the definition of 
SD. The Brundtland Report defines SD as “development that meets the needs for the 
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present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(WCED [144]). This Brundtland’s definition of SD contains three key concepts: 
 
• The concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to 
which overriding priority should be given. 
• The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs. 
• An equity between generations 
 
At the time of the publication of the Brundtland Report the world faced a meta crisis 
including the crises of environment, development, security, and energy. The Brundtland 
Report was one of the outcomes of the WCED which attempted to solve these crises. 
According to the Brundtland Report, these crises were caused by a mismatch between 
the capacities of the natural systems of the earth and humanity’s ability to fit its 
activities into this framework. The Brundtland Report suggested that these crises could 
be solved through SD within a framework of equity. 
The Brundtland Report serves as a vital historical marker because it firstly coined the 
definition of SD and it signals the emergence of “the environment” as a critically 
important facet of international governance (Sneddon et al. [103]). The Brundtland 
Report recommended urgent action on eight key issues including (1) population and 
human resources; (2) food security; (3) the urban challenge; (4) energy; (5) industry; (6) 
species and ecosystems; (7) conflict and environmental degradation; and (8) managing 
the commons to ensure that the development was sustainable. At the heart of the 
Brundtland Report is the belief that equity, growth, and environmental maintenance are 
simultaneously possible with each nation achieving its full economic potential and at 
the same time enhancing its resource base (Kirkby et al. [58]). The Brundtland Report 
designed a strategy for SD which aimed to promote harmony among human beings and 
between humanity and nature. This strategy for SD included reviving growth, changing 
the quality of growth, meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water, and 
sanitation, ensuring a sustainable level of population, conserving and enhancing the 
resource base, reorienting technology and managing risk, and merging environment and 
economics in decision making. Finally, the pursuit of SD requires (WCED [144]): 
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• a political system that secures effective citizen participation in decision making 
• an economic system that is able to generate surpluses and technical knowledge 
on a self-reliant and sustained basis 
• a social system that provides for solutions for the tensions arising from 
disharmonious development. 
• a production system that respects the obligation to preserve the ecological base 
for development 
• a technological system that can search continuously for new solutions 
• an international system that fosters sustainable patterns of trade and finance 
• an administrative system that is flexible and has the capacity for self-correction 
 
The Brundtland Report ultimately laid the groundwork for the development of Agenda 
21 and the development of the Commission on Sustainable Development. Following the 
Brundtland Report, the idea of SD is widely implemented throughout the world, 
especially through the development projects.     
Later, the UNCED marked the first international attempt to create action plans for SD. 
The primary goals of the UNCED were to come to an understanding of development 
which would support socio-economic development and prevent the degradation of the 
environment, and to provide the basis for a global partnership between the developing 
and the industrialized countries, based on mutual needs and common interests, that 
would ensure a healthy future for the planet. The UNCED successfully make the idea of 
SD become an international action plan by creating Agenda 21. Agenda 21 is an 
international action plan for SD which is taken globally, nationally and locally. Agenda 
21 has 40 chapters which can be divided into four sections: 
 
i ) Social and economic dimensions. This section includes developing countries, 
poverty, consumption patterns, population, health, human settlements, 
integrating environment and development. 
ii ) Conservation and management of resources. This section includes atmosphere, 
land, forests, deserts, mountains, agriculture, biodiversity, biotechnology, 
oceans, fresh water, toxic chemicals, hazardous radioactive and solid waste and 
sewage. 
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iii ) Strengthening the role of major groups. This section includes women, children 
and youth, indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations, local 
authorities, workers, business and industry, farmers, scientists and technologists.  
iv ) Means of implementation. This section includes finance, technology transfer, 
science, education, capacity-building, international institutions, legal measures, 
information.  
By creating Agenda 21, the UNCED attempted to implement the concept of SD at 
global, national, and local level.  
Most importantly, the UNCED created the three dimensions of SD, namely 
environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and social sustainability. The 
three dimensions of SD are also known as “the three pillars of sustainable 
development”. The Declaration of Rio on Environment and Development recognized 
that the SD was a balance of these three dimensions. These three dimensions are most 
often used to define the SD. Another fruitfulness of the UNCED is the creation of the 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). The CSD is responsible for reviewing 
the progress in the implementation of Agenda 21. In response to Agenda 21’s call for 
developing SD indicators, the CSD ultimately created 58 indicators of SD for decision-
making at the national level.  These 58 indicators can help country to measure and 
evaluate the progress towards SD goals. Moreover, these indicators can provide an early 
warning to a country for preventing economic, social, and environmental damage. 
More recently, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in 
Johannesburg in 2002 strengthened a multilateral commitment to SD. The WSSD was 
convened to discuss on a broad range of issues under the heading of SD including 
energy, resource use, biodiversity, agriculture, global trade, and poverty reduction 
(INTOSAI WGEA [50]). The key outcomes of the WSSD can be concluded as follows 
(United Nations [132]): 
 
• The summit reconfirmed SD as a central element of the international agenda  
• The summit broaden and strengthen the understanding of SD, especially the 
linkages between poverty, environment, and the use of natural resources 
• The summit support for the creation of a world fund for the eradication of 
poverty 
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• The summit agreed to and reconfirmed many actual commitments and targets for 
action to attain SD objectives effectively 
• The summit promoted the concept of partnerships between governments, 
business, and civil society 
 
Moreover, the WSSD created the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation which set many 
targets and timetables for the implementation of SD. Some of these targets and 
timetables include: 
 
• Significantly improving the lives of at least 100 million crowded residents by 
the year 2020  
• Halving the proportion of people who can not access to safe drinking water by 
the year 2015 
• Reducing the rate of biodiversity loss significantly by the year 2010 
• Creating integrated water resources management and water efficiency plans by 
the year 2005  
• Implementing the ecosystem approach for the SD of the oceans by the year 2010 
   
Most importantly, the WSSD successfully directed the focus towards integration and 
linkages between the climate change debate and the SD debate (Olsen [84]). Previous to 
the WSSD, in spite of the fact that the climate change and SD directly affect human life, 
the climate change debate and SD debate were largely separated for a long time. The SD 
debate was framed in the social and human science, whereas the climate change debate 
was framed in the natural science. Ultimately, the WSSD can combine these two 
debates into one debate.          
 
5.2 The Concept of Sustainable Development Applied to the CDM Project 
 
As previous discussed in section 5.1, early studies of sustainable development mainly focus 
on defining the concept, so there are a large number of SD definitions. However, Dobson [21] 
concluded that there were no SD definitions that were sufficient to capture its broad shape. 
Dobson suggested that any theory of SD should be able to answer critical questions such 
as sustainable for how long, at what level, for whom, and under what conditions. 
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Moreover, the SD assessment should be able to reflect different perceptions of value as well as 
dynamic socio-economic and environmental surroundings.  
 
How the concept of SD is applied remains as a critical issue for the implementing CDM 
projects. The CDM’s contribution to SD is clearly defined in Article 12.2 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
“The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not 
included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development…….” 
 
The host country must examine whether the CDM project can really provide the host 
country with SD. The host country’s duty to assess the sustainability is defined in the 
Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Agreement clearly state that “The Conference of the 
Parties agrees to affirm that it is the host Party’s prerogative to confirm whether a 
clean development mechanism project activity assists it in achieving sustainable 
development” (UNFCCC [130]). Thus, the host country will define the sustainable 
criteria used for assessing the CDM project.  
According to UNDP [122], there are two interpretations of a CDM project’s 
contribution to SD. The first interpretation is that CDM projects must reduce GHG 
emission without causing any social, economic, or environmental harm. Another 
interpretation is that CDM projects must provide positive economic, environmental, and 
social benefits, not just greenhouse gas emission reductions. According to Dobson’s 
typology UNDP suggest a ‘strong’ interpretation of SD (Dobson [21]).  The UNDP 
interpretation implies Pareto efficiency as an appropriate decision criterion, where a 
project is only acceptable if it does no harm.  Alternative, ‘weaker’, cost/benefit 
approaches would accept some negative impacts provided there is a net benefit.   
Most often the concept of SD is defined as a multidimensional concept integrating three 
dimensions, namely environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and social 
sustainability. Under each dimensions of SD, SD criteria are created for assessing 
sustainability. According to Sutter [108], the overall sustainability objective of a CDM 
project should be divided into environmental, social, and economic objectives. (Some 
countries pick-out technological issues as an extra objective, so these countries will 
have four objectives). Moreover, Sutter suggested that these objectives should be 
translated into a set of sustainability criteria. Finally, these criteria should be translated 
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into quantifiable indicators which can be used to assess individual CDM projects. 
Figure 5.1 show the structure of SD criteria for assessing CDM projects suggested by 
Sutter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The structure of the well defined sustainability criteria 
 
The SD criteria for CDM project should create a linkage between CDM projects and 
national objectives of SD. There are synergies between CDM projects and national SD 
objective. If the CDM project can contribute to SD at project level, it will also have a 
positive impact on SD at the national level. Finally, the United Nations gives examples 
of potential SD indicators for assessing CDM projects. These SD criteria must 
encompass the three SD objectives, namely environmental, economic, and social 
objectives. The SD criteria and indicators suggested by the UN can be concluded as 
follows (Olhoff et al. [83]): 
 
5.2.1 Environmental Criteria 
 
Environmental sustainability (or ecological sustainability) represent the use of natural 
resources within the earth’s environmental limits and the creation of pollutions and 
wastes without passing the biodegradation limits of receiving system (Lozano [68]). 
Environmental sustainability focuses on the natural environment, ecosystem, and 
environmental preservation. Influenced by a view that natural resources are being used 
up faster than nature’s ability to replenish. This dimension calls for management of 
Overall sustainability goal of CDM project 
Environmental 
Goal 
Social 
Goal 
Economic 
Goal 
Technological 
Goal 
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 1 Criterion 1 Criterion 1 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 Indicator 1 Indicator 1 Indicator 1 Indicator 1 Indicator 1 
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natural resources in such a way that natural productivity is increased and basic human 
needs are met. We can assess environmental sustainability by using environmental 
criteria. Environmental criteria for CDM projects suggested by the UN can be shown in 
Table 5.1. 
 
Criteria Project level indicator Measurement standard of indicator 
Climate change GHG emissions GHG emissions 
Air pollution Local air pollution, 
particulates 
Emissions of SO2, NOx, and 
particulates  
Environmental health 
benefits 
Monetary value of environmental 
health benefits 
Soil Exposure to pollutants Emission in physical units 
Damages in physical and monetary 
units 
Water Rivers, lakes, irrigation, 
drinking water 
Emission in physical units 
Damages in physical and monetary 
units 
Waste Waste discharge and 
disposal 
Emission in physical units 
Damages in physical and monetary 
units 
Exhaustible 
resources 
Fossil fuels The use of  fossil fuels (physical 
units) 
Biodiversity Specific species Number, monetary values 
 
Table 5.1: Environmental criteria suggested by the UN; (source: Olhoff et al. [83]) 
 
5.2.2 Economic Criteria 
 
Under the concept of sustainable economic development, economic growth will be 
sustainable if it can concurrently improve both the quality of life and the quality of 
environment. For achieving sustainable economic development, the economy will 
produce maximum outputs with minimum inputs, but in a manner that will not change 
the stock and quality of natural resources over the time (Overton [86]). Moreover, 
natural resources should be used up less than or equal to the nature’s ability to replenish 
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for achieving sustainable economic development. We can assess economic 
sustainability by using economic criteria. Economic criteria for CDM projects suggested 
by the UN can be shown in Table 5.2.  
 
Criteria Project level indicator Measurement standard of 
indicator 
Growth Income generation Net surplus of income 
Employment Employment Number of man-years created or 
lost 
Cost effectiveness Net costs and financial 
flows 
Financial costs and social costs 
Investments Activity in energy sector, 
industry, agriculture etc. 
Foreign exchange requirement ($ 
and share of investment) 
Sectoral 
development 
Technology access and 
market creation 
Physical measures like energy 
demand and supply, economic 
measures, energy efficiency and 
affordability, and energy security 
Technological 
change 
Innovation and learning Number of technology, price of 
technologies and maintenance, 
and cost development over time 
 
Table 5.2: Economic criteria suggested by the UN; (source: Olhoff et al. [83]) 
 
5.2.3 Social Criteria 
 
Social sustainability represents social development that helps people to equitably meet 
their basic needs without exploiting natural resources more than the nature’s ability to 
replenish. This dimension focuses on meeting people’s basic needs, and social equity. 
Social equity is another basic need right for humans. Within the concept of sustainable 
social development, social equity represent enabling people to share in environmental, 
economic, and social benefits; to share damages and costs; and to share governance. We 
can assess social sustainability by using social criteria. Social criteria for CDM projects 
suggested by the UN can be shown in Table 5.3.  
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Criteria Project level indicator Measurement standard of indicator 
Equity Distribution of costs and 
benefits, income 
distribution, and local 
participation 
Costs and benefits in economic units 
related to stakeholders, income 
segments, gender, geographical area 
etc., income generation adjusted with 
distributional weights, and Gini 
coefficient 
Legal framework Regulation and property 
rights 
Physical regulation standards, tax 
value and revenue, and land area 
distribution 
Governance Implementation of 
international agreements, 
enforcement 
Costs of administrating and enforcing 
agreements and project management, 
and number of infringements and 
sanctions 
Information 
sharing 
Institutions, markets, 
formal and informal 
networks 
New institutions created, number of 
institutional units participating in 
policy implementation (companies, 
households, public sector, NGOs, 
individuals) 
Education Literacy rates, primary 
and secondary education, 
and training 
Literacy rates, enrolment rates, energy 
for education, time savings from 
reduced fuelwood collection used for 
education, changes in years of training   
Health Life expectancy, infant 
mortality, major diseases, 
nutrition 
Epidemics, nutrition, energy for 
clinics, number of sick days 
Poverty 
alleviation 
Income or capabilities 
created for poor people 
Change in the number of people below 
poverty limit, income created to poor 
people, energy services provided to 
poor people (energy units) 
 
Table 5.3: Social criteria suggested by the UN; (source: Olhoff et al. [83]) 
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5.3 An Example of CDM Sustainability Criteria Used by Asia-Pacific Countries 
 
This topic will review recent CDM sustainability criteria used by non-Annex I 
countries. We have selected Asia-Pacific countries as a case study. Consequently, this 
study covers a total of nineteen non-Annex I countries1. Clearly, we can divide these 
countries into two groups: (i) countries with CDM sustainability criteria; and (ii) 
countries with no specific sustainability criteria.  
 
5.3.1 Countries with No Specific Sustainability Criteria 
 
We found that 7 out of 19 non-Annex I countries in the region do not have specific 
CDM sustainability criteria These countries are China, Bhutan, Fiji, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Papua New Guinea, and South Korea. Mostly these countries use their existing national 
SD agenda to assess CDM projects. However, these national SD agenda are generally 
too vague to provide effective guidelines for assessment. Although China has the largest 
number of registered CDM projects in the world, it still does not have specific CDM 
sustainability criteria for assessing projects. However, China has identified priority 
areas for CDM project implementation. Article 4 of ‘Measures for Operation and 
Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China’, states that “The 
priority areas for CDM projects in China are energy efficiency improvement, 
development and utilization of new and renewable energy, and methane recovery and 
utilization.” Importantly, China is the only nation to impose different tax levels on 
CDM projects with different perceived sustainability benefits (Muller [75]). China 
applies three tax levels on CER transfers: (i) 65% for HFCs and PFCs projects; (ii) 30% 
for N2O projects; (iii) 2% for CDM projects in priority areas defined in Article 4 and 
forestation projects. Consequently, China prefers using the priority areas and several tax 
levels for assessing CDM projects rather than specific sustainability criteria. South 
Korea also does not have specific sustainability criteria for assessing CDM projects 
despite hosting the 8th largest number of registered CDM projects in the world. 
                                                 
1
 Non-Annex I countries in Asia-Pacific region are Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Korea, Sri Lanka,Thailand, Vietnam. 
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5.3.2 Countries with CDM Sustainability Criteria 
 
We found that only 12 countries have their own specific SD criteria for assessing CDM 
projects (see Table 5.4). The criteria used by these countries clearly show what benefits 
these countries expect to gain from CDM projects. Therefore, it is very easy for 
investors and project developers to understand national preferences. In this group, 
Cambodia has the largest number of sustainability criteria (25 criteria), followed by 
Thailand (24 criteria). These criteria focus on environmental aspects. Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Thailand have developed criteria applicable for 
specific types of CDM project. For example, expanding rural electricity coverage is one 
of Malaysia’s special criteria applicable for assessing energy projects (CDM Malaysia 
[14]). Malaysia and Thailand allow projects to have a negative rating for any single 
sustainability criterion, provided the overall score of the project is positive.  This 
implies a cost/benefit decision criteria (i.e. negative outcomes allowed provide thet are 
outweighed by benefits and consequently a weak interpretation of SD. On the other 
hand, Cambodia and Indonesia do not allow negative ratings for any criteria. The 
Cambodian DNA Assessment Procedures state that “The absence of negative impacts 
for each criterion is considered to be the minimum threshold with which project 
proponents must comply” [12]. This implies a much stronger interpretation of SD and 
implies Praeto efficiency as the driver of decision making (i.e. no negative outcomes).  
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Country Assessment 
method 
Number 
of goals  
Number 
of 
criteria 
Number 
of 
indicators 
Scaling Permission 
on at least 
one negative 
impact 
Specific 
criteria for 
approval 
Bangladesh Multi-
Criteria 
4 10 10 +2 to -2 Not yet 
addressed 
No 
Cambodia Checklists 4 25 25 No No Special 
Criteria 
for energy 
projects 
Indonesia Checklists 4 6 17 No No Special 
Criteria 
for many 
sectors 
Malaysia Checklists 3 8 13 No Yes Special 
Criteria 
for energy 
and 
forestry 
projects 
Thailand Multi-
Criteria 
4 24 26 +3 to -1 Yes Special 
Criteria 
for 
monitorin
g projects 
Vietnam Checklists 3 9 17 No Not yet 
addressed 
No 
India Checklists 4 9 No No Not yet 
addressed 
No 
Lao PDR Checklists 4 19 No No Not yet 
addressed 
Special 
Criteria 
for energy 
projects 
Pakistan Checklists 4 13 No No Not yet 
addressed 
No 
Philippines Checklists 3 10 Depend 
on project 
developer 
No Not yet 
addressed 
No 
Singapore Checklists 3 5 No No Not yet 
addressed 
No 
Sri Lanka Checklists 3 10 No No Not yet 
addressed 
No 
 
Table 5.4: Countries with CDM sustainability criteria; (source: Data from each host country DNA 
website, status March, 2009) 
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SD criteria for assessing CDM projects are categorized into four groups: environmental, 
economic, social, and technological sustainability.  However 5 of the 12 countries listed 
in Table 5.5 combine technological and economic criteria.  
 
Country Environmental 
Criteria 
Social 
Criteria 
Economic 
Criteria 
Technological 
Criteria 
Total 
  Number % Number % Number % Number %   
Bangladesh 2 20 3 30 3 30 2 20 10 
Cambodia 11 44 8 32 4 16 2 8 25 
India 4 45 3 33 1 11 1 11 9 
Indonesia 7 41 3 18 4 23 3 18 17 
Lao PDR 7 37 7 37 3 16 2 10 19 
Malaysia 8 62 2 15 3 23 0 0 13 
Pakistan 2 15 6 47 3 23 2 15 13 
Philippines 3 30 3 30 4 40 0 0 10 
Singapore 2 40 1 20 2 40 0 0 5 
Sri Lanka 4 40 3 30 3 30 0 0 10 
Thailand 15 57 3 12 5 19 3 12 26 
Vietnam 7 41 6 35 4 24 0 0 17 
 
Table 5.5: The structure of sustainability criteria; (source: Data from each host country DNA website, 
status March, 2009) 
 
When we consider the structure of SD criteria used by Asia-Pacific countries, we find 
strong focus on environmental aspect (see Table 5.5). This would suggest a strong 
interpretation of SD, according to Dobson’s typology (Dobson [21]), with the 
environment being prioritized over human needs. For example, environmental criteria 
account for 41% of India’s SD criteria. Most Asia-Pacific countries tend approach this 
issue from similar perspectives and have similar sets of criteria for assessing CDM 
projects. The four groups of SD criteria can be described as follows: 
 
(i) Environmental criteria:  
Thailand has the largest number of environmental criteria (15), followed by Cambodia 
(11), and Malaysia (8). These three countries have the well defined environmental 
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criteria ensuring the environmental sustainability of CDM projects. Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Singapore have the smallest number of environmental criteria (2 each). 
The environmental criteria created by these three countries are so broad that they are 
difficult to apply these criteria at project level. Table 5.6 illustrates, the top seven most 
widely used environmental criteria for assessing CDM project in the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
 
Environmental Criterion Countries 
Reduction of GHGs Bangladesh, Cambodia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam 
Biodiversity conservation Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam 
Reduction in air pollution Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Vietnam 
Reduction in water pollution Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Vietnam 
Sustainable use of natural 
resources 
Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and 
Philippines 
Reduction in soil pollution Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and 
Thailand 
Reduction of pollutants Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and 
Philippines 
 
Table 5.6: The top seven most widely used environmental criteria in Asia-Pacific region; (source: Data 
from each host country DNA website, status March, 2009) 
 
Other important environmental criteria used by Asia-Pacific countries include 
protection of archaeological, cultural, historical and spiritual heritage and sites; 
reduction in noise pollution; impact on human health; and waste management.   
Reduction of GHGs and biodiversity conservation are the most widely used 
environmental criteria in the region used by 7 Asia-Pacific countries. The second most 
widely used environmental criteria are reduction in air pollution, reduction in water 
pollution, and sustainable use of natural resources each used by 5 Asia-Pacific 
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countries. We can see that most Asia-Pacific countries tend to have similar 
environmental criteria for assessing the environmental sustainability of CDM projects.   
 
(ii) Social criteria 
Cambodia has the largest number of social criteria (8), followed by Lao PDR (7 
criteria), Pakistan (6), and Vietnam (6). The five most widely used social criteria for 
assessing CDM projects are: creation of employment; poverty alleviation; improvement 
in quality of life; stakeholder consultation; and gender equity (see Table 5.7). Used by 7 
countries, the creation of employment and poverty alleviation are the most widely used 
social criteria. ‘Improvement in quality of life’ is the second most widely used social 
criterion, which is used by 6 countries. Other important social criteria include: impact 
on public health; social equity; provision of community infrastructures; and equity in 
accessing the community benefits. Like environmental criteria, most Asia-Pacific 
countries tend to have similar social criteria for assessing the social sustainability of 
CDM projects 
 
Social Criterion Countries 
Creation of employment Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Lao PDR, 
Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam 
Poverty alleviation Cambodia, India, , Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam 
Improvement in quality of 
life 
Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, and Vietnam 
Stakeholder consultation Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Philippines, 
and Thailand 
Gender equity Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Pakistan 
 
Table 5.7: The top five most widely used social criteria in Asia-Pacific region; (source: Data from each 
host country DNA website, status March, 2009) 
 
(iii)Economic criteria 
Unlike environmental, social, and technological criteria, most Asia-Pacific countries 
create their own economic criteria in the different perspective. Therefore, it may be 
difficult to standardize economic criteria applied to all non-Annex I countries. Thailand 
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is responsible for the largest number of economic criteria with 5. The five most widely 
used economic criteria are: impact on balance of payments; reduced dependence on 
fossil fuels; cost effectiveness; reduced dependence on imported energy; and share of 
project budget spent in country (see Table 5.8). Impact on balance of payments is the 
most widely used economic criteria in the region. However, this criterion is used by 
only 4 countries for assessing economic sustainability. 
 
Economic Criterion Countries 
Impact on balance of payments Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
and Vietnam 
Reduced dependence on fossil fuels or 
increased use of renewable energy 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and 
Thailand 
Cost effectiveness Bangladesh, and Pakistan 
Reduced dependence on imported energy Cambodia, and Lao PDR 
Share of project budget spent in country Cambodia, and Lao PDR 
 
Table 5.8: The top five most widely used economic criteria in Asia-Pacific region; (source: Data from 
each host country DNA website, status March, 2009) 
 
(iv) Technological criteria 
Technological criteria are created to assess technological sustainability of CDM 
projects. In this context a CDM project can be deemed beneficial it results in:  
 
• technology transfers that are environmentally safe, efficient, and the best 
available; and 
• capacity building through education and training.  
 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam combine technological and 
economic criteria. In each country, the technological criteria account for the smallest 
proportion of SD criteria (See Table 5.5). For example, technological criteria account 
for only 8% of Cambodia’s total number of SD criteria. Used by 7 countries, the 
transfer of appropriate and best available technology is the most widely used 
technological criterion (See Table 5.9). According to 3 options for defining technical 
additionality discussed in Chapter 4, most Asia-Pacific countries use Option 1 for 
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defining technical additionality. Like environmental and social criteria, most Asia-
Pacific countries tend to have similar technological criteria for assessing the 
sustainability of CDM projects.   
 
Technological Criterion Countries 
Transfer of appropriate and best 
available technology 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
Vietnam 
Transfer of skills or capacity 
building 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Pakistan, Singapore, and Thailand 
Transfer of environmentally safe, 
sound, and efficient technology 
India, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand 
 
Table 5.9: The top three most widely used technological criteria in Asia-Pacific region; (Source: Data 
from each host country DNA website, status March, 2009) 
 
5.3.3 Summary of SD Criteria 
 
Currently, most Asia-Pacific countries tend to have similar environmental, social, and 
technological criteria for assessing CDM projects. The most widely used SD criteria are 
reduction of GHGs; biodiversity conservation; creation of employment; poverty 
alleviation; quality of life; transfer of appropriate and best available technology; and 
capacity building. However, none of these seven fall into economic category (see Figure 
5.2).  
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Figure 5.2: The SD Criteria used by countries with their own SD criteria; (source: Data from each host 
country DNA website, status March, 2009, and author’s calculations) 
 
Indonesia is the only one country which creates SD criteria focusing on local impacts of 
CDM project. Indonesia design environmental, economic, and social criteria for 
measuring local benefits of CDM project [48].  Only technological criteria are designed 
to measure national benefits.  
Singapore has the smallest number of SD criteria (5 criteria).  This is insufficient to 
measure a CDM project’s overall impacts on SD. Most importantly, Singapore’s 
economic criteria concern only technological issues (technology transfer, capacity 
building, and efficient technology) [102]. Technological issues on their own are not 
sufficient to measure the overall economic benefits. Singapore’s economic criteria lack 
the main economic issues such as impact on balance of payment, national income 
generation, and share of project budget spent in country.  
Although these 12 Asia-Pacific countries have their own specific SD criteria, they are 
still not finalized and are under constant revision. For example, Thailand’s SD 
indicators are both quantitative and qualitative. However Thailand is planning to 
eliminate qualitative indicators and use only quantitative indicators to assess future 
CDM projects.2 Using CDM projects to ‘increasing the green area’ is one example of 
Thailand’s qualitative indicators [113]. The objective of this criterion is to grow more 
                                                 
2
 Personal Communication with Dr. Chaiwat  Muncharoen, Deputy Executive Director of Thailand 
Greenhouse Gas Management 
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trees in the area of CDM projects. However, Thai DNA does not decide what kinds of 
trees should be planted. It is very difficult for Thailand to interpret how the CDM 
project can increase green area. Consequently Thailand is planning eliminate this 
indicator from its environmental criteria.     
 
5.4 Methodologies for assessing the sustainability of CDM projects 
 
Although there are many methods for assessing CDM project’s contribution to SD, only 
two methods are the most commonly used (Olsen and Fenhann [85]). These methods 
are: 
 
5.4.1 Checklists 
 
Checklists are the most commonly used for assessing CDM projects. 10 Asia-Pacific 
countries use checklists (see Table 5.4). This method is a descriptive approach. The 
committee appointed by the DNA creates the national sustainability criteria which must 
be met in order to certify its contribution to SD. The sustainability assessment is done 
by the DNA or both the DNA and the project developer. The evaluator must provide a 
detailed description of the impact of CDM projects on each sustainability criterion. 
Moreover, an explanation must be given of the additionallity created by the project 
comparing conditions after the implementation of the project with a no-project baseline 
condition. Supporting data for justification can be quantitative and qualitative. This 
method has two strengths: (i) this approach is simple and quick, and (ii) it allows the 
inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative data. The main difficulty is assessing 
sustainability criteria which require qualitative data, and then achieve consistency in 
decision making.  Checklists created by Singapore can be shown in Table 5.10. 
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Criterion Description 
Environmental sustainability 
 
• Project meets Singapore’s Environmental 
Protection requirements, standards and 
regulations 
• Project produces real and measurable 
reductions in greenhouse gas  
Economic sustainability 
 
• Project utilizes more efficient (energy 
efficient, resource efficient) technology 
than common industrial practice 
• Project results in technology transfer 
and/or capacity building in GHG emission 
reduction technologies 
Social Sustainability 
 
• Project helps to improve quality of life by 
creating opportunities for jobs, job 
enhancement, etc 
 
Table 5.10: Singapore’s sustainable development criteria; (source: [102]) 
 
5.4.2 Multi-criteria Analysis (MCA) 
 
Olsen and Fenhann [85] state that “few host countries and few investors actually make 
use of the multi-criteria assessment methodologies”. In Asia-Pacific region only 
Bangladesh and Thailand use Multi-criteria Analysis (MCA) (see Table 5.4). MCA is 
used to measure the performance of various criteria. These criteria are translated into 
SD indicators (quantitative or qualitative) which are measured relative to a baseline. 
Each of these indicators is given a negative or positive score representing the negative 
impact or positive impacts of the CDM project.  Bangladesh’s SD indicators are scored 
between -2 to +2, whereas Thailand’s SD indicators are scored between -1 to +3. The 
CDM project will be approved if the aggregate value of all scores is positive. However, 
some countries do not allow the project to have a negative rating for any SD indicator. 
MCA methodologies include various specific approaches such as Multi-Attributive 
Utility Theory (MAUT), The Gold Standard, South South North (SSN) SD tool, etc. 
Generally, this methodology has six steps:  
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i ) Identifying the SD criteria. 
ii ) Translating the SD criteria into SD indicators. 
iii ) Weighting the criteria to reflect relative importance to the decision (Some 
countries do not weight the criteria, so these countries will skip this step). 
iv ) Assessing and scoring each SD indicator. 
v ) Combining weights and scores to get the overall value of sustainability.  
vi ) Examine results.  
 
Multicriteria analysis appeared in the 1960s as a decision-making tool. The method is 
designed to help decision-makers to integrate the different options, reflecting the 
opinions of the actors concerned, into a prospective or retrospective framework Strager 
and Rosenberger [107]. Participation of the decision-makers in the process is a central 
part of the approach. Multi-Attributive Utility Theory (MAUT) is a well-known 
example of MCA methodology. MAUT is frequently used in economics as a tool for 
decision making. Both quantitative and qualitative can be used in this methodology for 
measuring different dimensions of a project. Christoph Sutter applies MAUT to assess 
the sustainability of the CDM project (Sutter [108]). According to this approach, the SD 
indicators are measured in the unit of utility. This methodology measures the utility of 
each SD indicator, and then combines the utility of each SD indicator into an overall 
utility of the CDM project. Generally, MAUT has five steps:    
 
I. Identification of sustainability criteria: The overall goal of SD will be divided 
into criteria. Sutter [108] divided SD goals of the South African and Indian into 
12 criteria within 3 sub-goals of SD. These 3 sub-goals of SD are environmental 
development, social development, and economic development. The 12 criteria 
used in the South African and Indian cases can be shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: The 3 sub-goals of sustainable development and the 12 SD criteria are used in the South 
African and Indian cases; (source: Sutter [108]) 
       
II. Defining SD indicators: Each sustainability criteria must be translated into a set 
of SD indicators. These indicators are either qualitative or quantitative, and will 
be applied at the project level. These indicators are measured in the unit of 
utility. Thus, the evaluator must develop utility function for each SD indicator in 
order to measure the single utility of each indicator. A single utility value of 
each indicator ranges from -1 (minimum) to +1 (maximum). The sustainability 
criteria and SD indicators designed for assessing the CDM projects in the South 
African and Indian are shown in the Table 5.11 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sustainable 
Development 
Environmental 
Development 
Economic 
Development 
Social 
Development 
Fossil 
Energy 
Resources 
Land  
Resources 
Air 
Quality 
Water 
Quality 
Microeconomic 
Efficiency 
Employment 
Generation Technology Transfer 
Regional  
Economy 
Equal 
Distribution 
Capacity 
Development 
Improved 
Service 
Availability 
Stakeholder 
Participation 
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Sub-goal SD Criteria Classification Indicator 
Environmental 
Development 
Fossil Energy 
Resources 
Quantitative MWh coal saved/ GHG 
reduction 
Land Resources Semi-quantitative Change relative to baseline 
Air Quality Semi-quantitative Change relative to baseline 
Water Quality Semi-quantitative Change relative to baseline 
Economic 
Development 
Microeconomic 
Efficiency 
Quantitative Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) 
Regional 
Economy 
Semi-quantitative Economic performance of 
project location 
Technology 
Transfer 
Qualitative Qualitative indicator with 
descriptive five-step scale 
Employment 
Generation 
Quantitative Additional man-month per 
GHG reduction 
Social 
Development 
Stakeholder 
Participation 
Qualitative Qualitative indicator with 
descriptive five-step scale 
Improved 
Service 
Availability 
Semi-quantitative Change in availability of 
services compared to 
baseline 
Capacity 
Development 
Qualitative Qualitative indicator with 
descriptive five-step scale 
Equal 
Distribution of 
Project Return 
Quantitative Share of turnover 
benefiting people below 
poverty line  
 
Table 5.11: The sustainability criteria and SD indicators designed for assessing the CDM projects in the 
South African and Indian; (source: Sutter [108]) 
 
III. Weighting the SD indicators: The SD indicators must be weighted for reflecting 
their relative importance. The weighted SD indicators represent the 
sustainability preferences of an individual or a group. The SD indicators are 
weighted by the stakeholders. Table 5.12 show results of the criteria weighting 
done by participants in India  
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SD Criteria Result of the criteria weighting 
Fossil Energy Resources 5.7% 
Land Resources 7.6% 
Air Quality 7.7% 
Water Quality 9.6% 
Microeconomic Efficiency 6.7% 
Regional Economy 7.6% 
Technology Transfer 8.5% 
Employment Generation 11.3% 
Stakeholder Participation 7.4% 
Improved Service Availability 10.8% 
Capacity Development 10.0% 
Equal Distribution of Project Return 7.1% 
Total 100.00% 
 
Table 5.12: Results of the criteria weighting done by participants in India; (source: Sutter [108]) 
 
IV. Assessing each SD indicator: Each SD indicator must be assessed. Then, MAUT 
will use utility function to convert the assessment result to a single utility value 
of each indicator.  
 
V. Calculating an overall utility of the CDM project: The weights (from step 3) are 
used to combine the single utilities of indicators into an overall utility of the 
CDM project. An overall utility of the CDM project is calculated by using the 
following equation: 
 
                      n 
            U  =  ∑ Ui * Wi 
                    i=1 
 
where 
U = overall utility 
Ui = single utility of criterion i 
Wi = weighting of criterion i 
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Finally, an overall utility of the CDM project represent how much the CDM project 
contribute to the local SD. An overall utility of the CDM project ranges from -1 
(minimum) to +1 (maximum). A positive overall utility means the CDM project has 
positive impact on the local SD. On the other hand, a negative overall utility means the 
CDM project has negative impact on the local SD. 
MCA has three strengths. Firstly, the stakeholders can decide and/or weight the SD 
criteria used for the sustainability assessment, so MCA can really reflect the preferences 
of the stakeholders. Secondly, MCA use a designated scoring value as a unit of 
measurement for the SD assessment, which improves transparency. The last strength is 
that it can provide measurement capabilities for both qualitative and quantitative data. 
The weakness of multi-criteria analysis is its reliance on arbitrary judgments about the 
criteria (Wattage and Mardle [138]). Both the choice of criteria to be included and the 
relative weight given to each criterion can bias the final result. Furthermore, the 
technique may help to reach a compromise or define a coalition of views, but it does not 
dictate the individual or collective judgement of the partners (Sato [99]). Moreover, 
there is a tendency for stakeholders to include a large number of highly complex criteria 
which are difficult to determine (Sutter [108]).  Finally, there is no consistent procedure 
for the weighting of criteria a process which itself can be qualitative and is ultimately 
open to institutional capture.  
  
5.5 The Problem of CDM’s Contribution to Sustainable Development 
 
Although the number of CDM projects is increasing (see section 6.2.1), the CDM’s 
contribution to SD is being questioned. There are many researchers trying to examine 
the CDM’s contribution to SD. The balance of opinion is that that CDM does not 
significantly contribute to SD (see Burian [10], Kolshus et al. [59], Michaelowa [74], 
Nussbaumer [80], Olsen [84], Olsen and Fenhann [85], Schneider [101], Sutter and 
Parreno [109]). CDM projects may fail to achieve SD objective because of the two 
fundamental problems: (1) a conflict between the twin objectives of CDM projects 
(sustainability and carbon reduction); and (2) the lack of consistency in the fulfillment 
of host countries’ duties to assess CDM projects for sustainability. These problems are 
discussed below.: 
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5.5.1 A Conflict between the Twin Objectives of CDM Projects 
 
Each ton of GHG emission reduction is given a monetary value through the CERs, but 
the CDM’s contribution to SD is not given a similar monetary value. The missing value 
of SD benefit has resulted in a trade-off between the CDM target of supplying cheap 
emission credits and the promotion of SD making projects with high SD obligations 
unattractive to investors. On the other hand, the monetary value placed upon carbon 
reductions encourages investment in CDM projects which deliver large volumes of 
CERs. There is a widespread perception that projects that deliver large volumes of 
CERs cannot deliver other SD benefits. In particular, industrial gas projects (HFCs, 
N2O, PFCs) can generate high CER volumes, but cannot create many jobs or contribute 
directly to community development. Erion [26] described these industrial gas projects 
as “ low hanging fruit” 
Kolshus et al. [59] conducted a research to investigate whether the two objectives of 
CDM project can be achieved simultaneously by analyzing two case studies from Brazil 
and China. They developed a set of indicators to evaluate non-carbon benefits of CDM 
project candidates on the environment, development, and equity. Finally, they found 
that a high cost per ton of carbon dioxide abated was linked to a high score on 
sustainability indicators, whereas a low abatement cost per ton of carbon dioxide was 
linked to a low score on sustainability indicators. These findings indicated that there 
was a conflict between fulfilling cost-effective criteria and achieving sustainability 
criteria.  
Schneider [101] has divided CDM project into three different types (categories A, B, 
and C) according to the impact of CER revenues on the IRR. Category A projects does 
not generate revenue beyond the CER revenue, so this category largely depends on the 
CER revenue. These projects include HFC, N2O, flaring of landfill gas projects, etc. 
Category B projects generate revenues other than the CER’s, but the CER revenue has 
considerable impact on the IRR. These projects include coal bed/mine methane, power 
generation from landfill gas, etc. Schneider found that mostly projects in categories A 
and B are likely to be additional, but these projects have few SD benefits. On the other 
hand, Project category C creates other revenues that by far outweigh the CER revenue. 
The impact of CER revenue on the IRR is very low (ranging from 0.5% to 2%). This 
project includes renewable energy generation (except biomass), the construction of new 
natural gas power plants, energy efficiency in industry, etc. Schneider found that mostly 
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projects in categories C are unlikely to be additional, but these projects have high SD 
benefits. Finally, these findings lead to the conclusion that there is a clear trade-off 
between additionality and SD benefits. For example, projects without any benefits other 
than CERs often have few SD benefits, but they are likely to be additional.   
More recently, Olsen and Fenhann [85] conducted the sustainability assessment based 
on text analysis of the PDDs. They set 13 SD criteria for analyzing the expected SD 
benefits described in the 744 PDDs (744 CDM projects). They tried to count the number 
of SD benefits each CDM project has by matching each SD benefits described in its 
PDD with one of the 13 SD criteria. They found that HFC and N2O projects have the 
least SD benefits, compared to other types of CDM project. N2O projects have on 
average only one benefit per project and HFC projects have 1.8 benefits per project, 
whereas renewable energy projects have 3.2 benefits per project. Moreover, small-scale 
projects were found to have a higher average number of SD benefits than large-scale 
projects. Finally, Olsen and Fenhann arrived at the conclusion that a significant conflict 
exist between the twin objectives of CDM projects.     
Consequently, the results of these three studies clearly showed that the twin objectives 
of the CDM are not being achieved simultaneously. If this is the case it ultimately 
means that CDM projects may fail to achieve SD objective under the existing 
implementation and audit regime.  
 
5.5.2 A Lack of Consistency in the Application of the Host Countries’ Duties to 
Ensure the Sustainability of CDM Projects 
  
According to Sutter [108], an assessment of the sustainability of the CDM project 
represents an ill-defined problem. This is because the concept of SD defined in the 
Kyoto Protocol is vague. Different countries have different views on the concept of SD. 
Host countries develop their own SD criteria for assessing CDM projects. However, 
there are no common international standards for the host country approval processes and 
the development of SD criteria.  In contrast to GHG emissions, whose assessment and 
monitoring are standardized, the SD criteria for approval of projects are not clearly 
defined. Several studies have now concluded that the SD objectives of CDM project are 
not clearly interpreted by many host countries (Brown et al. [8], Schneider [101], Sterk 
et al. [105]). Consequently, the host countries’ duties to assess the SD benefits of CDM 
projects are inconsistently applied and SD criteria vary widely.  
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There were two main reasons to assign this duty to host country. Firstly, it can be 
argued that the SD principles and criteria should be country specific, the justification 
being that each country has its own specific national circumstances and development 
priorities (UNDP [122]). Secondly, many countries have their own well developed 
principles of SD which could in theory be simply applied to CDM assessment. There 
are advantages and disadvantages to host country assessment of CDM sustainability. 
One advantage is that it gives an opportunity for host countries to build linkages 
between national SD policies and CDM projects. On the other hand, assigning host 
countries the responsibility of assessing CDM projects creates an incentive to set low 
sustainability standards in order to attract CDM investments (Sutter [108]). If countries 
have relatively strict SD criteria, this will lower their CDM market share, as the 
developers will choose to run projects with low SD benefits in other countries 
(Schneider [101]). Ultimately, the low sustainability standards can lead to “a race to the 
bottom” in terms of SD standards (Sutter [108]). The second disadvantage is that some 
the poorest host countries, who stand to gain most from the CDM, have inadequate 
capacity and resources to assess the sustainability of projects.         
An assessment of rejected projects by host country might provide an indication of how 
rigorously SD criteria are being applied. However, it is very difficult to find information 
on rejected projects by host country (UNDP [122]). Normally, information on rejected 
projects is not made public. Consequently, it cannot be observed that host countries 
prioritize projects with high SD benefits by rejecting projects with low SD benefits 
(Schneider [101]).  According to Burian [10], the results of a survey at Carbon Expo 
2005 showed that the reasons to reject projects by host countries include projects’ 
negative impacts on environment, major stakeholder conflicts, and badly elaborated 
PDDs. This limited analysis of rejected projects suggests that SD benefits are given a 
low weighting in the decision-making process (UNDP [122]).   
The question of whether host country can ensure the sustainability of CDM projects is 
open to debate. Erion [26] goes as far as to suggest that even if host countries have their 
own SD criteria for assessing CDM projects, host countries may ignore some SD 
criteria for assessing CDM projects. This is because they try to attract CDM 
investments. Burian [10] found that several projects with negative ecological or social 
impacts have been approved by host country DNAs. These results implied that host 
countries cannot guarantee the SD benefits of CDM projects. Finally, this make the 
CDM fail to achieve SD objective.   
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5.6 CDM Sustainability Labels: Paving the Way to Sustainability Path 
 
As previously discussed, the CDM is facing the two fundamental problems. In order to 
solve this problem, the two prominent concepts: the use of  preferential tax rates levied 
on projects with significant expected sustainability benefits or a CDM sustainability 
label. China is the first nation which imposes several tax levels on CDM projects with 
different expected sustainability benefits. According to different sustainability 
performances of CDM projects, China set three tax levels applied for CDM projects. 
For the first level, the Government of China takes 65% CER transfer benefit from HFC 
and PFC projects. For the second level, the Government of China takes 30% CER 
transfer benefit from N2O project. For the last level, Government of China takes 2% 
CER transfer benefit from renewable energy and forestation projects. However, 
revenues of this tax are earmarked for further climate policy projects, not general 
development activities (Michaelowa [74]; Curtius and Vorlaufer [18]). Consequently, 
the current tax levied on expected sustainability benefits is not sufficient to guarantee 
the project’s contribution to sustainable development. Moreover, tax proposals usually 
face considerable opposition and an implementation in the CDM might not be 
politically visible on a global level (Muller [75]). 
CDM sustainability labeling is another option for solving the problem of the CDM’s 
inability to achieve SD. CDM sustainability labeling was first addressed in the literature 
by Muller [75]. Sustainability labels provide their own independent standards to assess 
the sustainability of CDM projects. Projects with CDM sustainability labels must pass 
both the sustainability test set by the host country and the test set by CDM sustainability 
labels, while non-labelled project need only pass sustainability test set by the host 
country. One may view the test set by CDM sustainability labels as an additional 
guarantee of SD benefits. The intention of CDM sustainability labels is to provide 
simple, clear, and reliable information on sustainability aspect of CDM projects to CER 
buyers who cannot themselves verify the project’s contribution to SD (Muller, [75]). 
There are now several CDM sustainability labels including the Gold Standard, the 
Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance Standard (CCB Standards), the 
Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF), and the MDG Carbon Facility 
(Nussbaumer [80]). We will investigate the sustainability test set by CDM sustainability 
labels through a case study of the Gold Standard (GS) label in the next topic. 
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Since projects with sustainability labels are likely to be more costly than non-labelled 
projects, there is a question whether labelled projects can really outperform non-labelled 
projects in terms of SD profile. Ultimately, this question is answered by Nussbaumer 
[80]. Nussbaumer apply a multi-criteria methodology to evaluate how labelled projects 
perform with respect to sustainability criteria in comparison to similar non-labelled 
projects. Nussbaumer comes to the conclusion that the SD profile of labelled projects 
tends to be better than similar non-labelled projects.  
Consequently, CERs generated by the project with CDM sustainability label are 
accepted as the high quality CERs in terms of their SD benefits. The carbon market is 
segmented, the quality of CERs and buyers’ consciousness of the SD (Grandpre [38]). 
According to Sutter, if CDM sustainability labels can attract a price premium, it will 
induce the project developers to develop projects with high SD. Consequently, a price 
premium for CERs is the key motivation for project developer to invest in CDM project 
with sustainability label. This will help the CDM to achieve its SD objective. However, 
the willingness to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability label is 
unclear. 
 
5.7 An Example of CDM Sustainability Labels: The Gold Standard Label 
 
The Gold Standard (GS) label is the first best practice benchmark for the CDM and JI 
projects. The GS label was developed as a tool for promoting emission reduction 
projects that simultaneously reduce greenhouse gases emission, promote sustainable 
development, and benefit local communities. This reflects the twin objectives of the 
CDM as defined in the Kyoto Protocol (Grandpre [38]). The GS is endorsed by 42 non-
governmental organizations, including the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
SouthSouthNorth, and Greenpeace. According to Gold Standard [37], the GS itself is a 
project methodology, completely consistent with the CDM Executive Board's Project 
Design Document, providing assurance that CDM projects will achieve both twin 
objectives. The Gold Standard has three objectives: 
 
I. To promote investments in energy technologies and management techniques 
reducing climate change effects. 
II. To contribute to sustainable development. 
III. To contribute towards a transition to non-fossil energy systems.      
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Not all CDM project types are eligible for the GS. The CDM project types eligible to 
the GS can be shown in Table 5.13. 
 
 
Renewable energy: 
• Photovoltaic 
• Solar thermal (Electricity, Heat) 
• Ecologically sound biomass, biogas and liquid biofuels (Electricity, Heat, 
Cogeneration, Transport) 
• Wind 
• Geothermal 
• Small low-impact hydro, with a size limit of 15MW, complying with World 
Commission on Dams guidelines 
 
End use energy efficiency improvement: 
• Industrial energy efficiency 
• Domestic energy efficiency 
• Energy efficiency in the transport sector 
• Energy efficiency in the public sector 
• Energy efficiency in the agricultural sector 
• Energy efficiency in the commercial sector 
 
 
Table 5.13: The CDM project types eligible to the Gold Standard; (source: The Gold Standard 
Foundation [36])   
 
To assess CDM projects the GS use the following methods: (1) the SD assessment 
matrix; (2) a stakeholder consultation; and (3) an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA). 
The SD assessment matrix includes three categories of SD indicators, namely 
local/regional/global environment, social sustainability and development, and economic 
and technological development, and has 12 items in total. The SD assessment matrix 
can be shown in Table 5.14. 
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Indicators Score (-2 to 2) 
Local/regional/global environment 
• Water quality and quantity 
 
• Air quality (emissions other than GHGs)  
• Other pollutants (including, where relevant, toxicity, 
radioactivity, POPs, stratospheric ozone layer depleting gases) 
 
• Soil condition (quality and quantity)  
• Biodiversity (species and habitat conservation)  
Sub total  
Social sustainability and development 
• Employment (including job quality, fulfillment of labor 
standards) 
 
• Livelihood of the poor (including poverty alleviation, 
distributional equity, and access to essential services) 
 
• Access to energy services  
• Human and institutional capacity (including empowerment, 
education, involvement, gender) 
 
Sub total  
Economic and technological development 
• Employment (numbers) 
 
• Balance of payments (sustainability)  
• Technological self reliance (including project replicability, 
hard currency liability, skills development, institutional 
capacity, technology transfer) 
 
Sub total  
Total  
 
Table 5.14: The sustainable development assessment matrix; (source: The Gold Standard Foundation 
[36]) 
 
For evaluating each indicator, the evaluator will use a five-value scale. A five-value 
scale range from +2 (maximum) to -2 (minimum), with a middle value at zero and two 
intermediate values (+1 and -1). The definition of a scoring system is shown in Table 
5.15. 
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Score Definition 
+2 Major positive impacts 
+1 Minor positive impacts 
0 No, or negligible impacts, i.e. there is no impact or the impact is considered 
insignificant by stakeholders. 
-1 Minor negative impacts, i.e. where there is a measurable impact but not one 
that is considered by stakeholders to mitigate against the implementation of 
the project activity or cause significant damage to ecological, social, and/or 
economic systems.    
-2 Major negative, i.e. where there is significant damage to ecological, social, 
and/or economic systems that cannot be mitigated through preventive (not 
remedial) measures. 
 
Table 5.15: The definition of a scoring system; (source: The Gold Standard Foundation [36]) 
 
The SD indicators must be measured relative to the baseline situation as described in the 
project documents. The SD assessment must be based on existing sources of 
information such as existing reports, results from stakeholder consultations, past 
experiences with similar project type, etc. For eligibility to the GS, the project must 
meet all the following requirements (The Gold Standard Foundation [36]): 
 
• Each of the components must get a non-negative sub-total score. 
• The project must get a positive total score. 
• If one of the indicators has a score of -2, the project is not eligible for the Gold 
Standard.   
 
The objective of stakeholder consultation is to ensure local acceptance of the project. 
Project developers must invite local stakeholders to two consultation meetings, one in 
the initial stages of project, and another one before validation (Gold Standard [37]). 
Finally, the GS requires an EIA if the stakeholders indicate significant environmental 
impacts. 
Finally, the GS cannot be widely implemented because this methodology was designed 
for only renewable energy projects and end use energy efficiency improvement projects. 
Therefore, the GS is not suitable for other project types to implement.  
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5.8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigates the concept of SD and the methods for assessing the 
sustainability of the CDM project. The first and the most widely quoted definition of SD 
was coined by the Brundtland Report. Later, the UNCED created the three dimensions 
of SD for defining the concept of SD. The three dimensions of SD include 
environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and social sustainability. These 
three dimensions are also used to define the sustainability of CDM projects. Under each 
dimension of SD, SD criteria are created for assessing sustainability of CDM projects. 
The United Nations designed the potential SD indicators for assessing CDM projects 
(see Table 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3). These SD indicators are equally important, so each SD 
indicator is not given a weight based on its importance. However, not all SD indicators 
of CDM project are equally important in the specific context of a country or a region 
(Sutter [108]). Consequently, the potential SD indicators suggested by the United 
Nations may not reflect stakeholder preferences towards the sustainability of CDM 
projects.  
Our review clearly finds that the SD objectives of CDM project are not clearly 
interpreted by many host countries. This finding is consistent with Brown et al. [8], 
Schneider [101], and Sterk et al. [105]. Moreover, we found that most host countries 
use checklists as a method for assessing the sustainability of CDM projects. However, 
this method has two weaknesses: (i) It is very difficult to implement this methodology 
because this methodology gives the wide and vague assessment requirements and 
therefore it provides much room for interpretation; and (2) The validity of assessment 
based on this methodology is low because there is no clear procedure for 
implementation.   
Finally, we found the two problems of CDM’s contribution to SD: (1) a conflict 
between the twin objectives of CDM projects (sustainability and carbon reduction); and 
(2) the lack of consistency in the fulfillment of host countries’ duties to assess CDM 
projects for sustainability. These problems are shown in Figure 5.4.    
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Figure 5.4: The two fundamental problems of CDM’s contribution to SD 
 
The vague concept of sustainability gives the host countries a chance to set their own 
SD assessment for CDM projects, so their SD assessments are inconsistent. This means 
some host countries cannot guarantee the sustainability of CDM projects. Consequently, 
we found that some projects with negative impacts were approved by some host 
countries. Considering another problem, there is a conflict between the twin objectives 
of CDM projects. This is because the SD objective of CDM projects is not given a 
monetary value. Finally, this encourages investors to invest in the low hanging fruit 
projects which can deliver huge volumes of CERs, but cannot deliver other SD benefits. 
These two problems make CDM projects fail to achieve the SD objective. Finally, this 
has resulted in the development of CDM sustainability labels.      
 In theory CDM sustainability labels will give a monetary value to the SD objective. 
This can result in a synergy between the twin objectives of “ensuring cost-effectiveness 
of GHG emission reductions” and “promoting sustainable development”. Moreover, 
Providing additional 
standard to assess 
CDM projects 
A conflict between the 
twin objectives 
A lack of consistency in 
the application of the host 
countries’ duties 
Investment in the low 
hanging fruit projects 
Projects with negative 
impacts approved by the 
host countries 
CDM projects fail to 
achieve the SD objective 
The development of 
CDM sustainability 
labels 
Giving the 
monetary value 
to the SD 
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CDM sustainability labels will provide additional standard to assess the sustainability of 
CDM projects which is very clear and consistent. This has potential to help host 
countries to guarantee the sustainability of CDM projects. In principle, CDM 
sustainability labels can completely solve these two problems. However, the willingness 
to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability labels is unclear. Therefore, 
we will investigate whether CDM sustainability labels can give monetary value to SD in 
Chapter 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 6 
 
An Analysis of Current CDM Portfolio 
 
 
As previously noted, CDM projects are facing the problem of their contribution to SD. 
According to Kolshus et al. [59], CERs generated by industrial gas projects (including 
HFCs, PFCs, and N2O projects) produce fewest SD benefits compared to other types of 
project. This implies that all types of CDM project are not the same in terms of SD 
benefits. Although the CDM could be considered successful in terms of the number of 
registered projects, serious questions remain about whether the current CDM portfolio 
generates high quality of carbon credits in terms of SD benefits. Consequently, this 
chapter aims to: (1) investigate the demand and supply of CDM projects; and (2) 
investigate whether the current CDM portfolio is generating the high quality of carbon 
credits in terms of SD benefits. 
As CDM projects generate CERs directly, CERs represent the demand and supply of the 
CDM projects. Consequently, we will use the demand and supply of CERs as  
representative of CDM portfolio.     
 
6.1 Demand Side 
 
The value of CERs is, like any traded good, influenced by both demand and supply. An 
increase in the number of the CDM projects will directly raise the supply of CERs to the 
market. However there are many drivers of CER demand. The key drivers are the Kyoto 
commitments, the multinational and national commitments, and the voluntary 
commitments. Buyers largely engage in CER transactions because of emission 
commitments at international, national, and local levels. The Kyoto Protocol is the 
largest demand for CERs (World Bank [142]). Besides large scale buyers, there is also a 
growing number of retail buyer who purchase emission permits to meet their own 
individual emission reduction targets. The major demand for CERs can be divided into 
the following groups. 
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6.1.1 The Kyoto Obligation 
 
The Kyoto obligation generates the largest demand for CERs. Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, Annex I countries have their own emission reduction targets. Thus, Annex I 
countries must buy CERs generated by the CDM projects to meet their own emission 
reduction targets. Figure 6.1 show the gap between average 2008–2010 total GHG 
emissions and Kyoto targets (without the use of carbon sinks and flexible mechanisms) 
for the European countries (European Environment Agency [27]). Each bar represents 
the gap between domestic emissions and the Kyoto target. A positive value indicates 
that national total emissions were lower than the Kyoto target. According to European 
Environment Agency [27], Austria, Luxembourg, and Spain were furthest away from 
their individual targets (see Figure 6.1). Therefore, these countries are the majority of 
European countries’ demand for CERs.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: The gap between average 2008–2010 total GHG emissions and Kyoto targets (without the 
use of carbon sinks and flexible mechanisms) for the European countries (source: European Environment 
Agency [27]) 
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6.1.2 The European Union  Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
 
The EU ETS is currently the largest multinational emissions trading scheme in the 
world. Under the EU ETS, the EU member states will agree their national emission caps 
and then allocate allowances to their main industrial sectors. Currently, each member 
state allocate allowances to five main industrial sectors, namely power and heat 
generation, iron and steel, mineral oil refineries, mineral industry, and the pulp and 
paper. The EU ETS allow the companies to trade surplus allowances between 
themselves. The company that reduces its GHG emissions beyond its target will has a 
surplus of allowances and then can sell these surplus allowances to the company that 
can not meet its own target. Moreover, the EU ETS allow the companies to purchase 
CERs and ERUs generated by the CDM and JI respectively for meeting their own 
targets. Consequently, the EU ETS generate the high demand for CERs. In year 2008 
and 2009, 86.9 million CERs and 83.5 million CERs respectively, were surrendered for 
compliance in the EU ETS (Trotignon [120]).  
 
6.1.3 The U.S. Cap-and-Trade Program 
 
Despite the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, individual states have their own climate 
change policies aiming to reduce GHG emissions. Indeed, the state and local climate 
change policies far outpace the federal climate change policies. Although the local 
government has less power than the federal government, the local government has more 
responsibility for climate change problem than the federal government. These climate 
change policies developed by local government represent a sharp contrast to the federal 
government’s official stance on climate change. Many states have enacted climate 
change legislation. State climate change policies were initiated by state Climate Action 
Plans (CAPs) and their policies focus on the use of renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
public transportation, climate-neutral land use, waste management, alternative fuel 
fleets, and recycling (Byrne et al. [11]). The objective of the state and local climate 
change policies is to reduce their GHG emissions. State and local governments are now 
setting climate change action plans. Most state and local governments set two key 
policies which include individual emission reduction targets and a multi-state cap-and-
trade program in their climate change action plans. 
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In their climate change action plans, state governments set their own emission reduction 
targets which are similar to those of the Kyoto Protocol. Different states have different 
emission reduction targets as shown in Table 6.1.  
 
States Climate Change Policies 
Arizona Targets to reduce GHG emissions to 50% below 2000 
levels by 2040 
California Targets to reduce GHG emissions to 80% below 1990 
levels by 2050 
Delaware Targets to reduce GHG emissions to 7% below 1990 
levels by 2010 
New Jersey Targets to reduce GHG emissions to 3.5% below 1990 
levels by 2005 
New Mexico Targets to reduce GHG emissions to 75% below 2000 
levels by 2050 
New York Targets to reduce GHG emissions by 5% below 1990 
levels in 2010, and 10% below 1990 levels by 2020 
 
Table 6.1: An example of state emission reduction targets; (source: [134]) 
 
Moreover, state and local governments set a multi-state cap-and-trade program which 
represents the cooperative action by multiple states to reduce GHG emissions. A multi-
state cap-and-trade program is developed by the multi-government alliances to help US 
states to reduce their GHG emissions in a cost-effective manner. A multi-state cap-and-
trade program is also known as the U.S. cap-and-trade program. The multi-state cap-
and-trade programs are being developed under the three multi-state programs for 
climate change which include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the 
Western Climate Initiative (WCI), and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Accord. A multi-state cap-and-trade program is firstly developed under the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cooperative initiative of the 
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic United States region to reduce CO2 emissions and 
develop a multi-state cap-and-trade program. A multi-state cap-and-trade program is 
aimed to reduce CO2 emissions from power plants in participating states. The RGGI is 
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currently participated by 10 states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
Moreover, the District of Columbia, New Brunswick, Pennsylvania, and the Eastern 
Canadian Provinces are observers in the process. The RGGI is initiated by New York 
Governor George E. Pataki who invited the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States to 
work together to develop climate change action plan. According to a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), the signatory states would stabilize their CO2 emissions from 
power plants at 2005 levels by 2015. Then the CO2 emissions will be reduced by 2.5% 
per year for the four years 2015 through 2018. This approach will result in a total of a 
10% reduction by the end of 2018. The RGGI will go into effect on 1 January 2009.     
Then, a multi-state cap-and-trade program is developed under the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI) on February 2007. The WCI is participated by Arizona, California, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and the Canadian provinces of British 
Columbia and Manitoba. The purpose of the WCI is to collaborative in identifying, 
evaluating, and implementing ways to reduce GHG emissions and to achieve related co-
benefits. On August 2007, The WCI set a regional target to reduce GHG emissions by 
15% below 2005 levels by 2020. The WCI is now developing a multi-state cap-and-
trade program to help its members meet their emission reduction targets at least cost. 
The WCI members will release design recommendations for a multi-state cap-and-trade 
program by August 2008. 
Finally, the most recent multi-state cap-and-trade program is developed under the 
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (The Midwest Accord). The Midwest 
Accord (MA) is developed on November 2007 to reduce GHG emissions and create a 
multi-state cap-and-trade program. The Midwest Accord is participated by the US states 
of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Canadian province 
of Manitoba. Moreover, Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota are observers in the process. 
The Midwestern cap-and-trade program is expected to be active in Mid-2010.                  
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(Million Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide) 
State Cap-and-Trade  State Carbon Dioxide  Percent of total state  
  Program Emissions (Year 2004) CO2 emissions 
Connecticut RGGI 45.5 0.77% 
Delaware RGGI 16.9 0.28% 
Maine RGGI 23.3 0.39% 
Maryland RGGI 80.6 1.36% 
Massachusetts RGGI 83.6 1.41% 
New Hampshire RGGI 22.0 0.37% 
New Jersey RGGI 128.6 2.16% 
New York RGGI 216.7 3.65% 
Rhode Island RGGI 11.0 0.19% 
Vermont RGGI 7.0 0.12% 
Total 635.2 10.69% 
Arizona WCI 96.9 1.63% 
California WCI 398.9 6.71% 
New Mexico WCI 59.0 0.99% 
Oregon WCI 42.5 0.72% 
Utah WCI 65.7 1.11% 
Washington WCI 82.9 1.40% 
Total 745.9 12.55% 
Illinois MA 244.5 4.11% 
Iowa MA 81.8 1.38% 
Kansas MA 77.8 1.31% 
Michigan MA 189.9 3.20% 
Minnesota MA 102.8 1.73% 
Wisconsin MA 108.8 1.83% 
Total 805.6 13.56% 
Total Programs 2,186.7 36.80% 
 
Table 6.2: State CO2 emissions (Year 2004) under the three cap-and-trade programs; (source: [104]) 
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Table 6.2 show how much CO2 emissions all multi-state cap-and-trade programs cover. 
Clearly, all multi-state cap-and-trade programs cover 36.8% of the total US CO2 
emissions. The Midwest Accord covers the largest proportion (13.56%) of the total state 
CO2 emissions, closely followed by the WCI (12.55%), and the RGGI (10.69%). All 
multi-state cap-and-trade programs account for 2,186 million metric tons in 2004, 
whereas Russia which is the world's third largest emitter in 2004 account for 1,669 
million metric tons. Thus, CO2 emissions from these cap-and-trade programs can be 
ranked the third largest CO2 emissions in the world. Unfortunately, Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Florida which are the major CO2 emitters do not participate in 
these multi-state cap-and-trade programs. In the year 2004, these four major CO2 
emitters account for 24.5% of the total US CO2 emissions.  
Clearly, all multi-state cap-and-trade programs represent the large demand for emission 
permits in the carbon market because CO2 emissions from these cap-and-trade programs 
are ranked the third largest CO2 emissions in the world. Consequently, U.S. states will 
soon become one of the large buyers of emission permits.  Although the U.S. has not 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. companies can buy CERs from the members of the 
Kyoto Protocol for meeting their own targets (Engel [25]). This is because there are no 
Kyoto regulations which prohibit members of the Kyoto Protocol from selling emission 
permits to nonparty countries. Consequently, these three multi-state cap-and-trade 
programs will become the large sources of demand for CERs in the future. 
 
6.1.4 The other trading schemes 
 
There are many other trading schemes such as the Keidanren voluntary action plan, 
Canadian Large Final Emitters system (LFE), etc. These schemes are the major sources 
of demand for CERs. The Keidanren voluntary action plan is created by the Nippon 
Keidanren which is a Japan Business Federation. The Keidanren plan is aimed to 
stabilize CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and industrial processes at 1990 level by 
2010, but this plan make no commitment to the Japanese government (Kiko Network 
[57]). Currently, there are 35 industries including energy, mining, manufacturing, and 
construction participating in the Keidanren plan. These industries select their own target 
indices such as CO2 emission per unit, gross CO2 emission, energy efficiency, etc. The 
Keidanren plan bundle these industrial targets together as one. Industries under the 
Keidanren plan can purchase CERs for meeting their own targets.  
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Another example of trading scheme is Canadian Large Final Emitters system (LFE). 
The LFE aimed to reduce emissions by approximately 270 Mt annually in the period 
2008-2012. The LFE consist mainly of companies active in three industries including 
thermal electricity, oil and gas, and mining and manufacturing. Reducing emissions in 
these industries will help Canada to meet its emission reduction targets during the first 
period of the Kyoto Protocol. Like other trading schemes mentioned above, the LFE 
allow the companies to use CERs for compliance purposes.  
 
6.2 Supply Side 
 
6.2.1 Overview of the CDM Projects 
 
As of July 2010, 2,262 projects are registered as CDM projects and a further 171 
projects are in the registration process (UNEP-Risoe [126]). 49 projects are withdrawn 
and rejected. The amount of CERs issued is 421 million CERs. CER price is about 
€12.00 per tonne of CO2e, so the value of CERs issued is 5,052 million Euros. These 
2,262 projects are expected to generate 370 million CERs per year. The total amount of 
expected 2012 CERs is 2,879 million CERs. The growth of total expected accumulated 
2012 CERs can be shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: The growth of total expected accumulated 2012 CERs; (source: UNEP-Risoe [126]) 
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6.2.2 Distribution of Registered Projects by Host Region and Host Country 
 
As of July 2010, the CDM projects are concentrated in Asia-Pacific and Latin America, 
with a 75.07% and 20.73% share of total number of registered projects, respectively 
(UNEP-Risoe [126]). Asia-Pacific creates the largest amount of CERs (300,666,000 
CERs), followed by Latin America (49,901,000 CERs), and Africa (11,181,000 CERs). 
The distribution of registered projects by host region is shown in Table 6.3 and Figure 
6.3.       
 
Host Country  Number of  % share of  kCERs % share  
  
registered 
project  
the registered 
project    of CERs 
Latin America 469 20.73% 49,901 13.50% 
Asia-Pacific 1698 75.07% 300,666 81.34% 
Europe and Central Asia 26 1.15% 2,151 0.58% 
Africa 43 1.90% 11,181 3.02% 
Middle-East 26 1.15% 5,727 1.55% 
Total 2,262 100.00% 369,626 100.00% 
 
Table 6.3: The distribution of registered projects by host region; (source: UNEP-Risoe [126] and author’s 
calculations) 
Registered projects by region (Total: 2,262)
Latin 
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Figure 6.3: The distribution of registered projects by host region 
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Considering the distribution of registered projects by host country, China has the largest 
number of registered projects (883 projects), followed by India (513 projects), Brazil 
(173 projects), Mexico (121 projects), and Malaysia (81 projects). In these developing 
countries which are actively hosting the CDM projects, it is seen as a means to attract 
new, foreign capital, and possibly to stimulate technology transfer (Ellis and Kamel 
[23]). The distribution of registered projects by host country can be shown in Table 6.4 
and Figure 6.4.  
 
Host Country  Number of  % share of  
  registered project  the registered project  
China 883 39.04% 
India 513 22.68% 
Brazil 173 7.65% 
Mexico 121 5.35% 
Malaysia 81 3.58% 
Indonesia 48 2.12% 
Philippines 41 1.81% 
South Korea 40 1.77% 
Others 362 16.00% 
Total 2262 100.00% 
 
Table 6.4: The distribution of registered projects by host country; (source: UNEP-Risoe [126] and 
author’s calculations) 
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Figure 6.4: The distribution of registered projects by host country 
 
Host Country  kCERs % share of CERs  
China 225,019 60.88% 
India 42,816 11.58% 
Brazil 20,385 5.52% 
South Korea 14,933 4.04% 
Mexico 9,474 2.56% 
Malaysia 5,230 1.42% 
Chile 4,705 1.27% 
Indonesia 4,327 1.17% 
Others 42,738 11.56% 
Total 369,627 100.00% 
 
Table 6.5: The distribution of CERs by host country; (source: UNEP-Risoe [126] and author’s 
calculations) 
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Figure 6.5: The distribution of CERs by host country 
 
The amount of CERs generated by the CDM projects does not correlate strongly with 
the number of registered projects in a given country. Although India accounts for 
22.68% of total number of registered projects, these projects provide only 11.58% of 
CERs. South Korea is ranked fourth in the amount of CERs generated by the registered 
projects despite hosting the eighth largest number of registered projects. South Korea 
has the number of registered projects close to Philippines (see Table 6.4), but South 
Korea (14,933,000 CERs) far surpasses Philippines (1,474,000 CERs) in the amount of 
CERs. This is because the amount of CERs is strongly related to CDM project types. 
Industrial gas projects (including HFCs, PFCs, and N2O projects) generate more CER 
volumes than other CDM project types. South Korea has 12 industrial gas projects, 
whereas Philippines has only one industrial gas project. Consequently, South Korea can 
generate higher CER volumes than Philippines. China far surpasses India in the amount 
of CERs generated by the registered projects. China is responsible for the largest 
amount of CERs (60.88%), distantly followed by India (11.58%), Brazil (5.52%), South 
Korea (4.04%), and Mexico (2.56%). The distribution of CERs by host country can be 
shown in Table 6.5 and Figure 6.5. 
  
6.2.3 Distribution of CDM Project Types 
 
So far, renewable energy projects account for the largest number of registered projects. 
Renewable energy projects are responsible for 58.75% share of total number of 
CERs by country ( Total: 369 ,627,000) 
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South Korea, 4 .04% 
Mexico , 2.56% 
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registered projects, distantly followed by CH4 reduction & Cement & Coal mine/bed 
(24.14%), Supply-side EE (7.21%), and HFC & N2O reduction (3.98%). The 
distribution of CDM project types can be shown in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.6. The 
amount of CERs generated by the CDM projects does not correlate strongly with the 
number of registered projects in a given project type. Although renewable energy 
projects account for more than 50% share of total number of registered projects, these 
projects can provide only 31.58% of CERs. On the other hand, HFC and N2O reduction 
projects surpass renewable energy projects in the amount of CERs generated by the 
registered projects. HFC and N2O reduction projects ranked fourth in the number of 
registered projects are responsible for only 90 projects (3.98%), but these projects can 
provide the largest amount of CERs. HFC and N2O reduction projects account for 
35.37% share of CERs, followed by Renewables (31.58%), CH4 reduction & Cement & 
Coal mine/bed (17.97%), Supply-side EE (7.33%), and Fuel switch (6.98%). The 
distribution of CERs by project type can be shown in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.7. 
 
CDM project type Number of  % share of  
  registered project  the registered project  
Renewables 1,329 58.75% 
CH4 reduction&Cement&Coal mine/bed 546 24.14% 
Supply-side EE 163 7.21% 
HFC&N2O reduction 90 3.98% 
Demand-side EE 71 3.14% 
Fuel switch 45 1.99% 
Afforestation & Reforestation 15 0.66% 
Transport 3 0.13% 
Total 2,262 100.00% 
 
Table 6.6: The distribution of CDM project types; (source: UNEP-Risoe [126] and author’s calculations) 
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Figure 6.6: The distribution of CDM project types 
 
 
CDM project type kCERs % share of CERs  
HFC & N2O reduction 130,749 35.37% 
Renewables 116,713 31.58% 
CH4 reduction & Cement & Coal mine/bed 66,414 17.97% 
Supply-side EE 27,106 7.33% 
Fuel switch 25,817 6.98% 
Demand-side EE 2,060 0.56% 
Afforestation & Reforestation 463 0.13% 
Transport 305 0.08% 
Total 369,627 100.00% 
 
Table 6.7: The distribution of CERs by project type; (source: UNEP-Risoe [126] and author’s 
calculations) 
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CERs by project type (Total: 369,627,000)
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Figure 6.7: The distribution of CERs by project type 
 
6.2.4 Distribution of Renewable Energy CDM Projects 
 
So far, hydro projects account for the largest number of registered projects. The hydro 
projects are responsible for 48.23% share of total number of registered projects, 
distantly followed by Wind (27.69%), Biomass (21.67%), and Solar (1.66%). There is 
only one tidal CDM project, namely Shinwa Tidal Power Plant Project, which is located 
in South Korea. The distribution of renewable energy CDM projects can be shown in 
Table 6.8 and Figure 6.8. The hydro projects provide the largest amount of CERs 
(52.69%), distantly followed by Wind (30.81%), Biomass (14.25%), and Geothermal 
(1.57%). Surprisingly, the only one tidal CDM project provides 0.27% of CERs, 
whereas the 22 solar CDM projects can provide only 0.40%. The only 9 geothermal 
projects can generate more CERs than 22 solar CDM projects. The distribution of CERs 
by type of renewable energy can be shown in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.9. 
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Type of renewable energy Number of  % share of  
  registered project  the registered project  
Hydro 641 48.23% 
Wind 368 27.69% 
Biomass energy 288 21.67% 
Solar 22 1.66% 
Geothermal 9 0.68% 
Tidal 1 0.07% 
Total 1,329 100% 
 
Table 6.8: The distribution of renewable energy CDM projects; (source: UNEP-Risoe [126] and author’s 
calculations) 
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Figure 6.8: The distribution of renewable energy CDM projects 
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Type of renewable energy kCERs % share of CERs  
Hydro 61,496 52.69% 
Wind 35,963 30.81% 
Biomass energy 16,637 14.25% 
Geothermal 1,835 1.57% 
Solar 467 0.40% 
Tidal 315 0.27% 
Total 116,713 100.00% 
 
Table 6.9: The distribution of CERs by type of renewable energy; (source: UNEP-Risoe [126] and 
author’s calculations) 
 
CERs by type of renewable energy (Total:116,713,000)
Hydro, 52.69%
Wind, 30.81%
Biomass energy, 
14.25%
Geothermal, 
1.58%
Tidal, 0.27%
Solar, 0.40%
Hydro
Wind
Biomass energy
Geothermal
Tidal
Solar
 
Figure 6.9: The distribution of CERs by type of renewable energy 
 
6.3 Conclusions 
 
Currently, the CDM projects are concentrated in Asia-Pacific region with a 75.07% 
share of total number of registered projects. So far, China has the largest number of 
registered projects and provides more than 50% of CERs. Considering the distribution 
of CDM project types, HFC and N2O reduction projects account for the largest share of 
CERs (35.37%). According to Kolshus et al. [59], industrial gas projects (including 
HFCs, PFCs, and N2O projects) produce fewest SD benefits compared to other types of 
project. Therefore, this result showed that carbon credits with low quality in terms of 
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SD benefits are occupying the carbon market. Moreover, CER buyers may not be 
concerned with the SD benefits generated by project types. Although renewable energy 
projects account for the largest number of registered projects, they account for the 
second largest share of CERs (31.38%). This imply that the amount of CERs does not 
correlate strongly with the number of registered projects in a given project type. 
Renewable energy projects are concentrated in three sectors: (1) hydro, (2) wind, and 
(3) biomass projects.  
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Chapter 7 
 
A Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology for Classifying 
CER Buyers and Valuing the Sustainable Development Benefits of 
CDM Projects 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The Kyoto Protocol intended CERs to conform to a common standard (for carbon 
reduction and sustainability) providing a homogenous good that could be bought and 
sold. In reality they are not all the same, some CERs are worth more (or less) than 
others in terms of the SD benefits (Meyrick [73]). As previously noted, CERs generated 
by industrial gas projects produce fewest SD benefits compared to other types of project 
(Kolshus et al., [59]). The quality of carbon credits has now entered into the market’s 
consciousness. Consequently, credits are not perceived as a homogenous product with 
traders differentiating between CERs. A lack of consistency in the application of the 
host countries’ duties to ensure the sustainability of CDM projects and a conflict 
between the twin objectives of sustainability and carbon reduction make credits 
different from each other.  This has resulted in the development of international CDM 
sustainability labels. CERs with CDM sustainability label are accepted as the high 
quality CERs in terms of their SD benefits. According to Sutter [108], there is a need 
for developing CDM sustainability label to guarantee a high quality of CDM projects in 
addition to the low requirements by the host country. Moreover, Sutter suggested that 
CDM sustainability labeling has the potential to drive the CDM down the sustainability 
path provided the buyers are willing to pay a price premium. This is because a price 
premium will encourage project developers to develop more projects with CDM 
sustainability labels. The promotion of these labels is therefore a critical issue. In order 
to increase the market share of CDM sustainability label, the marketing is important 
(Muller, [75]). However, not all buyers are concerned with the SD quality CERs. Some 
buyers still target cheap credits from projects which deliver large volumes of CERs, but 
cannot deliver other SD benefits. There is no information about the characteristics of 
buyers favoring CDM sustainability labels and those who do not. Moreover, the market 
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does not know why some buyers participate in CDM sustainability labels (Meyrick, 
[73]). Therefore, it is now necessary to validate the concept of non-homogeneous 
carbon credits and investigate buyers’ willingness to pay a price premium for CERs 
with CDM sustainability label. This research will use cluster analysis to classify CER 
buyers according to their attitudes towards and involvement in CDM sustainability 
labels and apply the contingent valuation method (CVM) to assess the value of SD 
benefits of CDM projects. Finally, this study has chosen the Gold Standard (GS) label 
as the representative of CDM sustainability labels traded in the premium market.        
 
7.2 Research Objectives, Research Questions, and Research Hypotheses 
 
1) To classify CER buyers according to their attitudes towards and involvement in 
CDM sustainability labels. 
This objective can be achieved by pursuing these two research questions: 
 
• Whether the carbon market is comprises multiple groups based on their 
attitudes towards and involvement in CDM sustainability labels. 
We can evaluate this research question by formulating Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: CER buyers can be classified into distinct groups based on 
their attitudes towards and involvement in CDM sustainability labels.   
• What are the key characteristics of each buyer cluster? 
We can evaluate this research question by formulating the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The buyer clusters are significantly different in: organization 
type; level of paid up capital; perception of SD benefits; perception of return 
on investment; perception of image of the sustainability labeling; 
participation in the voluntary market; the project priority; knowledge in the 
sustainability label; the attitude towards the host country’s duty; and their 
willingness to pay.     
 
2) Investigate the value of SD benefits generated by CDM projects through the 
willingness of buyers to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability 
label. 
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This objective can be achieved by pursuing these two research questions: 
 
• Whether the buyers are willing to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM 
sustainability label in recognition of the contribution to SD. 
We can evaluate this research question by formulating Hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3: Buyers are willing to pay a price premium for CERs with 
CDM sustainability label.   
• How much are the buyers willing to pay a price premium for CERs with 
CDM sustainability Label in recognition of the contribution to SD? 
 
3) Identify the factors influencing buyers’ willingness to pay a price premium for 
CERs with CDM sustainability label. 
This objective can be achieved by pursuing this research question: 
 
• What are the factors influencing the willingness of CER buyers to pay a 
price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability label?  
We can evaluate this research question by formulating the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Expected SD benefits, expected return on investment, 
involvement in the GS label, importance of the GS label, and the attitude 
towards the host country’s duty are significantly related to the probability of 
the willingness to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability 
label.    
 
7.3 An Application of Cluster Analysis to Classify CER Buyers 
 
This study will use cluster analysis to classify the carbon market according to buyers’ 
attitudes towards and involvement in CDM sustainability labels. Cluster analysis is a 
multivariate technique, which is sometimes described as more of an art than a science 
(Ulengin et al. [121]). The objective of cluster analysis is to partition a set of objects 
into two or more groups based on the similarity of the objects for a set of specific 
characteristics (Hair et al. [41]). The clustering methods are broadly classified into two; 
namely hierarchical and non-hierarchical methods. Hierarchical clustering creates a 
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hierarchy of a treelike structure called a dendrogram to see the relationship among 
observations. The root of a dendrogram consists of a single cluster containing all 
observations. Hierarchical method join observations or clusters until instructed to stop. 
This method is often criticized because observations joined early in the process cannot 
be separated (Gloy and Akridge [35]). In contrast to the hierarchical method, a non-
hierarchical method does not create a hierarchy of a treelike structure.    The non-
hierarchical method is frequently referred to as the K-means method. This method 
assigns observations into cluster once the number of clusters to be formed is specified.   
The objective of the K-means method is to partition n cases into k clusters where each 
case belongs to the cluster with the nearest mean. By the K-means method, there will be 
a maximum intergroup and minimum intragroup variance. Analysts must decide how 
many clusters they wish to obtain before starting the calculation process of the K-means 
clustering (Hair et al. [41]). 
In the past the hierarchical method was more popular than the non- hierarchical method, 
but now the non-hierarchical method gain increased acceptability and is applied 
increasingly (Hair et al. [41]). Moreover, Hair et al. conclude that the non-hierarchical 
method has several advantages over the hierarchical method. The results generated by 
the non-hierarchical method are less susceptible to the outliers in the data, the distance 
measure used, and the inclusion of irrelevant or inappropriate variables.      
In this study the K-means method is selected to classify the CER buyers in the market. 
According to the literature discussed previously, the carbon market appears to offer two 
products: (1) CERs with CDM sustainability labels; and (2) Non-labelled CERs. CDM 
projects generating non-labelled CERs pass only the sustainability test set by the host 
country, while projects generating labelled CERs must pass both the sustainability test 
set by the host country and another set by CDM sustainability labels. This suggests the 
adoption of a two-cluster solution. Furthermore, the K-means method can identify a 
clear cluster structure if the number of clusters is known in advance (Hair et al. [41], 
Jung [54], Perez and Nadal [90]). The clustering variables and additional variables used 
in cluster analysis are identified as follows:    
 
7.3.1 Clustering Variables 
 
Clustering variables will be used to characterize CER buyers. Selecting the clustering 
variables is based on an explicit theory, past research, and practical considerations (Hair 
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et al., [41]). The clustering variables can be both demographic variables and behavioral 
variables. According to Herath et al. [45], sub-groups or segments of customers can be 
differentiated on the basis of shared needs, wants, lifestyle, values, and behavioral 
responses to information cues. Vlosky et al. [136] use two variables to differentiate 
buyers in the wood product industry, namely (i) involvement in environmentally 
certified products and (ii) attitudes towards the importance of environmentally certified 
products. Following Vlosky et al. [136] we use these two behavioral variables as the 
clustering variables. As discussed previously, this study will use the GS label as the 
representative of CDM sustainability labels. Therefore, we will measure buyers’ 
involvement in the GS label and attitudes towards an importance of the GS label.  This 
was achieved by asking whether they agreed with these five statements:          
 
• My organization has purchased CERs with the  Gold Standard label in the past 
year; 
• If available, I would seek out CERs with the  Gold Standard label; 
• My organization believes there is a need for the Gold Standard label in the 
carbon market; 
• My organization believes the Gold Standard label can guarantee the sustainable 
development benefits of CDM projects; and 
• My organization believes the Gold Standard label can help improve the CDM’s 
contribution to sustainable development. 
 
The participants gave answers on a five-point Likert scale where, 1 = totally disagree 
and 5 = totally agree. This study used these five statements as clustering variables. 
Following Vlosky et al. [136], key indicators of consumers’ involvement in 
environmentally certified products are: (i) behavior to seek out product, and (ii) past 
purchase of products. Therefore, we will use the first and second statements to measure 
consumer involvement.  
According to Vlosky et al. [136], positive attitudes towards product certification are 
translated into demand for certified products. In this study the attitudes towards an 
importance of the GS label will represent buyer’s consciousness in the SD objective of 
CDM project. We will use the third, fourth, and fifth statements to measure buyers’ 
attitudes towards an importance of the GS label.  
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Finally, we get the five clustering variables from these statements. The answers to these 
questions are presented in a five-point Likert scale. Therefore, we must check if these 
five statements measure the same dimension. The Cronbach alpha was used to measure 
the reliability of these five statements. The results of reliability testing will be presented 
with the research results.     
 
7.3.2 Additional Variables 
 
A set of additional variables will be used to develop more detailed profiles of each 
buyer cluster. To determine if differences exist based on this set of additional variables, 
a cross-tabulation will be employed to identify the profiles of the two buyer clusters. 
The chi-square statistic is used to determine if there are any statistically significant 
differences between the two buyer clusters. Such variables, if significant, would offer 
efficient ways for developing a policy to promote the products that can contribute to SD 
(Getzner and Grabner-Krauter [32]). Additional variables are concluded in Table 7.1 
and 7.2 below. 
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Variable Name Description 
Organization type Nominal; “1” for “Private company”; “2” for 
“Government”; “3” for “Charity” 
Paid up capital Ordinal; “1” for “less than 1 million Euros”; 
“2” for “1 – 10 million Euros”; “3” for “11 – 99 
million Euros”; “4” for “100 – 499 million 
Euros”; “5” for “500 – 1,000 million Euros”; 
“6” for “More than 1 billion Euros” 
Buyers’ perception of SD benefits 
generated by the GS project 
Ordinal; “1” for respondents stating “The 
expected SD benefits generated by Gold 
Standard are lower than non-labelled project”; 
“2” for “The expected SD benefits generated by 
Gold Standard are the same as non-labelled 
project”; “3” for “The expected SD benefits 
generated by Gold Standard are higher than 
non-labelled project” 
Buyers’ perception of return on 
investment (ROI) of CERs from the 
GS project 
Ordinal; “1” for respondents stating “ROI of 
CERs from Gold Standard is lower than non-
labelled project”; “2” for “ROI of CERs from 
Gold Standard is the same as non-labelled 
project”; “3” for “ROI of CERs from Gold 
Standard is higher than non-labelled project” 
Overall image of the GS label Ordinal; “1” for “Very negative”; “2” for 
“Fairly negative”; “3” for “Neither positive nor 
negative”; “4” for “Fairly positive”; “5” for 
“Very positive” 
 
Table 7.1: Additional variables for cluster profiling 
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Variable Name Description 
Buyers’ participation in the voluntary 
carbon offset market 
Nominal-Binary; “0” for “No”; “1” for “Yes” 
Priority for purchasing carbon credits Nominal; “1” for “Private company”; “2” for 
“Government” 
Buyers’ knowledge in the GS label Ordinal; “1” for “No knowledge”; “2” for 
“Poor”; “3” for “Fair”; “4” for “Good”; “5” for 
“Excellent” 
Attitude towards the host country’s 
duty to assess the sustainability of 
CDM projects 
Ordinal; The participants asked whether they 
agreed with the statement; “I cannot rely on a 
host country’s criteria to assess the sustainable 
development benefits of CDM projects”; “1” 
for “Totally disagree”; “2” for “Disagree”; “3” 
for “Not sure”; “4” for “Agree”; “5” for 
“Totally agree”  
Buyers’ willingness to pay Nominal-Binary; “0” for “No”; “1” for “Yes” 
 
Table 7.2 Additional variables for cluster profiling (Cont.) 
 
7.4 An Application of Contingent Valuation to Investigate the Value of SD 
benefits  
 
Contingent valuation (CV) is a survey-based hypothetical and direct method to estimate 
the monetary value of non-market resources. CV is referred to as a stated preference 
method because it asks respondents to directly state their value. This approach asks 
respondents to directly report their willingness to pay (WTP) or less often willingness to 
accept (WTA) compensation. Therefore, it is called “contingent” valuation because the 
respondents are asked to report their WTP or WTA, contingent on a specific 
hypothetical scenario and description of non-market resources. CV has been 
successfully used for resources that are not exchanged in the regular market. It creates a 
hypothetical marketplace where no actual transactions are made. CV was first presented 
in theory in 1947 by S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup who stated that people’s preferences can be 
obtained by appropriated interviews. However, S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup never followed up 
his idea. According to Kristrom [63], the first practical application of CV was 
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undertaken by a consulting company in 1958. This company asked people visiting the 
Delaware Basin to report their WTP for entering national parks. Moreover, Kristrom 
stated that the first significant academic application of CV was undertaken by Robert K. 
Davis in his Harvard dissertation in 1963. Currently, CV is being extensively employed 
in many research areas.      
According to Damigos et al. [19], CV is the most frequently and widely applied stated 
preference valuation technique because it is the only method available for capturing 
non-use values and it produce estimates as good as estimates obtained by other direct or 
indirect valuation methods. One objective of this study is to estimate the monetary value 
of SD benefits generated by CDM projects. As Yoo and Kwak [145] point out, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Panel (NOAA) concluded that CV 
can produce estimates that are reliable enough to be the starting point for administrative 
and judicial determinations and presented several recommendations.   
As previously noted, CV is based on asking people WTP questions. Freeman [29] 
defined that WTP is direct and indirect benefits of developing environmental quality in 
the form of money which is reported by people in the society. According to Tejam and 
Ross [112], WTP is the personal value over and above the actual cost or price of a good 
or service that is assigned by a person according to his/her own judgment. Considering 
the definition of WTP value, Hanley and Spash [43] defined that it is the sum of the 
product price and an individual’s consumer surplus. WTP values are represented by 
points along a demand curve for a product or service. Moreover, WTP values represent 
the marginal benefits of individuals at each point along the demand curve. Figure 7.1 
show WTP values. At point A, the quantity demanded is Q1 and the price is PC. The 
total WTP value is the whole area under the demand curve to the left of Q1. In other 
words, the total WTP value is represented by the area Q1AB0. This value is the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer revenue. The consumer surplus is represented by the 
triangle ABC and the producer revenue is represented by the area Q1AC0.  
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Figure 7.1: WTP value 
 
In economic theory, the WTP value should be approximately the same as the WTA 
value. However, Kahneman et al. [55] found that WTA value significantly exceed WTP 
value. Tohmo [123] gave the five reasons for the WTP/WTA disparity: (1) people act 
more cautiously in questions of WTP; (2) people reject the proprietorship connected 
with WTA; (3) people’s behavior is strategic; (4) people do not want to take any risks; 
and (5) income flexibility in the demand for goods in question is large.  
The advantage of the CV approach is that it can be used to estimate the monetary value 
of non-market goods and services that cannot be measured through other techniques 
(Tejam and Ross [112]). However, this method has some noteworthy limitations. 
Firstly, Evenson and Santaniello [28] find that the CV approach is susceptible to two 
types of bias – hypothetical bias; and strategic bias. Hypothetical bias typically occurs 
when the respondents are unable to accurately assess their WTP. This is because they 
have limited prior experience with the non-market good or service. Considering 
strategic bias, it occurs when the respondents deliberately understate or overstate the 
true value they place on the non-market good or service. An underbid may be indicative 
of the fact that someone isn’t willing to state his actual value for a resource because he 
believes it should be available at no cost. An overbid might represent a respondent’s 
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strategy to give a higher than reality price to something in hopes that the inflated 
response will influence the final results of the survey (Basili et al. [5]). Secondly, the 
CV approach can be very expensive and time-consuming because of the extensive 
survey work.     
Since the SD objective of the CDM is not given a monetary value, CV is chosen as a 
valuation method in this research. An application of CV to find the monetary value of 
SD benefits of the CDM is so far very limited. There have been only two studies that 
have employed CV to investigate willingness to pay a price premium for CERs in 
recognition of SD benefits. These studies were conducted by Asuka and Okimura [4] 
and Sterk et al. [105]. Asuka and Okimura conducted a survey in the carbon market 
with 82 usable questionnaires from CER buyers. Asuka and Okimura found that quality 
of CERs is determined by three aspects: (1) risks; (2) technologies; and (3) project’s 
contribution to SD. This study revealed that the willingness to pay a price premium for 
CERs in recognition of SD benefits and country risk was low. However, WTP value for 
SD benefits stand for only an improvement of the local environment in the host 
countries, the study failed to consider all SD aspects. This study showed that 
willingness to pay a price premium for an improvement of the local environment was € 
0.254 per tonne of CO2e. Moreover, the WTP value reported by this study may not be 
consistent because they did not give a clear definition of CERs used in the WTP 
question. In this study CERs may come from labelled CDM projects or non-labelled 
CDM projects. Consequently, some buyers may report their WTP in recognition of 
labelled CERs, whereas some buyers may report their WTP in recognition of non-
labelled CERs. In reality labelled CERs can attract a price premium more easily than 
non-labelled CERs. Therefore, the WTP question used in this study was inappropriate.   
More recently, Sterk et al. [105] conducted a survey of the demand for GS CERs and 
buyer’s willingness to pay a price premium for GS CERs. Sterk et al. sent 
questionnaires to 55 carbon credit buyers in the compliance market and got 17 usable 
questionnaires. When given the first question – “Has the buyer purchased GS-labelled 
CERs or would be interested in doing so?”, only 6 buyers (35%) answered “Yes” and 
the remaining 11 buyers answered “No”. These 6 buyers were then asked to report their 
WTP – “What level of premium on the normal CER price has been paid or would the 
buyer be willing to pay in relative and absolute terms?”. These buyers reported their 
WTP value ranging from € 1 to € 7 per tonne of CO2e. Finally, Sterk et al. concluded 
that a premium of 5% – 25% for GS CERs is possible and the tendency to pay a price 
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premium for GS CERs exists. However, a price premium for GS CERs varies widely. A 
price premium for GS CERs reported by Sterk et al. may not reflect the monetary value 
of SD benefits. This is because there are many reasons to pay a price premium for GS 
CERs such as high SD benefits, low Post-Kyoto risk, low methodology risk, etc. The 
Post-Kyoto risk is the risk that some CDM project types such as HFC, PFC, etc. may 
not be illegible to qualify as CDM project activity in the Post-Kyoto, whereas the 
methodology risk is the risk that some methodologies may not be used to demonstrate 
additionality and assess the sustainability of CDM projects in the Post-Kyoto. 
Consequently, some buyers may pay a price premium for GS CERs because of the low 
Post-Kyoto risk, not SD benefits. The WTP question used in this research was therefore 
incorrect.         
It is clear that the CV questions used in these two studies were inappropriate. This 
affected the WTP value. Moreover, these studies did not investigate the factors 
influencing the probability of the willingness to pay a price premium. The Sterk et al 
study also relied on a very small number of respondents. Therefore, there is clearly a 
need for more research to employ CV to investigate willingness to pay a price premium 
for CERs in recognition of SD benefits.       
 
7.4.1 An Econometric Model of Willingness to Pay 
 
CV is applied to measure the WTP value by employing survey questions to elicit 
buyers’ stated preferences for CDM sustainability labels. Therefore, the willingness to 
pay question plays a significant role in the accuracy of WTP value. In an exploring 
WTP for carbon offset certification and co-benefits among high-flying young adults in 
the UK, MacKerron [69] found that the WTP value measured in this research is 
overestimated and cannot be implemented because the maximum bid level designed in 
this research was set too low. The result show that the mean WTP is around £24 per 
person per flight which is higher than the highest price presented to respondents (£20). 
This implies that the maximum bid level was set too low, which unfortunately was not 
detected during piloting; that the WTP distribution therefore has a ‘fat tail’; and that the 
WTP measure could thus be overestimated. This research result implies that we should 
carefully design the WTP question to elicit the buyers’ WTP. Kotchen and Reiling [62] 
suggested that the valid CV questions of the WTP must include three components: (1) a 
detailed description of the resource to be valued, including the initial and alternative 
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conditions of the hypothetical scenario; (2) the form and frequency of payment; and (3) 
how respondent are asked their WTP (the formats of the WTP question). This research 
tries to design the WTP question which is based on Kotchen and Reiling. The chosen 
format for the WTP question is a payment card which provides CER buyers with an 
array of potential WTP amounts ranging from zero to some large amount. Buyers will 
be presented with the following values in the payment card: €0.10, €0.20, €0.30, €0.40, 
€0.50, €0.75, €1.00, €1.50, €2.00, and other. It is supposed that the adjacent WTP 
values on a payment card represent the ranges of WTP values containing the true 
underlying WTP of the buyer. A binary logistic regression will be used to evaluate 
factors influencing the probability of WTP. A binary logistic regression is appropriate 
when the dependent variable to be evaluated is a binary variable [1,0]. The WTP model 
is set up in a binary logistic regression where the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of an odds ratio in favour of willingness to pay a price premium: 
    
ln        Pi           =    Y  =  β0 + β1X1 + β2X2  + β3X3  + ……  + βnXn   
        1 - Pi 
 
Where 
Pi = the probability of being willing to pay 
1- Pi = the probability of not being willing to pay 
βn = the estimated coefficient 
Xn = an independent variable 
    Pi      = Odds ratio 
 1 - Pi 
 
Therefore, a binary regression creates the equation to explore the statistical relationship 
between the probability of the willingness to pay a price premium and the independent 
variables. The regression analysis aims to see which factors might contribute positively 
and negatively to the probability of the willingness to pay a price premium for the GS 
label. The dependent variable, willingness to pay a price premium, is dichotomous, 
coded 0 (unwillingness to pay) or 1 (willingness to pay).  
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7.4.2 The Independent  Variables 
 
There have been no studies identifying the factors influencing the probability of the 
willingness to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability labels. The 
research presented in this thesis attempts to identify those factors. In this research, the 
WTP for CDM sustainability labels is modeled and elicited through a survey. The 
conceptual model of buyers’ WTP for CDM sustainability labels incorporates five 
independent variables: expected sustainable development benefits (ExpectedSD), 
expected return on investment (ExpectedROI), involvement in the Gold Standard label 
(Involvement), importance of the Gold Standard label (Importance), and the attitude 
towards the host country’s duty (Attitude).  
 
7.4.2.1 Expected sustainable development benefits: 
According to Nussbaumer [80], CDM projects with sustainability labels can generate 
more SD benefits than non-label projects. Higher expectations for sustainable 
development benefits generated by CDM sustainability labels will lead to a higher 
probability of the willingness to pay a price premium. There was still not enough 
information about the possible relationship between expected SD benefits and the 
probability of the WTP. Thus, this variable is included to determine whether expected 
sustainable development benefit has an influence on the probability of the WTP.      
 
7.4.2.2  Expected return on investment:        
In the carbon market, CER buyers can use CERs to meet their own Kyoto targets 
alternatively they can sell CERs in the emission trading market for speculative 
purposes. The objective of buying CERs is not only to meet the Kyoto obligation, but 
also to make profit through the emission trading market. Therefore, some CER buyers 
may expect to gain profit through the carbon market. In exploring the willingness of 
consumers to invest in “green shares”, Getzner and Grabner-Krauter [32] found that 
higher expectations for the return on investment lead to a higher probability of 
investment in “green shares”. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that buyer’s 
perception of ROI has an influence on the probability of the WTP. 
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7.4.2.3 Involvement in the Gold Standard label:        
As previously noted in the clustering variables, the key indicators of consumers’ 
involvement in environmentally certified products are: (i) behavior to seek out product, 
and (ii) past purchase of products. Therefore, this variable is measured as the sum score 
on a multi-item scale consisting of questions 10 and 11 in the questionnaire. According 
to Vlosky [136], a time and effort expended in finding and buying environmentally 
certified products are translated into a desire or at least a willingness to pay a price 
premium for environmentally certified products. Moreover, Vlosky found that there is a 
positive relationship between consumer involvement in environmentally certified 
products and willingness to pay a price premium for environmentally certified products. 
Thus, this variable is included to determine whether an involvement in the GS label has 
an influence on the probability of the WTP. 
           
7.4.2.4 Importance of the Gold Standard label:       
As previously noted in the clustering variables, we create three questions (question 12, 
13, 14) to measure buyers’ attitudes towards the importance of the GS label. Therefore, 
this variable is measured as the sum score on a multi-item scale consisting of questions 
12, 13 and 14. In exploring the willingness of consumers to pay a premium for 
environmentally certified products, Vlosky [136] found that there was a positive 
relationship between consumer perception of environmental importance and their 
willingness to pay a premium for environmentally certified products. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that an importance of the GS label has an influence on the 
probability of the WTP.     
 
7.4.2.5 The attitude towards the host country’s duty:        
As previously discussed in Chapter 5, Erion [26] and Burian [10] found that host 
countries cannot guarantee the SD benefits of CDM projects. However, the buyer’s 
perception of the host country’s duty may not be the same as Erion and Burain’s 
conclusion. Buyers who do not trust in the host country’s duty to assess the CDM 
projects will try to find additional standards to guarantee the sustainability of CDM 
projects. Buyers with negative attitude towards the host country’s duty may pay a price 
premium for the GS label which can guarantee a high quality of CDM projects in 
addition to the low requirements given by the host country. Therefore, this variable is 
included to determine whether the attitude towards the host country’s duty has an 
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influence on the probability of the WTP. This variable is measured as the sum score on 
a multi-item scale consisting of questions 15 and 16.       
 
Based on these five variables, we therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: Expected sustainable development benefits, expected return on 
investment, involvement in the Gold Standard label, importance of the Gold Standard 
label, and the attitude towards the host country’s duty are significantly related to the 
probability of the willingness to pay a price premium for CERs with CDM sustainability 
label.    
 
7.5 Survey design and data Collection 
 
A survey is designed to collect information from CER buyers in the carbon market. The 
lists of CER buyers are taken from the UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and 
Database. However, this database provides only the name of companies, not the name of 
responsible persons and their E-mail address. The names of responsible individuals are 
taken from the PDDs of CDM projects. Eliminating many incorrect E-mail and postal 
address in the PDDs, resulted in a usable list of 295 buyers, as of May 2009. The unit of 
measurement in this research is the organization, not the individual, so one respondent 
represents one organization in the carbon market. We asked that participants answer the 
questions from the perspective of their organization.  
A draft questionnaire was developed after a thorough literature review. This draft 
questionnaire was refined after a review by 3 carbon credit traders at EU companies. 
The final questionnaire comprises two parts (see Appendix A). The first part is designed 
to investigate the respondents’ demographic information and the respondents’ 
perceptions of the sustainability of CDM projects: 
  
• Demographic information: organization type, nationality of organization, 
experience in the carbon market, the paid up capital, knowledge in the GS label, 
and participation in the voluntary carbon market.  
• Perceptions of the sustainability:  overall image of the GS label, project priority 
for purchasing carbon credits, ROI of the GS label, involvement in the GS label, 
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attitude towards an importance of the GS label, and attitude towards the host 
countries’ duties to assess CDM projects.  
 
The second part is designed to investigate the monetary value of SD benefits of CDM 
projects through WTP. In the second part the WTP questionnaire uses a two-step 
approach. Respondents are first asked whether they are willing to pay a price premium 
as follows:  
 
“There are many reasons to buy Gold Standard CERs such as high sustainable 
development benefits, low Post-Kyoto risk, low methodology risk, etc. However, this 
question will consider only the sustainable development benefits. Would your 
organization be willing to pay a price premium per tonne of CO2e for CERs from the 
Gold Standard label in recognition of its contribution to sustainable development? (This 
price premium given will stand for only the sustainable development benefits, not 
including other benefits such as low Post-Kyoto risk, low methodology risk, etc.)” 
 
Those who refuse to pay a price premium are asked to give the reason for that choice. 
Those who agree to pay a price premium are then asked as follows: 
“If you answered YES to question 1, what is the maximum amount you would be willing 
to pay as a price premium per tonne of CO2e for CERs with the Gold Standard Label in 
recognition of the contribution to sustainable development? Assume the current CER 
price, without any premium, is €10.00 per tonne of CO2e. 
□ 1. € 0.10/tCO2e     □ 2. € 0.20/tCO2e   □ 3. € 0.30/tCO2e     □ 4. € 0.40/tCO2e       
□ 5. € 0.50/tCO2e     □ 6. € 0.75/tCO2e   □ 7. € 1.00/tCO2e     □ 8. € 1.50/tCO2e       
□ 9. € 2.00/tCO2e     □ 10. Other   ” 
 
Moreover, they are asked to give the reason for willingness to pay. Finally, we provide 
the space for participants to give the qualitative comments for this survey. Respondents 
required approximately 15 minutes to complete this questionnaire.  
 
An online survey method was chosen to collect the data. Online questionnaires 
(http://www.kwiksurveys.com/online-survey.php?surveyID=OKJHK_f437b2ba) were 
sent to these buyers between September and November 2009. Online survey has several 
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advantages: it is inexpensive, it does not suffer from interviewer bias, and respondents 
are likely to feel more comfortable answering sensitive questions (MacKerron et al. 
[69]). In order to increase the response rate, we offered anonymised research results and 
entry in a free prize draw to the participants.   
 
7.6 Data Analysis 
 
SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was  used for data analysis. The 
statistic methods applied in the analysis are as follows: 
 
i ) Analysis of organizational characteristics by using percentage, means, and 
standard deviation to explain general characteristics of sample group. 
ii ) Classifying CER buyers according to their attitudes towards and involvement in 
CDM sustainability labels by using K-means method. 
iii ) The analysis to find the validity of the two cluster solution by using hierarchical 
method and discriminant analysis. 
iv ) Analysis of the differences between the two buyer clusters based on a set of 
additional variables by using a cross-tabulation and the chi-square statistic.    
v ) The analysis to find the willingness to pay a price premium for CDM 
sustainability label by using CVM to find mean of the willingness to pay which 
was retrieved from the questionnaire. 
vi ) Analysis of the relationship between independent variable and dependent 
variables by using binary regression to examine which factors might contribute 
positively and negatively to the probability of the willingness to pay a price 
premium for the Gold Standard label. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Research Results: Classifying CER Buyers and Willingness to Pay a Price 
Premium for CDM Sustainability Label 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter presents the research results from the survey conducted between 
September and November 2009. Online questionnaires were sent to the list of 295 
buyers which can be found in UNEP-Risoe website. The unit of measurement in this 
research is the organization, not the individual, so one respondent represent one 
organization in the carbon market. We suggested that the participants answered the 
questions from the perspective of their organization. In order to increase the response 
rate, we offered anonymised research results and entry in a free prize draw to the 
participants.  With a response rate of 40% the survey generated 117 valid 
questionnaires. The numbers of the usable questionnaires is higher than those found in 
previous research. Exploring the price premium for CDM credits, Asuka and Okimura 
[4] conducted a survey in the carbon market with 82 usable questionnaires from CER 
buyers. Lappalainen [64] conducted a survey investigating carbon offset practices of EU 
companies receiving 47 usable questionnaires. More recently, Sterk et al. [105] 
conducted a survey of the demand for GS CERs and buyer’s willingness to pay a price 
premium for GS CERs. Sterk et al. sent questionnaires to 55 carbon credit buyers in the 
compliance market and received only 19 usable questionnaires. The characteristics of 
our 117 respondents will be presented in the next section.   
This chapter first describes the organizational characteristics of respondents. Secondly, 
we present the results of cluster analysis. Next, we discuss the outcomes related to the 
answers to the questions on WTP for the Gold Standard carbon credits. Finally, we 
present the results of econometric estimations. 
 
8.2 The Reliability of Questionnaires 
 
As discussed in the research methods, we must check if the five statements used as 
variables in cluster analysis and regression analysis measure the same dimension. The 
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Cronbach alpha was used to measure the reliability of these statements. These five 
statements are shown in Table 8.1.  
 
Does your organization agree or disagree with the following statements: (question 10-14) 
  
10. My organization has purchased CERs from Gold Standard label in the past year. 
11. If available, I would seek out CERs from Gold Standard label. 
12. My organization believes there is a need for Gold Standard label in the carbon 
market. 
13. My organization believes Gold Standard label can guarantee the sustainable 
development benefits of CDM projects. 
14. My organization believes Gold Standard label can help improve the CDM’s 
contribution to sustainable development. 
Table 8.1: The statements are evaluated by the Cronbach method 
 
Cronbach  alpha is a coefficient of reliability. It is commonly used as a measure of the 
internal consistency or reliability of a psychometric test score for a sample of 
examinees. It measures how well a set of variables or items measures a single, one-
dimensional latent aspect of individuals. Nunnally [80] suggested that a Cronbach alpha 
greater than 0.70 demonstrates a high reliability.  Churchill [16] and Robinson [97] 
suggested that a cut off point of 0.6 is used as the minimum. The Cronbach alpha for 
these five statements was 0.862, representing a high reliability. Therefore, all these five 
statements were used for cluster analysis. 
 
8.3 Demographic and Organizational Characteristics of Respondents 
 
8.3.1 Nationality and Type of Organization 
 
Table 8.2 show the information on the nationality and organization type of respondents. 
In this study the majority of participants were European organizations (55.56%), 
distantly followed by Japanese organizations (11.97%), US and Canadian organization 
(11.11%), Multinational organizations (11.11%), and Australian and New Zealand 
organizations (7.69%). Although the US has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, we include 
the US organization in this survey. This is because the U.S. can buy emission permits 
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from the members of the Kyoto Protocol for meeting its emission reduction targets 
under the US cap-and-trade programs (see 6.1.3). Certainly, there are no regulations 
which prohibit members of the Kyoto Protocol from selling emission permits to 
nonparty countries. Thus, the United States can act as a buyer of emission permits. 
Regarding organization type, the majority of participants were private organizations 
(86.33%), distantly followed by governments (7.69%), and charities (5.98%).     
 
  Number % 
Nationality   
Europe 65 55.56 
Australia&New Zealand 9 7.69 
USA&Canada 13 11.11 
Japan 14 11.97 
Multinationality 13 11.11 
Other Coutries 3 2.56 
Total 117 100 
Organization Type   
Private Organization 101 86.33 
Government 9 7.69 
Charity 7 5.98 
Total 117 100 
 
Table 8.2: Nationality and organization type 
 
8.3.2 Organization’s Experience in the Carbon Market 
 
Table 8.3 provides information on organization’s experience in the carbon market. The 
table shows that most participants have 3 years of experience in the carbon market 
(19.66%), followed by companies with more than 8 years of experience (17.95%). Few 
of them have 7 years and 8 years experience in the carbon market at only 4.27% and 
1.71% respectively.  
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Experience Number % 
1 year 6 5.13 
2 years 15 12.82 
3 years 23 19.66 
4 years 17 14.53 
5 years 16 13.67 
6 years 12 10.26 
7 years 5 4.27 
8 years 2 1.71 
More than 8 years 21 17.95 
Total 117 100 
 
Table 8.3: Organization’s experience in the carbon market 
 
8.3.3 The Paid Up Capital 
 
A question concerning the paid up capital is applied to only the participants in the group 
of private organizations. The paid up capital is the amount of money that has been 
received by shareholders who have completely paid for their purchased shares. A 
classification of the participants by paid up capital (Table 8.4) indicated that most 
participants were companies with paid up capital less than 1 million Euros (38.62%) 
and between 1 – 10 million Euros (20.79%). The companies with paid up capital of 
more than 1 billion Euros accounted for 18.81% of all participating companies. Few of 
them were companies with paid up capital between 500 – 1,000 million Euros (3.96%). 
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The Paid Up Capital Number % 
less than 1 million Euros 39 38.62 
1 - 10 million Euros 21 20.79 
11 - 99 million Euros 12 11.88 
100 - 499 million Euros 6 5.94 
500 - 1,000 million Euros 4 3.96 
More than 1 billion Euros 19 18.81 
Total 101 100 
 
Table 8.4: The paid up capital 
 
8.4 Participation in the Voluntary Carbon Market 
 
According to World Bank [143], participation in the voluntary carbon offset market 
reflects a positive attitude towards the environment. Consequently, this study use firm’s 
participation in the voluntary carbon offset market to assess if participants were aware 
of climate change. The participants were asked about their participation in the voluntary 
carbon market, “Has your company purchased carbon credits for offsetting its own 
emissions in the voluntary carbon offset market”. 33.33% of the participants have 
purchased carbon credits from the voluntary carbon offset market (Table 8.5). In other 
words, they have purchased carbon credits from both the compliance market and 
voluntary market. However, the majority of the participants have participated in only 
the compliance market. With respect to the nationality of organization Australian and 
New Zealand organizations were becoming more aware of climate change. More than a 
half of participants of these three countries (78%) have purchased carbon credits for 
offsetting their own emissions in both the compliance market and voluntary market. 
Regarding organization type, charities were more aware of climate change than other 
organization types. 43% of charities had purchased carbon credits from both the 
compliance market and voluntary market.         
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 Participation in the Voluntary Market Number % 
No Participation 78 66.67 
Participation 39 33.33 
Total 117 100 
 
Table 8.5: Participation in the voluntary carbon market 
  
8.5 Ethical Purchasing Policy for Carbon Credits 
 
There is a widespread perception that industrial gas projects (HFC, N2O, PFC projects) 
can deliver huge volumes of CERs, so they can attract CER buyers to invest in them. 
However, these prejects cannot create many jobs and also cannot contribute directly to 
community development (Erion [26], Kolshus [59], Michaelowa [74]). So carbon 
credits generated by the industrial gas projects represent low quality carbon credits in 
term of the SD benefits. Currently, the carbon market is worried about these buyers’ 
behavior. Erion [26] recommend CER buyers to apply “an ethical purchasing policy” 
for purchasing carbon credits in the compliance market. According to Erion, an ethical 
purchasing policy will give the first priority to carbon credits generated by the 
renewable energy projects and give the last priority to carbon credits generated by the 
industrial gas projects (HFC, N2O, PFC projects). This policy will make organizations 
purchase carbon credits from project with high SD benefits.  
In this study we use the project priority for purchasing carbon credits to represent the 
organization’s ethical purchasing policy. This study will assess whether the 
organizations purchase CERs in accordance with an ethical purchasing policy. 
Therefore, the participants were asked, “What is your first project priority between the 
renewable energy projects and the industrial gas projects (HFCs, PFCs, N2O project) 
in purchasing carbon credits?” Finally, the result showed that nearly all organizations 
gave the first priority to carbon credits generated by the renewable energy projects 
(Table 8.6). We received 116 usable valid questionnaires for this question because one 
respondent report that his company has no priority for purchasing carbon credits. 
91.38% gave the first project priority to the renewable energy projects, whereas the 
remaining 8.62% gave the first project priority to the industrial gas projects. One 
participant states that “I would choose to buy carbon credits from my own list of positive 
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projects excluding the industrial gas projects.3” These comments from respondent also 
clearly represent that this buyer is concerned with the SD benefits generated by projects. 
This result implied that CER buyers were becoming more concerned with ethical 
behavior in purchasing carbon credits. So the results may make the carbon market to be 
less worried about the ethical behavior of CER buyers. 
 
Project priority Number % 
the renewable energy projects 106 91.38 
the industrial gas projects 10 8.62 
Total 116 100 
 
Table 8.6: Project priority 
 
Although the industrial gas projects (HFC, N2O, PFC projects) dominated the carbon 
market as discussed in Chapter 6, this research result imply that the proportion of the 
industrial gas projects in CDM market is decreasing. This is because many 
organizations increasingly prefer to purchase carbon credits generated by the renewable 
energy projects than those generated by the industrial gas projects. Therefore, this result 
shows an optimistic trend in the distribution of CDM project type in the future.  
 
8.6 An Overall Image of Gold Standard Label 
 
In this study, “overall image” refer to CER buyers’ overall perceptions of CDM 
sustainability labels, formed by processing information and by prior knowledge about 
CDM sustainability labels. To investigate the carbon market’s general view  of the Gold 
Standard label, the participants were asked to assess its image and the possible answers 
to select from very negative, fairly negative, neither positive nor negative, fairly 
positive, and very positive. The results show that an overall image of GS label was 
fairly positive with a mean score of 4.04 (Table 8.7 and 8.8). 53.85% of participants 
viewed that an overall image was fairly positive and 26.5% of participants viewed that 
an overall image was very positive. Few of them (2.56%) viewed that an overall image 
was fairly negative. More clearly, no participant viewed that an overall image was very 
                                                 
3
 Author’s survey. 
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negative. The GS label has the strength in its image with an optimistic view reported by 
more than 75% of buyers.   
 
  Number % 
Very negative - - 
Fairly negative 3 2.56 
Neither positive nor negative 20 17.09 
Fairly positive 63 53.85 
Very positive 31 26.50 
Total 117 100 
 
Table 8.7: An overall image of Gold Standard label 
  
Statistical Result Score 
Mean 4.04 
Std. Deviation 0.736 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 5 
 
Table 8.8: Statistical results of an overall image of Gold Standard label 
  
8.7 Buyers’ Knowledge in CDM Sustainability Labels 
 
Increased product knowledge also plays a positive role on whether consumers believed 
the net benefits of product (Wheeler [139]). Therefore, one would expect that people 
with excellent knowledge of CDM sustainability labels will be confident with the 
benefits of buying carbon credits from accredited projects. This study will explore 
buyers’ knowledge of CDM sustainability labels by using the Gold Standard (GS) and 
the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance Standard (CCB Standards) as case 
studies. Moreover, we will investigate whether buyers’ knowledge in each label are 
substantially different. In other words, we will investigate whether buyers’ knowledge 
in the GS differs from those in the CCB Standards. This study followed Wheeler [139] 
to use buyers’ self-perception of their own knowledge as a proxy for knowledge. The 
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respondents were asked to conduct the self-assessment of their knowledge in the Gold 
Standard and the CCB Standards. The possible answers to select are from no 
knowledge; poor; fair, good; and excellent. This may not reflect their true knowledge. 
However Wheeler concluded that we can trust the knowledge given by self-assessment 
because there was a high correlation between the knowledge derived from a test 
question and the knowledge derived from an individual’s self-perception.  Moreover, a 
test question may make CER buyers feel uncomfortable with the score they get from the 
test and CER buyers cannot spend too much time on a lot of test questions, so it is 
impossible to design a test question with right or wrong answer4. When asked about 
their knowledge in the GS, 43.59% have good knowledge in label, while 4.27% have no 
knowledge in this label (Figure 8.1). The majority of buyers have a high level of 
knowledge in this label with a mean score of 3.55 (Table 8.9).  
On the other hand the majority of buyers have a low level of knowledge in the CCB 
Standards with a mean score of 2.53 (Table 8.9). When asked about their knowledge in 
the CCB Standards, 25.64% have no knowledge in label and 24.79% have poor 
knowledge. Only 4.27% have excellent knowledge in the CCB Standards (Figure 8.1). 
The results clearly showed that buyers have better knowledge in the Gold Standard than 
knowledge in the CCB Standards. 
To investigate statistically the differences of the buyers’ knowledge in these two labels, 
we applied the Paired Samples T-test, the parametric test for testing the differences 
between the means of two variables. This hypothesis can be written as: 
H0: On average there is no difference between the knowledge in the two labels. 
H1: On average there is a difference between the knowledge in the two labels.  
The analyzed results clearly show that the differences between buyers’ knowledge in the 
GS and those in the CCB Standards are statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level (Table 8.10). Moreover, there is also a slight positive correlation between the 
knowledge in the two labels. The correlation is statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level (Table 8.11). This means that buyers who have a high level of 
knowledge in the GS also have a high level of knowledge in the CCB Standards.      
                                                 
4
 Interviewed with Mr.Boonrod Yaowapruek, Carbon Trader at Eneco Energy Trade. 
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Figure 8.1: Knowledge in CDM sustainability labels 
 Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Knowledge in the Gold Standard 
Knowledge in the CCB Standards  
3.55 117 .942 
2.53 117 1.200 
 
Table 8.9: Statistical results of knowledge in Gold Standard label 
  
 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
99% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
      Lower Upper       
Knowledge in Gold 
Standard - 
Knowledge in CCB 
1.02 1.320 .122 .70 1.34 8.338 116 .000 
 
Table 8.10: Paired samples test 
 
 N Correlation Sig. 
Knowledge in Gold Standard & Knowledge in CCB 117 .260 .005 
 
Table 8.11: Paired samples correlations 
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8.8 Involvement in the Gold Standard Label 
 
To investigate buyers’ involvement in the GS label, the participants were given the two 
statements to consider. The participants must give the answer on a five-point Likert 
scale. When given the first statement - “My organization has purchased CERs from 
Gold Standard label in the past year”, 47.01% of respondents totally disagreed with the 
statement, 25.64% disagreed, 12.82% totally agreed, 8.55% agreed, and 5.98% not sure 
(Table 8.12). The mean score was 2.15 for this statement. Considering the second 
statement – “If available, I would seek out CERs from Gold Standard label”, 30.77% of 
respondents agreed with this statement, 21.37% not sure, 18.8% disagreed, 17.09% 
totally agreed, and 11.97% totally disagreed (Table 8.12). The mean score was 3.22 for 
this statement.  The results showed that most participants have not purchased CERs 
from GS label. However, most participants have a strong intention to buy CERs from 
GS label in the future.  
 
Survey statement Totally 
Disagree 
Disagree  Not 
Sure 
Agree Totally 
Agree 
Mean on 
the Likert 
scale 
S.D. 
My organization has 
purchased CERs from 
Gold Standard label in 
the past year. 
47.01% 
(55) 
25.64% 
(30) 
5.98% 
(7) 
8.55% 
(10) 
12.82% 
(15) 
2.15 1.42 
If available, I would seek 
out CERs from Gold 
Standard label. 
11.97% 
(14) 
18.80% 
(22) 
21.37% 
(25) 
30.77% 
(36) 
17.09% 
(20) 
3.22 1.27 
 
Table 8.12: Involvement in the Gold Standard label 
 
8.9 The Attitude towards an Importance of the Gold Standard Label 
 
To investigate buyers’ attitude towards the importance of the GS label, the participants 
were asked whether they agreed with the three statements. When the participants were 
asked, “Does your organization agree or disagree with this statement – “My 
organization believes there is a need for Gold Standard label in the carbon market””, 
39.32% of participants agreed with this statement, 24.79% totally agreed, 17.09% not 
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sure, 11.11% disagreed, and 7.69% totally disagreed (Table 8.13). The mean score was 
3.62 for this statement. The results clearly indicated that most buyers believed that there 
is a need for the GS label in the carbon market. Considering the second statement – “My 
organization believes Gold Standard label can guarantee the sustainable development 
benefits of CDM projects”, 37.61% of respondents agreed with this statement, 24.79% 
not sure, 17.09% totally agreed, 12.82% disagreed, and 7.69% totally disagreed (Table 
8.13). The mean score was 3.44 for this statement. Regarding the last statement – “My 
organization believes Gold Standard label can help improve the CDM’s contribution to 
sustainable development”, 47.01% of respondents agreed with this statement, 22.22% 
not sure, 17.95% totally agreed, 6.84% disagreed, and 5.98% totally disagreed (Table 
8.13). The mean score was 3.64 for this statement.   
 
All these results clearly showed that most buyers have an optimistic view on the GS 
label. In the viewpoint of buyers the GS label is very important in terms of its 
contribution to SD. Most buyers have a positive attitude towards the GS label.  
 
Survey statement Totally 
Disagree 
Disagree  Not 
Sure 
Agree Totally 
Agree 
Mean on 
the Likert 
scale 
S.D. 
My organization believes 
there is a need for Gold 
Standard label in the 
carbon market. 
7.69%  
(9) 
11.11% 
(13) 
17.09% 
(20) 
39.32% 
(46) 
24.79% 
(29) 
3.62 1.19 
My organization believes 
Gold Standard label can 
guarantee the sustainable 
development benefits of 
CDM projects. 
7.69%  
(9) 
12.82% 
(15) 
24.79% 
(29) 
37.61% 
(44) 
17.09% 
(20) 
3.44 1.15 
My organization believes 
Gold Standard label can 
help improve the CDM’s 
contribution to 
sustainable development. 
5.98% 
 (7) 
6.84%  
(8) 
22.22% 
(26) 
47.01% 
(55) 
17.95% 
(21) 
3.64 1.05 
 
Table 8.13: Buyers’ attitude towards an importance of the Gold Standard label 
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8.10 Classification of CER Buyers by Cluster Analysis 
 
The results of a literature review indicated that the carbon market is separated into the 
two segments. Consequently, we used the two-cluster solution for K-means clustering. 
However, we firstly applied the hierarchical method to find the appropriateness of the 
two-cluster solution and after classifying the buyers by the K-means method we applied 
a discriminant analysis to recheck the appropriateness of this solution.  
The hierarchical method was first performed to create a hierarchy in the form of a 
treelike structure called a dendrogram to see the relationship among observations. By 
the hierarchical procedure, the dendrogram clearly suggested that the two clusters would 
be appropriate for this study (see Figure 8.2). Therefore, the two-cluster solution was 
used as the starting process for K-means clustering.  
 
Figure 8.2: Jointing-tree cluster analysis output: Dendrogram 
 
The K-means clustering was performed using the five clustering variables measuring 
buyers’ involvement with SD labels and buyers’ attitudes towards labels as independent 
variables. Finally, two clusters of the CER buyers were identified. These clusters varied 
with respect to buyers’ attitude towards and involvement in the GS label.  
After clustering the buyers into two groups, we performed a discriminant analysis to 
investigate whether the two-cluster solution was appropriate and whether these two 
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clusters were really homogenous within clusters and different between clusters. 
Discriminant analysis was used with cluster membership as the grouping variable and 
the five clustering variables as the independent variables. The results showed that 
95.7% of the original clustered cases were correctly classified (See Table 8.14) 
confirming that the two-cluster solution is valid.  
 
 Actual group Total 
 
Predicted group membership Percentage correct 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2  
Cluster 1 55 51 4 92.7% 
Cluster 2 62 1 61 98.4% 
Overall percentage    95.7% 
 
Table 8.14: Classification table 
  
Table 8.15 shows means of final cluster centers and the significance testing of 
differences between cluster centers. For each cluster, the mean values of the five 
clustering variables were provided along with the univariate F ratios and levels of 
significance comparing the differences between the cluster means. Means of all five 
clustering variables were significantly different between the two clusters at the 0.01 
level using the univariate F test (see Table 8.15). These results ensure that the two 
groups are truly distinctive. Therefore, the means of all five clustering variables were 
used to interpret and name the segment. 
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Summary of means of final cluster centers 
Clustering variables Cluster F Significance 
1 (n=55) 2 (n=62)   
(1) My organization has purchased 
CERs from Gold Standard label in the 
past year. 
0.652 -0.579 70.677 0.000 
(2) If available, I would seek out 
CERs from Gold Standard label. 
0.725 -0.643 101.986 0.000 
(3) My organization believes there is a 
need for Gold Standard label in the 
carbon market. 
0.696 -0.617 87.748 0.000 
(4) My organization believes Gold 
Standard label can guarantee the 
sustainable development benefits of 
CDM projects. 
0.634 -0.563 64.634 0.000 
(5) My organization believes Gold 
Standard label can help improve the 
CDM’s contribution to sustainable 
development. 
0.639 -0.567 66.093 0.000 
 
Table 8.15: Results of cluster analysis for CER buyers 
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Figure 8.3: Mean values of clustering variables 
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8.10.1 Cluster 1: Buyers Favouring CERs with Sustainability Labels 
 
Members of Cluster 1 have higher mean scores across all clustering variables than those 
of Cluster 2 (see Figure 8.3), showing that this group has strong preference for the GS 
label. Consequently, this cluster containing 55 buyers (47% of respondents) was 
described as buyers favouring CERs with sustainability labels. These buyers require the 
additional standard to ensure the sustainability of CDM projects. Considering buyers’ 
involvement in the GS label: most buyers who have purchased CERs from the GS label 
in the past were in Cluster 1 and 84% of buyers in this group have strong intentions to 
purchase GS labelled CERS in the future. There was only one buyer in Cluster 2 who 
had purchased CERs from the GS label. Regarding buyers’ attitudes towards the 
importance of the GS label; 95% of buyers in this group believed that there is a need for 
the GS label in the carbon market. Moreover, 84% of buyers in this group believed that 
the GS label can guarantee the SD benefits of CDM projects. Finally, a high level of 
buyers in this group (93%) believed that the GS label can help improve the CDM’s 
contribution to SD. These results strongly confirmed that buyers in this group have a 
positive attitude towards an importance of the GS label. Of this group, they had an 
average of 4.9 years of experience in the carbon market, 60% were European, followed 
by US and Canadian (12.73%), and Multinational organizations (9.09%).  
 
8.10.2 Cluster 2: Buyers Favouring Non-Labelled CERs 
 
Members of Cluster 2 gave low scores to all clustering variables, showing that this 
group had a low preference for the GS label. Therefore, this group was described as 
buyers favouring non-labelled CERs. This cluster contained 62 buyers (53% of 
respondents). Some 97% of buyers in this group have not purchased CERs from the GS 
label in the past. No buyers in this group totally agreed with the second statement 
asking about future buying intentions towards the GS label. More clearly, 55% of 
buyers in this group have no intention of purchasing CERs from the GS label. These 
results clearly showed that these buyers were the least involved in the GS label. Most 
buyers in this group did not believe that there is a need for the GS label in the carbon 
market. In contrast with the previous cluster, most buyers did not believe that the GS 
label could guarantee the SD benefits of CDM projects and improve the CDM’s 
contribution to SD. These results strongly confirmed that buyers in this group have a 
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negative attitude towards an importance of the GS label. Members of this group, had an 
average of 5.2 years of experience in the carbon market, 51.61% were European, 
followed by Japanese (16.13%), and Multinational organizations (12.90%). Most 
nationalities excluding Japanese seem to be equally distributed between the two 
clusters. Japanese organizations were more likely to be in Cluster 2 (16.13%) than in 
Cluster 1 (7.27%), but these differences were not statistically significant.         
                          
8.11 Profiling the Cluster Members on Additional Variables 
 
In order to understand the characteristics of each cluster better a set of additional 
variables were used to develop more detailed profiles (see Table 8.16). 
 
1) organization type 
2) paid up capital,  
3) buyers’ perception of SD benefits generated by the GS project,  
4) buyers’ perception of return on investment of CERs from the GS project,  
5) overall image of the GS label,  
6) buyers’ participation in the voluntary carbon offset market,  
7) priority for purchasing carbon credits,  
8) buyers’ knowledge in the GS label,  
9) attitude towards the host country’s duty to assess the sustainability of CDM 
projects,  
10) buyers’ willingness to pay. 
 
Table 8.16: Additional variables for cluster profiling 
 
To determine if differences exist based on this set of additional variables, a cross-
tabulation was employed to identify the profiles of the two buyer clusters. The chi-
square statistic was used to determine if there were any statistically significant 
differences between the two buyer clusters (see Table 8.17 and 8.18).   
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Characteristics Cluster 1: 
Buyers favoring  
labelled CERs 
Cluster 2: 
Buyers favoring  non-
labelled CERs 
Chi-square Significance 
Organization type Profit organization 
(80%); non-profit 
(20%) 
Profit organization 
(92%); non-profit (8%) 
3.517 0.061* 
The paid up capital < 100 million Euros 
(82%); >= 100 
million Euros (18%)  
< 100 million Euros 
(63%); >= 100 million 
Euros (37%) 
4.224 0.040** 
An overall image of 
label 
Very positive (49%); 
fairly positive 
(45.5%); neither 
positive nor negative 
(5.5%); fairly 
negative (0%) 
Very positive (6.4%); 
fairly positive (61.3%); 
neither positive nor 
negative (27.4%); fairly 
negative (4.9%) 
32.244 0.000*** 
Perception of SD 
benefits 
(Comparing SD 
benefits generated by 
labelled project with 
non-labelled project)  
Labelled project 
higher than non-
labelled project 
(87%); the same as 
non-labelled project 
(13%); lower than 
non-labelled project 
(0%)  
Labelled project higher 
than non-labelled 
project (42%); the same 
as non-labelled project 
(55%); lower than non-
labelled project (3%) 
25.995 0.000*** 
Perception of ROI 
(Comparing ROI of 
CERs from  labelled 
project with non-
labelled project) 
Labelled project 
higher than non-
labelled project 
(64%); the same as 
non-labelled project 
(22%); lower than 
non-labelled project 
(14%) 
Labelled project higher 
than non-labelled 
project (40%); the same 
as non-labelled project 
(45%); lower than non-
labelled project (15%) 
7.734 0.021** 
 
*** Significant at P < 0.01 level; ** Significant at P < 0.05 level; * Significant at P < 0.10 level 
Table 8.17: Profile of the two buyer clusters on a set of additional variables 
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Characteristics Cluster 1: 
Buyers favoring  
labelled CERs 
Cluster 2: 
Buyers favoring  non-
labelled CERs 
Chi-square Significance 
Participation in 
voluntary market 
Yes (42%); No (58%) Yes (26%); No (74%) 3.362 0.067* 
The project priority 
for purchasing carbon 
credits 
Renewable energy 
(98%); Industrial gas 
(2%) 
Renewable energy 
(85%); Industrial gas 
(15%) 
6.144 0.013** 
Knowledge in the 
label 
Excellent (18%); 
good (53%); fair 
(27%); poor (2%); no 
knowledge (0%) 
Excellent (8%); good 
(35%); fair (39%); poor 
(10%); no knowledge 
(8%) 
12.903 0.012** 
Attitude towards the 
host country’s duty 
(I cannot rely on a 
host country’s criteria 
to assess the 
sustainable 
development benefits 
of CDM projects) 
Totally agree (13%); 
agree (34%); not sure 
(42%); disagree (9%); 
totally disagree (2%) 
Totally agree (0%); 
agree (39%); not sure 
(26%); disagree (29%); 
totally disagree (6%) 
17.630 0.001*** 
Willingness to pay a 
price premium for the 
label 
Yes (82%); No (18%) Yes (34%); No (66%) 27.249 0.000*** 
 
*** Significant at P < 0.01 level; ** Significant at P < 0.05 level; * Significant at P < 0.10 level 
Table 8.18: Profile of the two buyer clusters on a set of additional variables (Cont.) 
 
Table 8.17 and 8.18 shows the results of the chi-square analysis and a cross-tabulation 
between the two buyer clusters and a set of additional variables. As we can see, the two 
buyer clusters have distinctive profiles on this set of additional variables. However, 
these differences were statistically significant at levels ranging from the 0.01 to the 
0.10. The details of these results were the following.  
 
8.11.1 Organization Type 
 
Non-profit organizations, including governments, and the charities were more likely to 
be in Cluster 1 (20%) than in Cluster 2 (8%). While, Cluster 2 had a higher percentage 
of private organizations (92%). These differences were statistically significant at the 
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0.10 level. This may be because non-profit organizations are potentially inclined to 
contribute to environment (Basili et al. [5]).            
 
8.11.2 The Paid up Capital 
 
An analysis concerning the paid up capital is only applied to private organization. 
Private companies with the paid up capital <100 million Euros were more likely to be in 
Cluster 1 (82%) than in Cluster 2 (63%). On the other hand, companies with large paid 
up capital (≥100 million Euros) were more likely to be in Cluster 2. These differences 
were statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.      
 
8.11.3 An Overall Image of the GS Label 
 
A firm’s image plays a critical role in consumer’s decision-making process. Based on 
this variable, the two clusters were significantly different at the 99% confidence level. 
The proportion of buyers who viewed that an overall image of the GS label was fairly 
positive and very positive is significantly higher in Cluster 1 (94.5%) than in Cluster 2 
(67.7%). In other words, buyers with a positive view of the GS label were more likely to 
be in Cluster 1 than in Cluster 2. These results were consistent with Han et al. [42] who 
reported that an overall image of a green hotel has a positive influence on demand for a 
green hotel.       
 
8.11.4 Buyers’ Perception of SD Benefits Generated by the GS Project 
 
As previously noted, Nussbaumer [80] found that CERs generated by the GS projects 
generate higher SD benefits. However, the buyer’s perception of SD profile of GS 
projects may not be the same as Nussbaumer’s conclusion. In this study the SD benefits 
generated by the GS label represent the social benefits of CDM projects. Based on this 
variable, there were statistically significant differences between the two buyer clusters 
at the 99% confidence level. Cluster 1 (87%) had a higher proportion of buyers who 
perceived that the expected SD benefits generated by project with GS label are higher 
than similar non-labelled project than Cluster 2 (42%). Most buyers in Cluster 2 (55%) 
believed that the expected SD benefits generated by project with GS label are the same 
as similar non-labelled project. There were no buyers in Cluster 1 who believed that the 
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expected SD benefits generated by projects with GS label are lower than similar non-
labelled project. Therefore, buyers with positive perception of the SD benefits generated 
by the GS projects were more likely to be in Cluster 1. These results were consistent 
with Getzner and Grabner-Krauter [32] who found that the higher social benefits of 
product lead to higher demand for that product.                
 
8.11.5 Buyers’ Perception of Return on Investment (ROI) of CERs from the GS Project 
 
The objective of buying CERs is not only to meet the Kyoto obligation, but also to 
make profit on the emission trading market. Providing shareholders and investors with 
returns on investment (ROI) in carbon credits is one of the purposes of carbon funds. 
ROI of the GS label also reflects the product value. According to Getzner and Grabner-
Krauter [32], purchase and investment decisions can be assumed to be correlated with 
expectations of profit. Consumers expecting higher profitability (higher benefits) might 
be willing to demand more of the product or investment. Based on this variable, the two 
clusters were significantly different at the 95% confidence level. A greater proportion of 
Cluster 1 members (64%) believed that ROI of CERs from the GS label is higher than 
non-labelled project compared to members of Cluster 2 (40%). Most buyers in Cluster 2 
(45%) believed that ROI of CERs from the GS label is the same as non-labelled project. 
Clearly buyers with positive perception of ROI of CERs from the GS label were more 
likely to be in Cluster 1.  
 
8.11.6 Buyers’ Participation in the Voluntary Carbon Offset Market 
 
According to Laroche et al. [65], environmental consciousness leads an increasing 
number of individuals to engage in environmentally friendly activity in their everyday 
lives. Attitudes towards environment will represent environmental consciousness which 
is positively correlated to environmentally friendly buying behaviours. Based on this 
variable, the two clusters were significantly different at the 0.10 level. Organizations 
that participated in the voluntary carbon market were more likely to be in Cluster 1 
(42%) than in Cluster 2 (26%). These results were consistent with Kotchen and Reiling 
[62] who reported that attitudes towards environment are good predictors of 
environmentally based actions and participation decisions.    
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8.11.7 The Project Priority for Purchasing Carbon Credits 
 
As previously noted, an ethical purchasing policy would prioritize carbon credits 
generated by renewable energy projects and give lowest priority to carbon credits 
generated by industrial gas projects. The results clearly showed that the proportion of 
buyers who gave the first project priority to the industrial gas projects was significantly 
higher in Cluster 2 (15%) than in Cluster 1 (2%). These differences were statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level. Only one buyer in cluster 1 gave the first 
project priority to the industrial gas projects.  
 
8.11.8 Buyers’ Knowledge in the GS Label 
 
Buyers who have good or excellent knowledge of the GS label were more likely to be in 
Cluster 1 (71%) than in Cluster 2 (43%).  Cluster 2 had a higher percentage of buyers 
who have a low level of knowledge of the GS label. These differences were statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. More clearly, there were no buyers in Cluster 1 who have 
no knowledge of the label. According to Wheeler [139], increased product knowledge 
also plays a positive role on whether consumers believe the claimed benefits of a 
product. Therefore, buyers with a high level of knowledge in CDM sustainability label 
will be confident with the benefits of buying CERs from projects with CDM 
sustainability label.     
 
8.11.9 Buyers’ Attitude Towards the Host Country’s Duty to Assess the Sustainability 
of CDM Projects 
 
As previously discussed, there are no international standards for the host country 
approval processes or the host country SD criteria for assessing CDM projects. Erion 
[26] and Burian [10] found that host countries cannot guarantee the SD benefits of 
CDM projects. However, the buyer’s perception of the host country’s duty may not be 
the same as Erion and Burain’s conclusion. Therefore, this study sought to test buyers’ 
attitudes towards the host country’s duty guarantee SD benefits from CDM projects. 
The participants asked whether they agreed with the statement; “I cannot rely on a host 
country’s criteria to assess the sustainable development benefits of CDM projects”. The 
participants gave answers on a five-point Likert scale where, 1 = totally disagree and 5 
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= totally agree. The results showed that buyers who agreed and totally agreed with this 
statement were more likely to be in Cluster 1 (47%) than in Cluster 2 (39%). These 
differences were statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. More clearly, there 
were no buyers in Cluster 2 who totally agreed with this statement. This means that 
buyers with a negative attitude towards the host country’s duty were more likely to be in 
Cluster 1. This may be because buyers who do not trust in the host country’s duty to 
assess the CDM projects will try to find other standards to guarantee the sustainability 
of CDM projects.  
 
8.11.10 Buyers’ Willingness to Pay a Price Premium for the Label 
 
When asked about their willingness to pay (WTP) a price premium for the GS label in 
recognition of its contribution to SD, Cluster 1 (82%) had a higher proportion of buyers 
who were willing to pay a price premium than Cluster 2 (34%). These differences were 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. These results suggest that CDM 
sustainability labels can attract a price premium for the SD benefits from buyers 
favoring them. However, not all buyers who seek environmentally certified products are 
necessarily willing to pay a price premium (Aguilar and Vlosky [2]). This is observable 
in Cluster 1 where 18% were not willing to pay a price premium for the SD label.    
 
8.12 WTP Responses 
 
This study investigates whether buyers are willing pay a price premium for GS CERs, 
so the participants were asked, “Would you be willing to pay a price premium per tonne 
of CO2e for CERs from the Gold Standard label in recognition of its contribution to 
sustainable development?” The results of buyers’ WTP are presented in Figure 4. 
56.4% of the buyers were willing to pay a price premium, whereas the remaining 43.6% 
were not willing to pay (see Figure 8.4). 
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Figure 8.4: WTP responses from CER buyers 
 
8.12.1 WTP Responses in Relation to Organization Type 
 
Considering the aspect of organization type against responses to the WTP question, it is 
clearly seen that the highest number of buyers that are willing to pay was found in the 
charity group (85.71%), followed by the government group (77.78%). As expected, the 
charity group and the government group have a greater percentage of the “yes” WTP 
responses than the private group (Table 8.19). In other words the charity and the 
government are more willing to pay than the private group. 
 
Organization Type 
WTP Responses 
Yes No 
Number % Number % 
Private Organization 53 52.48 48 47.52 
Government 7 77.78 2 22.22 
Charity 6 85.71 1 14.29 
Total 66 56.40 51 43.60 
 
Table 8.19: WTP responses by organization type 
 
Figure 8.5 showed the “yes” WTP response in relation to type of organization. As 
expected, the data showed that there was an obvious trend in the “yes” WTP response in 
WTP Responses from CER buyers
Willingness to pay  
Unwillingness to pay 
Willingness to pay Unwillingness to pay
 56.4% 
(66) 
 43.6% 
(51) 
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relation to type of organization. Non-profit organizations tend to be more willing to pay 
than profit organizations.     
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Figure 8.5: WTP responses in relation to type of organization 
 
8.12.2 WTP Responses in Relation to Overall Image of Gold Standard Label 
 
WTP responses were different among the groups of buyers’ perception of image of 
Gold Standard label (Table 8.20). The group with a “very positive image” showed a 
highest occurrence of the “yes” WTP responses. As can be seen, 87.10% of buyers in 
the group with a “very positive image” were willing to pay a price premium. On the 
other hand the group with a “fairly negative image” showed a lowest occurrence of the 
“yes” WTP responses. As can be seen, 100% of buyers in the group with a “fairly 
negative image” were not willing to pay. The groups with a “very positive image” and 
“fairly positive image” have a greater percentage of the “yes” WTP responses than the 
group of “neither positive nor negative image” and “fairly negative image”.  
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Buyer’s perception of image 
WTP Responses 
Yes No 
Number % Number % 
Fairly negative 0 0 3 100 
Neither positive nor negative 4 20 16 80 
Fairly positive 35 55.55 28 44.45 
Very positive 27 87.10 4 12.90 
Total 66 56.40 51 43.60 
 
Table 8.20: WTP responses by overall image of Gold Standard label 
 
Figure 8.6 showed the “yes” WTP response in relation to overall image of Gold 
Standard label. The data clearly showed that there was an obvious trend in the “yes” 
WTP response in relation to image of label. A more optimistic view of image of Gold 
Standard label will lead to a higher probability of the “yes” WTP responses.      
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Figure 8.6: WTP responses in relation to overall image of Gold Standard label 
 
8.12.3 WTP Responses in Relation to Knowledge in the Gold Standard Label 
 
Table 8.21 present the different WTP responses among the group of buyers’ knowledge. 
Buyers who have an excellent knowledge showed a highest occurrence of the “yes” 
WTP responses (73.33%), followed by those who have a good knowledge (64.71%). On 
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the other hand only 28.57% of buyers in the group of poor knowledge were willing to 
pay a price premium.  
 
Level of knowledge 
WTP Responses 
Yes No 
Number % Number % 
No knowledge 2 0.40 3 0.60 
Poor knowledge 2 28.57 5 71.43 
Fair knowledge 18 46.15 21 53.85 
Good knowledge 33 64.71 18 35.29 
Excellent knowledge 11 73.33 4 26.67 
Total 66 56.40 51 43.60 
 
Table 8.21: WTP responses by level of knowledge in label 
 
Figure 8.7 showed the “yes” WTP response in relation to knowledge in label. As 
expected, the data showed that there was an obvious trend in the “yes” WTP response in 
relation to knowledge in label. Buyers with high level of knowledge in label are more 
willing to pay than those with low level of knowledge. 
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Figure 8.7: WTP responses in relation to knowledge in Gold Standard label 
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8.13 Reasons for the Willingness to Pay 
 
Considering the reasons for the willingness to pay, 36.4% of participants view the 
payment of a premium as a reward given to the CDM sustainability labels and the 
project developers. Some 25.8% of participants believed that paying a price premium 
was worthwhile as the GS label is a tool for public relations and branding their 
organizations.  This concurs with Meyrick [73] and Sutter [108] hypothesized that 
buyers may pay a price premium because they may use it for public relations activities. 
Therefore, our findings proved that their assumption of reason for willingness to pay is 
correct. Another motive for paying a price premium for the GS projects is the belief that 
it will help CDMs projects achieve their SD objectives (25.8%). Few of them (7.6%) 
stated that they were worried about the CDM’s inability to generate SD benefits, so they 
would like to pay a price premium for project with high SD benefits.  
There were three participants (4.4%) who stated other reasons for WTP. The first 
participant stated that the Gold Standard project can generate more SD benefits than the 
non-labelled project, so this participant would like to pay a price premium. The second 
participant stated that the Gold Standard CER is very liquid in the market and the 
company can easily resell it for speculative purpose, so this participant would like to 
pay. The last participant stated that the Gold Standard project give a chance for the local 
community to participate in it and can generate many benefits for the local people, so 
this participant were willing to pay.      
 
8.14  Reasons for the Unwillingness to Pay 
             
The participants identified many reasons for unwillingness to pay. For the first reason 
29.4% of participants did not believed that paying a price premium for the Gold 
Standard project can help CDM project in achieving its sustainable development 
objectives. One respondent stated that this payment cannot help CDM projects, so it is a 
waste of money. For the second reason 23.5% stated that they are not interested in 
sustainable development benefits, but they would like to pay a price premium for Gold 
Standard CERs in recognition of its other benefits such as low methodology risk, low 
Post-Kyoto risk, etc. More clearly, in qualitative comments one respondent said “We 
are not concerned with type of CER which is being acquired. However, we would be 
concerned about the risks associated with some project types (post-Kyoto etc.). Also, we 
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could acquire only a reduced amount of CERs (thus achieving a diminished effect only) 
if we paid a premium per CER”. For the third reason 13.8% of participants stated that 
paying a price premium will result in higher costs of acquiring carbon credits, so there 
is no benefit for the compliance buyer. More clearly, in qualitative comments one 
respondent said “CER purchases are purchases to ensure compliance with the relevant 
regulation. I am required to meet compliance at least cost and I have no reason to incur 
additional costs to achieve SD objectives”.  
For the fourth reason 11.8% of participants stated that their budget is not enough to pay. 
For the fifth reason 11.8% of participants stated that the SD benefits generated by GS 
project are the same as similar non-labelled project. In qualitative comments one 
respondent said “We buy CERs for compliance buyers, and the SD value of a CER is the 
same regardless of the standard”. Another respondent said “I am for SD benefits but 
those should be included in the CDM itself, so there is no need for paying a price 
premium”. For the sixth reason 5.9% of participant stated that paying a price premium 
will destroy the market mechanism in the carbon market. 
There were two participants (3.8%) who stated other reasons for WTP. The first 
participant said “I have very little confidence in the GS methodology for assessing the 
SD benefits of a project”. Another participant said “This is about CO2, not social issues, 
the carbon money and in particular private money should not go to fixing social 
problems in countries where the governments are ignoring their social duties, it is bribe 
money”. So the second participant has a pessimistic view on paying a price premium.  
Finally, one respondent suggested that strict regulation for proving sustainability of 
CDM projects may make the company change its decision to pay a price premium. This 
respondent said “During a current market situation, it is difficult for credit buyer to pay 
premium for GS but situation may change especially when there is a strict regulation 
for proving sustainability of CDM projects”. This implied that the WTP responses may 
change in the future.   
       
8.15 WTP Values 
 
Buyers who agreed to pay a price premium were asked to state the maximum amount 
they would be willing to pay as a price premium per tonne of CO2e for CERs with the 
GS Label in recognition of the contribution to SD. Therefore, this premium stand for 
only the SD benefits, not including other benefits such as low Post-Kyoto risk, low 
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methodology risk, etc. One respondent would not provide a WTP figure because he 
thought that it is very difficult to determine the SD value of Gold Standard project in the 
situation given in this research. So we got the exact WTP figures from 65 respondents 
who were willing to pay. Table 8.22 shows the summary statistics of the WTP values. 
The results show that the mean WTP was €1.12/tCO2e with a standard deviation of 
€0.65 and the median WTP was €1.0/tCO2e (At the time of study we assumed that the 
current CER price, without any premium, is €10.00 per tonne of CO2e). Detailed 
information about the distribution of the WTP values is given in Figure 8.8, a graph of 
the cumulative numbers of individuals’ WTP. 
 
 Mean Median S.D. 
WTP value 1.12 1.00 0.65 
 
Table 8.22: WTP values 
 
 
Figure 8.8: The cumulative numbers of individuals’ WTP 
 
It can be seen from this graph that the range of WTP values was wide. Most buyers 
(34.8%) reported €1.0 WTP per tCO2e, followed by €2.0 WTP (24.24%), and €0.50 
WTP (19.70%). Each 4.54% of participants expressed a WTP value of €0.20, €1.50, and 
more than €2.0 respectively. Few of them (each 1.52% of participants) expressed a 
WTP value of €0.00, €0.30, and €0.75. We can clearly see that more than a half of 
respondents (68.17%) provided a willingness to pay greater than or equal to €1.0/tCO2e.             
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8.16 An Analysis of the WTP Values in Relation to the Independent Variables 
 
This part aims to investigate trends in the WTP values in relation to the independent 
variables. The independent variables used in this part include nationality, type of 
organization, overall image of label, buyers’ perception of ROI, buyers’ perception of 
SD benefits, and knowledge in label.     
 
8.16.1 WTP Values in Relation to Nationality of Organization 
 
To investigate trend in the WTP values in relation to nationality of organization, the 
sample was grouped into two groups: European countries, and Non-European countries. 
Each of these two groups has the same sample sizes which are 33 participants. Table 
8.23 shows the mean WTP of these two groups. Surprisingly, there was no difference 
between European countries and Non-European countries in the amount of money that 
they were willing to pay. As can be seen, the mean WTP of these two groups was 
€1.12/tCO2e. Figure 8.9 is a graphical presentation of the WTP values in relation to 
each nationality. The analysis concerning each nationality showed that there was no 
obvious trend in the WTP value in relation to each nationality. The group of USA and 
Canada showed the highest mean WTP which was €1.31/tCO2e, while the mean WTP 
of Multinationality was lowest (€0.90/tCO2e). This implied that the mean WTP of USA 
and Canada was considerably higher than that of Multinationality. For other 
nationalities including Australia and New Zealand, Japan, and European countries, their 
mean WTP values are all pretty close together.       
 
 European Non-European 
Mean WTP 1.12 (n=33) 1.12 (n=33) 
 
Table 8.23: Mean WTP in relation to nationality 
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Figure 8.9: The WTP values in relation to each nationality 
 
8.16.2    WTP Values in Relation to Type of Organization 
 
Figure 8.10 showed the WTP values in relation to type of organization. As expected, the 
charity showed the highest mean WTP which was €1.50/tCO2e. Surprisingly, the mean 
WTP of government was lower than that of the private. As can be seen, the mean WTP 
of the government was €0.93/tCO2e, while the mean WTP of the private was 
€1.10/tCO2e. Finally, the data showed that type of organization did not tend to have an 
influence on the WTP value.  
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Figure 8.10: The WTP values in relation to type of organization 
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8.16.3   WTP Values in Relation to Overall Image of Gold Standard Label 
 
Only the participants with the perception that overall image of Gold Standard label was 
“neither positive nor negative”, “fairly positive”, or “very positive” were willing to pay. 
Therefore, we apply only these three levels of image to test any trends in response that 
seem to influence the WTP value. Figure 8.11 show the WTP values in relation to 
overall image of Gold Standard label. The group of “very positive image” expressed the 
highest mean WTP which was €1.22/tCO2e, while the group of “neither positive nor 
negative image” expressed the lowest mean WTP which was €0.80/tCO2e. The mean 
WTP of the group of “fairly positive image” was €1.07/tCO2e. The data clearly showed 
that there was an obvious trend in the WTP value in relation to buyer’s perception of 
image. Buyers with an optimistic view of image of Gold Standard label tend to be 
willing to pay more money for the SD value than those with a pessimistic view. 
However, when the Pearson correlation analysis was carried out the relationship 
between the WTP value and buyer’s perception of image was not statistically 
significant.  
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Figure 8.11: The WTP values in relation to overall image of Gold Standard label 
 
8.16.4   WTP Values in Relation to Buyer’s Perception of ROI  
 
Considering the aspect of buyer’s perception of ROI against WTP values, participants 
who perceived that “ROI from Gold Standard label is higher than non-labelled project” 
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showed the highest mean WTP which was €1.22/tCO2e (Figure 8.12). On the other hand 
participants who perceived that “ROI from Gold Standard label is lower than non-
labelled project” showed the lowest mean WTP which was €0.80/tCO2e. The data 
showed that buyer’s perception of ROI tend to influence WTP value positively. When 
the Pearson correlation analysis was carried out the relationship between the WTP value 
and buyer’s perception of ROI was positive (Pearson correlation 0.248) and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level (P < 0.05). This means that with a more positive perception 
of ROI the maximum amount of the willingness to pay a price increases.   
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Figure 8.12: The WTP values in relation to overall image of Gold Standard label 
 
8.16.5   WTP Values in Relation to Buyer’s Perception of the SD Benefits 
 
All buyers who perceived that “The SD benefits generated by Gold Standard project are 
lower than similar non-labelled project” were not willing to pay, so the participants in 
this group were not taken into this analysis. Table 21 showed the aspect of buyer’s 
perception of the SD benefits against WTP values. Buyers who perceived that “The SD 
benefits generated by Gold Standard project are higher than similar non-labelled 
project” expressed the mean WTP of €1.19, while buyers who perceived that “The SD 
benefits generated by Gold Standard project are the same as similar non-labelled 
project” expressed the mean WTP of €0.70. Buyer’s perception of the SD benefits tends 
to have an influence on the WTP value (Table 8.24). When the Pearson correlation 
analysis was carried out the relationship between the WTP value and buyer’s perception 
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of SD benefits was positive (Pearson correlation 0.260) and statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level (P < 0.05). This means that with a more positive perception of the SD 
benefits the maximum amount of the willingness to pay a price increase.   
 
 
The SD benefits 
generated by Gold 
Standard project are 
lower than similar 
non-labelled project 
The SD benefits 
generated by Gold 
Standard project are 
the same as similar 
non-labelled project 
The SD benefits 
generated by Gold 
Standard project are 
higher than similar 
non-labelled project 
Mean WTP - 0.70 1.19 
 
Table 8.24: Mean WTP in relation to buyer’s perception of the SD benefits 
 
8.16.6   WTP Values in Relation to Knowledge in Gold Standard Label 
 
Considering the aspect of buyer’s knowledge in the GS label against WTP values, the 
participants with no knowledge in Gold Standard label expressed the lowest mean WTP 
which was €0.75/tCO2e (Figure 8.13). Buyers with good knowledge showed the highest 
mean WTP which was €1.20/tCO2e. However, there was no obvious trend in the WTP 
value in relation to knowledge in Gold Standard label. Similarity, when the Pearson 
correlation analysis was carried out the relationship between the WTP value and buyer’s 
knowledge in Gold Standard label was not statistically significant. However, 
considering only the two groups between buyers with knowledge in label and buyers 
with no knowledge, we can clearly see that buyers with knowledge tend to be willing to 
pay more money for the SD value than those with no knowledge.   
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Figure 8.13: The WTP values in relation to knowledge in Gold Standard label 
 
 
8.17 Factor affecting WTP for the Gold Standard Label 
 
The final part presents the regression results. Binary regression analysis was carried out 
to create the equation to explore the statistical relationship between the probability of 
the willingness to pay a price premium and the independent variables. The regression 
analysis aims to see which factors might contribute positively and negatively to the 
probability of the willingness to pay a price premium for the GS label. The dependent 
variable, willingness to pay a price premium, is dichotomous, coded 0 (unwillingness to 
pay) or 1 (willingness to pay). The independent variables discussed earlier in Chapter 7 
and that were used in the regression model include expected sustainable development 
benefits (ExpectedSD), expected return on investment (ExpectedROI), involvement in 
the Gold Standard label (Involvement), importance of the Gold Standard label 
(Importance), and the attitude towards the host country’s duty (Attitude). Table 8.25 
displays each variable name, description, and the expected sign of the coefficient. 
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Variable name Description Expected sign 
ExpectedSD Expected sustainable development benefits; “1” for 
respondents stating “The expected SD benefits 
generated by Gold Standard are lower than non-
labelled project”; “2” for “The expected SD benefits 
generated by Gold Standard are the same as non-
labelled project”; “3” for “The expected SD benefits 
generated by Gold Standard are higher than non-
labelled project” 
+ 
ExpectedROI Expected return on investment; “1” for respondents 
stating “ROI of CERs from Gold Standard is lower 
than non-labelled project”; “2” for “ROI of CERs 
from Gold Standard is the same as non-labelled 
project”; “3” for “ROI of CERs from Gold Standard 
is higher than non-labelled project” 
+ 
Involvement Involvement in the Gold Standard label was 
measured as the sum score on a multi-item scale 
consisting of questions 10 and 11. The summed 
score falls between 2 and 10. 
+ 
Importance Importance of the Gold Standard label was 
measured as the sum score on a multi-item scale 
consisting of questions 12, 13 and 14. The summed 
score falls between 3 and 15. 
+ 
Attitude The attitude towards the host country’s duty to 
assess the sustainability of CDM projects was 
measured as the sum score on a multi-item scale 
consisting of questions 15 and 16. The summed 
score falls between 2 and 10.  
+ 
 
Table 8.25: The independent variables for regression model 
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8.17.1 Test for Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity is a statistical phenomenon in which two or more predictor variables 
in a multiple regression model are highly correlated. The problem of multicollinearity is 
a data problem, not a problem of model specification. Multicollinearity is a serious 
problem if the research objective is to understand how the independent variables impact 
the dependent variable. This is because the confidence intervals on the regression 
coefficients will be very wide. As the confidence intervals are so wide, excluding a 
subject or adding a new one can change the coefficients dramatically and may even 
change their signs (Hair et al. [41]). Moreover, multicollinearity limits the size of the 
coefficient of determination and makes it progressively more difficult to add unique 
explanatory prediction from additional variables. Lastly, multicollinearity makes 
determining the contribution of each independent variable difficult. 
A test for multicollinearity aims to investigate the correlation among the independent 
variables. To investigate the degree of multicollinearity Hair et al. [41] suggested the 
two methods including: (1) the tolerance value and (2) the variance inflation factor 
(VIF). The VIF is 1/Tolerance. The VIF value is always greater than or equal to 1. The 
results of testing multicollinearity will be presented in terms of its degree, not in terms 
of the presence of the absence of multicollinearity. The small tolerance values which 
correspond to the large VIF values denote the degree of high multicollinearity. 
According to Hair et al. [41], a tolerance value less than 0.1 which corresponds to a VIF 
value greater than 10 is an indication of potential multicollinearity problem. Table 8.26 
showed the results of testing multicollinearity. There are no VIF values greater than 10 
(Table 8.26), so there is no multicollinearity problem.            
 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
ExpectedSD 0.589 1.699 
ExpectedROI 0.893 1.119 
Involvement 0.559 1.789 
Importance 0.414 2.417 
Attitude 0.942 1.062 
 
Table 8.26: Testing for multicollinearity 
 183
8.17.2   Estimated Binary Logistic Regression Model for Determining Factors of the 
Buyers’ Willingness to Pay 
 
Binary logistic regression model is used when the dependent variable is not continuous 
but instead has only two possible outcomes, coded 1 {a probability of success - (Pi)} or 
0 {a probability of failure – (1-Pi)}. Regular regression models cannot be used for such 
variables because the predicted value needs to be constrained between 0 and 1, which is 
not possible in regular regression. It also violates the assumption that the variable is 
normally distributed, since a binary variable has a binomial distribution (Hair et al. 
[41]). Therefore, the expected response is appropriately modeled by some curved 
relationship with the predictor variable. One such curved relationship is given by the 
logistic model. In the case of a single independent variable, the model can be written as 
(Hair et al. [41]): 
 
Y = Probability (event - Pi)  =              1  
                                                      1 + e - (B0 + B1X) 
 
Probability (no event)          =         1 - Pi    
 
where B0 and B1 are coefficients estimated from the data, X is the independent variable, 
and e is the base of the natural logarithm, approximately 2.718.  
 
Considering this model, it is bounded between zero and one. Moreover, there is a linear 
model hidden in the function that can be revealed with a proper transformation of the 
response. Finally, the sign associated with the coefficient, B1 indicates the direction of 
the curve. A positive value for B1 indicates an increasing function (see Figure 8.14) 
while a negative value indicates a decreasing function. 
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Figure 8.14: Binary logistic regression model (B1 > 0) 
 
As regular regression model cannot be used for a binary variable, logistic regression 
model can solves this problem by applying the logit transformation to the dependent 
variable. The logistic model predicts the logit of Y from X. The logit is the natural 
logarithm (ln) of odds ratio. Odds are ratios of probabilities of Y happening (Pi) to 
probabilities of Y not happening (1 – Pi). Odds ratio can be written as: 
 
 Odds ratio    =          Pi 
                                1 - Pi 
 
The natural logarithm of the odds ratio gives a linear model in Xi. Therefore, the simple 
logistic model has the form (Hair et al. [41]): 
 
Logit (Y) = the natural logarithm (odds) = ln        Pi           =   β0 + β1X1 
                                                                            1 - Pi 
In this study the dependent variable (Y) is the probability of being willing to pay which 
can be written as: 
 
Y   =  Probability of being willing to pay (Pi)    =             1  
                                                                                        1 + e - z 
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where  Z =  β0 + β1ExpectedSD + β2ExpectedROI + β3Involvement + β4Importance +  
                   β5Attitude   
 
As previously noted, the natural logarithm of the odds ratio gives a linear model, so in 
this study the binary logistic regression model can be written as: 
 
The natural logarithm (odds) = ln    Pi      =β0 + β1ExpectedSD + β2ExpectedROI +  
                                                       1 - Pi      β3Involvement + β4Importance + β5Attitude 
Where 
Pi = the probability of being willing to pay 
1- Pi = the probability of not being willing to pay 
 
The regression results for the model are reported in Table 8.27. Most of the tested 
variables were significant related to the probability of the willingness to pay a price 
premium (Table 8.27).   
 
 
Variable Coefficient Significance 
Constant -10.977 0.000 
ExpectedSD 1.245 0.037 
ExpectedROI 0.816 0.022 
Involvement 0.382 0.025 
Importance 0.343 0.021 
Attitude 0.071 0.664 
Cox&Snell R2  =  0.453   
Nagelkerke R2  =  0.608   
 
Table 8.27: Estimated binary logistic regression model 
 
Given these coefficients, the logistic regression equation for the probability of a positive 
WTP can be written as: 
 
Y = Probability of being willing to pay =       1  
                                                                     1 + e - z 
 186
 
where  Z = -10.977 + 1.245ExpectedSD + 0.816ExpectedROI + 0.382Involvement  
                  + 0.343Importance + 0.071Attitude
 
  
 
If we apply this equation to an example of organization which has the following 
characteristics: 
 
• Perceived that “The expected SD benefits generated by Gold Standard are higher 
than non-labelled project” (ExpectedSD = 3) 
• Perceived that “ROI of CERs from Gold Standard is higher than non-labelled 
project” (ExpectedROI = 3) 
• Totally agreed with the statements 10 and 11 (Involvement = 10) 
• Totally agreed with the statements 12, 13, and 14 (Importance = 15) 
• Disagreed with the statements 15 and 16 (Attitude = 4) 
 
We find: Z = -10.977 + 1.245 (3) + 0.816 (3) + 0.382 (10) + 0.343 (15) + 0.071 (4) 
               Z = -10.977 + 3.735 + 2.448 + 3.82 + 5.145 + 0.284 = 4.455 
 
The probability of being willing to pay (Y) is then estimated to be: 
Probability of being willing to pay =             1                       
                                                                     1 + e – 4.455 
                                                         =   1 / 1.011626 = 0.9885 
 
Therefore the probability of being willing to pay of this sample organization is 0.9885, 
representing the event will occur.  
According to Tohmo [118], if the estimated probability of the event is less than 0.5, we 
predict that the event will not occur. On the other hand if the estimated probability of 
the event is more than 0.5, we predict that the event will occur. Finally, if the estimated 
probability of the event is exactly 0.5, we can make our prediction by flipping a coin. 
The coefficients for all independent variables have a positive sign as expected. The 
positive sign on the coefficient indicated that the probability of the willingness to pay a 
price premium is affected positively by all independent variables. As can be seen from 
Table 24, the variables ExpectedSD, ExpectedROI, Involvement, and Importance are 
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statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance. Only the variable Attitude 
is not statistically significant.  
Buyer’s perception of the SD benefits generated by the Gold Standard label has an 
influence on the probability of the WTP (statistically significant at the 5 percent level of 
significance). The positive coefficient for expected SD benefits indicate that buyers who 
have a positive perception of the SD benefits generated by the Gold Standard label are 
more likely to pay a price premium for the Gold Standard CERs than those who have a 
negative perception. This result agrees with the qualitative comments given by three 
participants. The first participant said “The Gold Standard project can generate many 
benefits for the local people, so I would like to pay a price premium for it”. Like the 
first participant, the second participant said “The reason for willingness to pay is that 
the Gold Standard project can generate more SD benefits than the non-labelled 
project”. On the other hand, the third participant said “The SD value of a CER is the 
same regardless of the standard, so I am not willing to pay a price premium”. 
Moreover, 11.8% of participants stated their reason for unwillingness to pay which is 
that the SD benefits generated by Gold Standard projects are the same as similar non-
labelled project. This result also agree with Getzner and Grabner-Krauter [32], 
confirming that the higher social benefits of product lead to higher demand for that 
product. Consequently, we can conclude that more positive perception of the SD 
benefits will lead to higher probability of the willingness to pay a price premium for the 
Gold Standard CERs. So the research result may induce the project developer to 
develop the project with high SD benefits for getting a price premium.   
Buyer’s perception of ROI of CERs from Gold Standard projects has an influence on 
the probability of the WTP. The positive coefficient for expected ROI (P < 0.05)  
indicate that buyers expecting high ROI of Gold Standard CERs have a higher 
probability of the willingness to pay a price premium than those expecting low ROI. 
The positive relationship between these two variables is supported by the result of the 
study on consumers’ willingness to invest in “green shares” which was conducted by 
Getzner and Grabner-Krauter [32]. According to Getzner and Grabner-Krauter, 
purchase and investment decisions can be subsumed to be correlated with expectations 
of the profit (the benefits) of product. Consumers expecting higher profitability (higher 
benefits) might be willing to demand more of the product or investment. Finally, 
Getzner and Grabner-Krauter arrive at the conclusion that higher expectations for the 
return on investment lead to a higher probability of investment in “green shares”. 
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However, in their study the expected ROI is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level of significance, while in this study the expected ROI is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level of significance.  
An involvement in the Gold Standard label has an influence on the probability of the 
WTP (statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance). The positive 
coefficient for an involvement in the label indicates that with more involvement in the 
Gold Standard label the probability of the willingness to pay a price premium increases. 
An involvement in the Gold Standard label represents buyer behaviors to seek out and 
purchase CERs from this label. The time and effort expended in finding and buying 
Gold Standard CERs are translated into the willingness to pay a price premium for it. 
Therefore, the relationship between these two variables is positive. This result is similar 
with the result of the study on the willingness to pay a price premium for 
environmentally certified wood products which was conducted by Vlosky [136]. Vlosky 
found that there is a positive relationship between consumer involvement in 
environmentally certified wood products and willingness to pay a price premium. 
Similarity, Jensen et al. [52] found that consumers who purchased environmentally 
certified products in the past have a higher probability of the willingness to pay a price 
premium for certified wood products.              
Buyers’ attitude towards an importance of the Gold Standard label has an influence on 
the probability of the WTP (statistically significant at the 5 percent level of 
significance). The positive coefficient for buyers’ attitude towards an importance of the 
label indicates that with a more positive attitude towards an importance of the Gold 
Standard label the probability of the willingness to pay a price premium increase. 
Attitudes towards an importance of the Gold Standard label will represent buyer’s 
consciousness in the sustainable development objectives of a CDM project. According 
to Vlosky [136], the positive attitude towards an importance of an environmentally 
certified wood product is translated into the willingness to pay a price premium for it. 
Therefore, the relationship between these two variables is positive. This result is 
consistent with Vlosky [136], confirming that there was a positive relationship between 
the positive attitude towards an importance of environmentally certified wood product 
and their willingness to pay a premium for certified wood products.       
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8.17.3 Goodness of Fit of the Model 
 
We assess whether or not the model fits the data. Firstly, Nagelkerke’s R2 of the model 
show reliability because of its high value. In this study Nagelkerke’s R2 (the fraction of 
explained variation) was 0.608 (Table 8.27). 60.8% of the probability of the willingness 
to pay could be explained by all independents variables in this model, while the 
remaining 39.2% could not explain the probability of the willingness to pay which was 
caused by other factors which are not examined. This means that the direct relationship 
between the independent variables (ExpectedSD, ExpectedROI, Involvement, 
Importance, Attitude) and the probability of the willingness to pay is high.     
 
Observed Predicted Percentage 
Correct Unwillingness to Pay Willingness to Pay 
Unwillingness to Pay 40 11 78.4 
Willingness to Pay 9 57 86.4 
Overall Percentage   82.9 
 
Table 8.28: Classification table 
 
Secondly, according to Hair et al. [41], to assess the predictive ability of the binary 
logistic regression we will construct the classification matrices. Table 8.28 showed the 
classification matrix. The classification matrix showed that 86.4% of buyers who were 
willing to pay were correctly predicted and 78.4% of buyers who were not willing to 
pay were correctly predicted. In all, 82.9% of the original cases were correctly 
predicted. Consequently, the model showed the best in the sense of the predictive 
ability.  
Thirdly, there is no multicollinearity problem in this study (Table 8.26). This means that 
the independent variables are not too highly related to each other. Lastly, the signs for 
the estimated coefficients are consistent with the theoretical or prior expectations.          
 
 
 
 
 
 190
8.18 Conclusions 
 
8.18.1 Classification of CER Buyers by Cluster Analysis 
 
Carbon markets are increasingly conscious of the social and environmental ‘quality’ of 
credits delivered by CDM projects.  Consequently carbon credits are no longer viewed 
as a homogenous good and buyers now differentiate between credits supplied by 
different types of CDM project. According to Sutter [108], CDM sustainability labels 
can differentiate the market for CERs into normal CERs and premium CERs. This 
research tries to validate the concept of a premium market by using cluster analysis. K-
means clustering was used to segment a sample of buyers into two clusters. The results 
clearly demonstrate that, within the sample studied, two clusters of buyers exist with 
distinct profile patterns. Moreover, the results of the chi-square analysis and a cross-
tabulation showed that these two clusters were significantly different in: organization 
type; level of paid up capital; perception of sustainable development benefits; 
perception of return on investment; perception of image of the sustainability labeling; 
participation in the voluntary market; the project priority; knowledge in the 
sustainability label; attitude towards the host country’s duty; and their willingness to 
pay. 
The first cluster of buyers has a strong preference for CERs with CDM sustainability 
labels. These buyers have negative attitudes towards the host countries’ capacity to 
assess CDM projects, so they require the additional standard to ensure the sustainability 
of CDM projects. They have high involvement in past purchase and purchase intention 
of CDM sustainability labels. These buyers have a high level of knowledge in CDM 
sustainability labels. They perceive that CERs with sustainability labels differ from non-
labelled CERs in terms of SD benefits. They were positive about the importance of 
labeling and the image of SD labels. Most buyers in this group apply “an ethical 
purchasing policy” for purchasing carbon credits by giving the least project priority to 
the industrial gas projects. Finally, non-profit organizations and companies with small 
paid up capital (< 100 million Euros) tend to be the members of this group.  
On the other hand, the second cluster of buyers has a strong preference for non-labelled 
CERs. These buyers have low involvement in past purchase and purchase intention of 
CDM sustainability labels. Moreover, they have a low level of knowledge in CDM 
sustainability labels. They view that CERs with sustainability labels are the same as 
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non-labelled CERs in terms of SD benefits and ROI. They were negative on an 
importance of sustainability labels, but have a positive attitude towards the host 
country’s duty to assess CDM projects. Finally, private companies with large paid up 
capital (≥100 million Euros) tend to be the members of this group.          
These findings clearly agree with Sutter’s recommendations, supporting that CDM 
sustainability labels can differentiate the carbon market. Finally, we may define this 
market characteristic as “One CER Two Markets”.      
 
8.18.2 The Willingness of Buyers to Pay a Price Premium for CERs with CDM 
Sustainability Label 
 
It is increasingly clear that carbon credits generated by CDM project do not all deliver 
the same SD benefits, as intended by the Kyoto Protocol. GS carbon credit has now 
been developed to meet the needs of buyers searching for carbon credit with high SD 
benefits. The research presented in this thesis used the contingent valuation method to 
better understand the buyers’ valuation of SD benefits of CDM projects through their 
WTP a price premium for GS carbon credits. This study finds that 56.4% of the buyers 
are willing to pay a price premium for GS carbon credits. The charity group and the 
government have a greater percentage of the “yes” WTP responses than the private 
group. On average, buyers are willing to pay a price premium of €1.12 per tonne of 
CO2e for GS carbon credit in recognition of SD benefits. Moreover, we found that a 
price premium for GS CERs varies widely. A wide range of WTP values is also 
supported by the result of the study on buyer’s willingness to pay a price premium for 
GS CERs which was conducted by Sterk et al. [105]. 
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Chapter 9 
  
A Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology for Assessing 
the Sustainability of CDM Projects 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the vagueness of the concept of SD is the most critical 
problem. There is still no single universally accepted definition of the sustainability of 
CDM project because the Bonn Agreement assigns a duty to interpret the sustainability 
of CDM project to each host country.  Therefore the vague concept of SD gives the 
opportunity, arguably it pressurizes, host countries to set the low sustainability 
standards in order to compete for CDM investment. This ultimately leads to the problem 
known as “a race to the bottom” in terms of SD standards (Sutter [108]). Several studies 
have found that the SD objectives of CDM project were not clearly interpreted by host 
countries (Brown et al. [8], Schneider [101]). Moreover, the relative importance of these 
SD objectives is still considerably vague. Stakeholder preferences towards the 
sustainable development objectives of CDM project are not explicit, and are left open 
for host countries to interpret. Making these objective preferences explicit will help 
reduce conflicts and help develop consensus as different stakeholders can evaluate their 
own proposals from the others’ preferences (Pascoe et al. [88]). Finally, the question of 
whether host countries can ensure the sustainability of CDM projects has been widely 
debated. Burian [10], Kolshus et al. [59], Michaelowa [74], Nussbaumer [80], Olsen 
[84], Olsen and Fenhann [85], Schneider [101], Sutter and Parreno [109]). Burian [10] 
found that projects with negative ecological or social impacts have been approved by 
host countries. This implied that host countries cannot guarantee the SD benefits of 
CDM projects.  
Given this context, an investigation of stakeholder preferences towards the SD of CDM 
projects is clearly needed. Moreover, there is a need for more specific research 
investigating how the CDM contributes to SD. This research tries to investigate these 
issues by using a case study of a biomass CDM project in Thailand. 
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9.2 Research Objectives, Research Questions, and Research Hypotheses 
 
The objective of this chapter is “to investigate the contribution of the CDM to 
sustainable development.” This objective can be achieved by pursuing these four 
research questions: 
 
i ) Are the expected SD benefits described in the PDD actually realized? 
ii ) How does CDM project distribute benefits and social costs to stakeholders? 
iii ) Were the preferences of the stakeholder for the sustainable development of 
CDM projects? 
iv ) Whether are the group’s preferences are substantially different from each other, 
on which criteria they differ? 
We can evaluate this research question by formulating the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The inter-group preference weights are different. 
 
9.3 Prior Literature 
 
There have been several studies of the sustainability assessment of CDM projects, but 
the research on stakeholder preferences towards the SD benefits of CDM project is 
limited to only two studies (Nussbaumer [79], Sutter [108]). This topic first discusses 
the literature on the sustainability assessment of CDM projects. Next, we discuss the 
literature on stakeholder preferences towards the SD benefits of CDM project.  
The sustainability assessments of CDM projects were mostly based on the reviews of 
the PDDs, whereas the in-depth interviews with stakeholders were not widely used for 
data collection. Kolshus et al. [59] assess the sustainability of the Brazilian energy 
project candidates including: (1) ethanol (with bagasse cogeneration); (2) cogeneration 
from refineries; (3) biomass thermoelectricity (gasification of wood); and (4) wind 
energy. Kolshus et al. developed a set of indicators to evaluate non-carbon benefits of 
these CDM project candidates on the environment, development, and equity. The data 
used in this analysis was obtained by the literature review, not the interviews. Thus, this 
study recommended further research to collect more data from the other sources. 
Kolshus et al. found that the cogeneration from refineries has positive impacts on all 
three dimensions including the environment, development, and equity, and also seem 
profitable (require low carbon quota prices). Therefore, the cogeneration is the most 
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cost-effective option. The wind energy option also has positive impacts on all three 
dimensions, but it requires high carbon quota prices to be profitable. On the other hand, 
fuel wood gasification has negative impacts on most environmental indicators, but it 
requires low carbon quota prices to be profitable. Finally, Kolshus et al. concluded that 
a high cost per ton of carbon dioxide abated was linked to a high score on sustainability 
indicators, whereas a low abatement cost per ton of carbon dioxide was linked to a low 
score on sustainability indicators. 
Brown et al. [8] investigated the sustainability of CDM forestry projects by using the 
case studies in Mexico and Belize. Brown used a multi-stakeholder analysis as a method 
for assessing projects. This method is based on in-depth interviews and qualitative data 
was derived from these interviews. Finally, the research results showed that the pilot 
CDM projects in this study did not contribute significantly to SD in terms of income, 
diversification of production, and other environmental or development aspects.   
Burian [10] investigated the sustainability of CDM projects by using an in-depth case 
study in Honduras. Burian chose Rio Blanco Small Hydroelectric Project as a case 
study because this project was supposed to be a best practice model concerning SD. 
Burian used a qualitative method to assess this project. The analysis was based on the 
data obtained from the PDD and in-depth interviews with project developers. This study 
tried to examine whether the expected SD benefits described in the PDD are actually 
achieved and whether there are important aspects not mentioned in the PDD. Therefore, 
this research requires the project visit to investigate the sustainability aspects. Finally, 
Burian found that this project contributed significantly to SD by being a self-sufficient 
source of renewable energy. The significant SD benefits generated by this project were 
increasing the quality of energy supply in region, creating plantation activities, and 
generating temporary and permanent jobs. However, this research only gathered data 
from the site visit, and it did not receive the information from other stakeholders such as 
local residents, experts, etc. We can not see the views of other stakeholders on the real 
SD benefits generated by this project. Consequently, this research only gives provides a 
crude analysis the project’s real contribution to SD.         
The other three studies of the sustainability assessment of CDM projects largely rely on 
data available in the PDD. These studies are conducted by Nussbaumer [79], Olsen and 
Fenhann [85], and Sutter and Parreno [109]. Sutter and Parreno used Multi-Attributive 
Utility Theory (MAUT) to assess the sustainability of the CDM project. They assessed 
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16 officially registered CDM projects with regard to whether they fulfill the GHG 
emission reduction objective and SD objective. The SD indicators used for his 
assessment were: (1) employment generation; (2) distribution of CER returns; and (3) 
improvement in local air quality. The data of expected SD benefits generated by each 
project was obtained from the PDDs. Moreover, Sutter and Parreno sent the 
questionnaires to 16 project developers to find the data of SD benefits generated by 
these projects. However, he got only 4 responses from his survey. Thus, the data for his 
analysis were largely obtained from the PDDs. Finally, he found that there were no 
registered CDM projects that were likely to fulfill the twin objectives simultaneously. 
Moreover, only 1 out of 16 projects was likely to contribute significantly to SD in the 
host country. 
Nussbaumer [79] used MAUT to assess the five case studies of CDM projects. The data 
of expected SD benefits generated by each project was obtained from the PDDs. Where 
the PDD did not provide  precise data of expected SD benefits, Nussbaumer used an 
educated guess to find the expected SD benefits. His guess for SD benefits missing from 
the PDDs may not be correct, so this will affect the quality of research results. Another 
weak point of this research is that Nussbaumer uses only five usable questionnaires to 
calculate the SD criteria weighting used in SD assessment. This low participation may 
not represent the real criteria weighting by stakeholders. Thus, this weighting will affect 
the quality of research results. Finally, the research results showed that a GS CDM 
project and a CDM project with Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF) 
perform well in terms of both overall SD benefits and the distribution between the 
different SD benefits. On the other hand, the HFC project in India doesn’t appear to 
perform well because its contribution to social development is low and the 
environmental impact is negative.         
As previously noted in Chapter 5, Olsen and Fenhann [85] conducted the sustainability 
assessment based on text analysis of the PDDs. They set 13 SD criteria for analyzing 
the expected SD benefits described in the 744 PDDs (744 CDM projects). They tried to 
find how many SD benefits each CDM project can generate. Consequently, this 
assessment relied only on data obtained from the PDDs.  
Therefore, the quality of the PDD will directly affect the accuracy of these three 
research works. Some host countries have their poor PDDs which do not give details of 
sustainable development benefits generated by CDM projects (Castro and Michaelowa 
[13]). Some PDDs do not give enough details for the sustainability assessment. 
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Moreover, the SD benefits described in the PDDs are only potential benefits, not the 
real benefits or actual negative impacts (Olsen and Fenhann [85]).  Therefore, relying 
only on data available in the PDD is not sufficient to investigate the CDM’s 
contribution to SD. Besides the details available in the PDDs, researchers need to find 
more details about SD benefits from other sources. Moreover, researchers need to 
investigate whether the expected SD benefits described in the PDD are actually 
achieved. Given these weaknesses of relying on data from PDDs, this research will use 
in-depth interviews and site visits to find the SD benefits.  
As previously noted, the research on stakeholder preferences towards the SD benefits of 
CDM project is limited to only two studies done by Nussbaumer [79] and Sutter [108]. 
Sutter [108] conducted the first survey on the sustainability preferences of CDM 
stakeholders in three host countries including South Africa, India, and Uruguay. Sutter 
used the direct weighting and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to assess the 
sustainability preferences. The Uruguayan stakeholder survey was conducted in a 
weighting workshop in which 36 CDM stakeholders participated. Unlike the Uruguayan 
survey, the South African and Indian surveys were conducted through the face-to-face 
interviews and electronic questionnaires. Each of these two countries got around 30 
responses from government, industry, NGOs, and academia. Indian stakeholders rate 
reducing dependency on fossil fuels as the highest preference, whereas South African 
stakeholder rate employment generation as the highest preference. Another stakeholder 
survey in Uruguay found that water resource (water quality and efficiency in the use of 
water) was the highest ranked preference. However, the distribution of participants in 
these surveys was not well balanced. Therefore, the assessment will get altered through 
biased weightings of assessment criteria. More importantly, these surveys covered only 
a group of expert, not the local residents in the CDM area. The CDM stakeholders 
include not only the experts, but also the local residents. Most stakeholder surveys on 
the sustainability preferences will include both a group of experts and a group of local 
residents (Ananda and Herath [3], Kontogianni et al. [60], Koontz and Hoag [61], 
Nielsen and Mathiesen [77], Strager and Rosenberger [107], Wattage and Mardle 
[138]). Therefore, the results of these three surveys did not reflect the preferences of 
local people for the SD of CDM project. Finally, Sutter [108] gave several 
recommendations for further research on the preferences of CDM stakeholders. Firstly, 
he recommended further research to ensure that the survey can reach a well balance 
between stakeholders from different groups. Secondly, he recommended further 
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research to add a group of local residents, especially the grass-roots level into the 
stakeholder survey and examine whether the sustainability preferences of experts and 
the sustainability preferences of local residents are different. Lastly, he suggested 
conducting a small scale survey rather than a large scale survey because a large scale 
survey tends to produce equalized weightings. 
More recently, Nussbaumer [79] followed Sutter [108] to conduct a survey on the 
sustainability preferences of CDM stakeholders. Nussbaumer used only the direct 
weighting to assess the sustainability preferences. This survey was conducted through 
electronic questionnaires and gained a small number of participants which included only 
11 people (5 responses from Annex I countries and 6 responses from non-Annex I 
countries). Unfortunately, this research failed to clearly find the preferences of CDM 
stakeholders. There was no strong evidence for a group of stakeholders to significantly 
favor one or the other SD criteria, or even a SD category. Moreover, the results of the 
questionnaire were not statistically relevant. More seriously, this survey include only 
the participants from Annex I countries. Consequently, the results of this survey cannot 
really reflect the preferences of all CDM stakeholders. 
There is clearly a need for further research on the stakeholder preferences towards the 
SD benefits of CDM project. Therefore, this research will follow Sutter [108] and use 
his recommendations to conduct a research on the sustainability preferences of CDM 
stakeholders. Hopefully this research will answer the open questions that were left by 
Sutter. Finally, this research will use in-depth interviews and site visits to find the SD 
benefits of a project case study and check whether the expected SD benefits described in 
the PDD are actually realized.   
 
9.4 Research Methodologies 
 
According to Nielsen and Mathiesen [77], the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods is useful in eliciting the preference structures within a complex 
group of stakeholders. The link between the qualitative and quantitative results will 
show whether the results of priority weights (quantitative method) are consistent with 
the real SD benefits and social costs we found by using qualitative interviews. This dual 
approach has been adopted in this research. 
 
 
 198
9.4.1 Selecting SD Benefits and Social Costs for the Stakeholder Survey 
 
Quantitative methods have been used to find stakeholder preferences for the SD of 
biomass CDM projects while qualitative methods have been used to investigate 
stakeholders’ perceptions of SD impacts. CDM potentially provide a wide range of 
environmental, economic, social, and technological benefits. However several potential 
CDM benefits are not relevant to biomass projects based on rice husk. Moreover 
including too many options in a study of stakeholder preferences increases the 
respondents’ cognitive burdens to the detriment of the study. This is a particular 
problem with face-to-face interviews (Ananda and Herath [3]). We therefore follow 
Curtius and Vorlaufer [18] and study only the SD benefits related to biomass CDM 
projects based on rice husk. In order to identify SD benefits we reviewed the project 
design documents (PDDs) of the 11 Thai biomass projects. Finally, we arrived at six SD 
benefits and the three social costs. The six SD benefits are: 
 
i. Generating extra income from selling biomass residues 
ii. Avoidance of danger from the burning of biomass residues 
iii. Creating jobs for local people 
iv. Transfer of technology and knowledge in renewable energy 
v. Increasing the usage of renewable energy and local content 
vi. Reduction of GHG emissions 
 
As for the social costs, most PDDs of the 11 CDM projects (rice husk) stated that 
stakeholders were worried about environmental problems including: (i) dust; (ii) noise; 
and (iii) waste disposal.  
The Buasommai Biomass CDM Project used the GS methodology to assess the 
sustainability of its project and found that it has a negative score (-1) on air quality and 
noise pollution during the operation period [9]. Moreover, the PDDs of Thaisaree Rice 
Husk Power Plant, Phu Khieo Bio-Energy Cogeneration project, and Buayai Bio Power 
Plant revealed that their stakeholders were concerned about: (i) air quality; (ii) water 
quality; and (iii) noise level.    
These six SD benefits and three social costs were used in a pairwise questionnaire to 
explore sustainability preferences. A series of pre-test meetings were held in 
Bannsamednoi Village (the local area adjacent to the CDM project) with 8 local people 
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and 2 experts to discuss various aspects of the proposed research. All participants 
agreed that the SD benefits should not include the ‘avoidance of danger from the 
burning of biomass residues’. This is because the local rice mills had already stopped 
burning rice husks before the implementation of biomass CDM projects. Consequently 
this SD benefit is not relevant, and it was deleted from the pairwise questionnaire. 
 
9.4.2 Qualitative Method 
 
Qualitative method was used to gain a deeper insight. This research used multi-
stakeholder analysis described by Brown et al. [8] as “a system for collecting 
information about groups or individuals who are affected by decisions, categorizing 
that information, and explaining the possible conflicts that may exist between important 
groups, and areas where trade-off may be possible”. A multi-stakeholder analysis 
largely relies on in-depth interviews together with document and policy analysis. Brown 
et al. [8] suggested that the interview structure should be developed according to an 
interviewee’s position and experience in the field. An interviewee with a limited 
experience in CDM activities will be interviewed in less detail than those with more 
experience. Interviews were structured by referring to the six SD benefits and three 
social costs mentioned above. CDM stakeholders are asked about their experiences 
based on the rice husk project. In-depth interviews were conducted between January and 
March 2010. The discussions during the in-depth interviews were audio recorded for 
analyzing the transcribed data. 
 
9.4.3 Quantitative Method: The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 
Quantitative method will be used to answer the two research questions: (1) What the 
preferences of the stakeholder for the SD of CDM projects are; and (2) Whether the 
group’s preferences are substantially different from each other, on which criteria they 
differ. This research will use the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) developed by Saaty 
[98] to assess the sustainability preferences of CDM stakeholders. 
AHP is suitable for complex decisions which involve the comparison of decision 
elements which are difficult to quantify (Saaty [98]). The AHP has proven to be a 
helpful tool for prioritizing the objectives of stakeholders’ preferences and exposing 
similarities and differences in stakeholder preferences (Nielsen and Mathiesen [77]). As 
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CDM project has multiple SD objectives to be prioritized, AHP is a suitable tool for this 
study to rank multiple SD objectives of CDM project. AHP has been used in various 
contexts and fields because of its user-friendly interface for multi-criteria decision-
making (Nielsen and Mathiesen [77], Sato [99], Wattage and Mardle [138]). According 
to Pascoe et al. [88], Strager and Rosenberger [107], and Sutter [108], the reasons for 
choosing the AHP as a tool to assess the preferences of stakeholders are as follows: 1) 
the AHP allow for many objectives to be simplified to individual choices by using 
pairwise comparison. Pairwise comparison will make the process of assigning weights 
much easier for participants because only two objectives are being compared at any one 
time rather than all objectives having to be compared with each other simultaneously; 2) 
the availability of AHP software makes calculation easy and provides many display 
tools to quickly view results; 3) the AHP provides an inconsistency check that enable 
the elimination of unserious answers. The AHP involve the following steps: 
 
i ) Identification of stakeholders 
 
The first step of the AHP is to identify stakeholders. This step is aimed to ensure that all 
interests in the CDM area are considered within the planning and decision-making 
process. In this step stakeholders will be added to the list for the future interview. Most 
studies using the AHP have used a small sample of stakeholders (Wattage and Mardle 
[138]). This is because a large number of stakeholders tend to produce equalized 
weightings and a large number of stakeholders make the elicitation exercise unworkable 
(Ananda and Herath [3], Sutter [108]). The details of stakeholder selection will be 
shown in Topic 9.4.4 
 
ii ) Identification of sustainable development  objectives 
 
The SD objectives of CDM project is developed for application at the project level. The 
SD objectives of CDM project can be synthesized from national sustainable 
development priorities. Moreover, the SD objectives of CDM project should create a 
linkage between CDM projects and national dimensions of sustainable development. 
The SD objectives largely overlap with national development objectives. There are 
synergies between CDM projects and national dimensions of SD. If the CDM project 
can contribute to SD at project level, it will also have a positive impact on SD at 
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national level. The SD objectives of CDM project are often grouped in four categories 
covering environmental, social, economic, and technological aspects. Each objective 
must be translated into the sub-objectives. These SD sub-objectives will be used in an 
AHP pairwise comparison for measuring the weighted preferences of CDM 
stakeholders. 
In exploring the sustainability preferences of CDM stakeholders in South Africa and 
India, Sutter [108] developed the three SD objectives of CDM project including 
environmental, social, and economic objectives. These three objectives were translated 
into the 12 sub-objectives which can be shown in the figure 5.3 (Chapter 5). 
 
iii ) Questionnaire Design and Data Collection 
 
The stakeholder preferences towards the SD objectives can be elicited using the 
pairwise comparison questions. This step requires stakeholders to answer many pairwise 
comparison questions. In the pairwise comparison questions, stakeholders are asked to 
assess the importance of one sub-objective against another sub-objective on the 9-point 
scale. This 9-point scale is used to determine the weightings. According to Satty [98], 
the value “9” denotes “absolute importance”, whereas the value “1” represents “equal 
importance”. For example, if the sub-objective 1 is extremely more important than the 
subjective 2, the stakeholder will give the value “9” in a pairwise comparison question. 
Table 9.1 show the 9-point comparison scale 
 
Scale Definition 
1 
3 
5 
7 
9 
2, 4, 6, 8 
Equal importance 
Moderate importance 
Strong importance 
Very strong importance 
Absolute importance 
Intermediate values between 
the adjacent scale values 
 
Table 9.1:  The 9-point comparison scale 
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The number of the pairwise comparison questions depends on the number of the sub-
objectives. We can calculate the number of the pairwise comparison questions by using 
the following equations: 
 
N    =     n (n-1) 
                  2 
Where 
N = the number of the pairwise comparison questions 
n = the number of the sub-objectives 
 
There are many ways to conduct a stakeholder survey such as focus group, internet 
survey, a face-to-face interview, etc. However, most studies of the sustainability 
preferences choose a face-to-face interview as a tool for a stakeholder survey. 
According to Sutter [108], the advantages of a face-to-face interview are: (1) the 
participants have the chance to ask a researcher about the SD objectives they do not 
understand; (2) a researcher can check whether participants have actually studied the SD 
objectives; (3) a researcher can detect and correct the obvious inconsistencies that result 
from simple errors or misunderstandings. Consequently, this study will use a face-to-
face interview to conduct a survey. In the first version of pairwise questionnaire, 
participants will be asked to weight the six SD benefits and three social costs with the 9-
point scale (See Appendix B). In order to ensure the validity of this questionnaire, we 
went to Bannsamednoi Village (the local area behind CDM project) discussing it with 8 
local people and 2 experts. The villagers were very keen to comment on the 
questionnaire. All participants completely disagreed with this first version of 
questionnaire. This first version included 18 pairwise questions which were so 
complicated that villagers could not understand this methodology. We agreed with the 
villagers because there are few stakeholder surveys using a pairwise questionnaire and 
this research is the first to use this method for CDM stakeholders. The participants gave 
us the three recommendations in order to improve this questionnaire. Firstly, they all 
agreed that the 9-point scale made them confused with its definition and also increase 
their cognitive burdens. Consequently, we follow Strager and Rosenberger [107] to 
employ a reduced form of the traditional 9-point scale. We developed the 5-point 
scaling system by deleting the four middle values (2, 4, 6, 8) of the traditional 9-point 
scale. This 5-point scaling system is shown in Table 9.2 below.        
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Scale Definition 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Equal importance 
Moderate importance 
Strong importance 
Very strong importance 
Absolute importance 
 
Table 9.2:  The 5-point comparison scale 
 
Secondly, all participants agreed that the SD benefits should not include avoidance of 
danger from the burning of biomass residues. This is because the rice mills stop burning 
the rice husks before the implementation of biomass CDM projects. This indicates that 
this is not a truly additional SD benefit, so we delete it from the pairwise questionnaire. 
Thirdly, they suggested us to describe more details of the five remaining SD benefits. 
Finally, we get the final version of questionnaire that all participants agree with (See 
Appendix C). This questionnaire including 13 pairwise questions asking the participants 
to weight the five SD benefits and three social costs with the 5-point scale. On an 
average, a participant need almost a minute to answer one pairwise comparison 
question, so it will take about 15 – 20 minutes for one participant to complete a survey. 
 
iv ) The analysis of stakeholders’ priority preferences 
 
We can compute the pairwise comparison score between two sub-objectives (a) by 
using the law of reciprocal comparison. For simplicity, we assume that there are two 
sub-objectives including Oi and Oj and aij is a pairwise comparison score between the 
sub-objective i and the sub-objective j. By reciprocal comparison, if aij = 3, then aji = 
1/3. These pairwise comparison scores will be concluded in form of a pairwise 
comparison reciprocal matrix shown in the table 9.3. All scores in the matrix are 
positive.  
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 Sub-Objective i Sub-Objective j 
Sub-Objective i 1 3 
Sub-Objective j 1/3 1 
 
Table 9.3:  The pairwise comparison reciprocal matrix 
 
The next step is score normalization. To normalize these pairwise comparison scores, 
we will compute the sum of each column and then divide each column by the 
corresponding sum. For example, the sum of column-j = 3 + 1 = 4, so the normalized 
score of aij = 3/4 = 0.75 and the normalized score of ajj = 1/4 = 0.25. The normalized 
scores can be shown in the table 9.4. 
 
 Sub-Objective i Sub-Objective j 
Sub-Objective i 0.75 0.75 
Sub-Objective j 0.25 0.25 
 
Table 9.4:  The normalized scores 
 
The final step is to compute the average values of each row in the Table 9.4, and use 
these as the preference weights for each sub-objective. For example, a preference 
weight for sub-objective i = (0.75+0.75)/2 = 0.75 (75%) and a preference weight for 
sub-objective j = (0.25+0.25)/2 = 0.25 (25%). These values represent stakeholder 
priority preferences towards the sub-objectives.  
Finally, Saaty suggested that a consistency ratio is used to measure how consistent the 
judgements have been relative to large samples of purely random judgements. 
Normally, each participant has a consistent decision. For example, one participant 
judges that criteria A is more important than criteria B and criteria B is more important 
than criteria C. If this participant has a consistent decision, participant will judge that 
criteria A is more important than C. However, not all participants have consistent 
decision. Therefore, we calculate a consistent ratio to measure the consistency of the 
pairwise comparisons.  As a rule of thumb, a consistency ratio of 0.10 (10%) or less is 
considered acceptable. If a consistency ratio is greater than 10%, we need to revise the 
pairwise comparison scores in a matrix. However, Sutter [108] set the cut-off at 0.20 
(20%) in exploring the sustainability preferences of CDM stakeholders. 
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9.4.4 Identification of Stakeholders 
 
CDM project involve a wide range of stakeholders. According to Ananda and Herath [3] 
and Grimble and Wellard [40], stakeholder is any group of people, organized or 
unorganized, who share a common interest or stake in a particular issue or system. 
CDM stakeholders are the individuals, groups and communities who are affected by 
projects such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local residents, and 
employees. In the design phase of the CDM project, the stakeholder participation 
focuses on the impacts of the CDM project and the project’s contribution to SD. In the 
validation phase of the CDM project, stakeholders comment on whether the project 
qualifies as a CDM project.  
In this research representative stakeholders will be added to the list for in-depth 
interview. However, selection of representative stakeholders is a difficult task (Ananda 
and Herath [3]). In the early stage of this research, we will identify stakeholders through 
a review of the PDD and a project site visit conducted in January to March 2010. As the 
research progressed, we will follow Brown et al. [8] to identify stakeholders by asking 
relevant stakeholder groups to identify individuals and organizations that have close 
relationships with them in terms of CDM activities.  
Most studies of the sustainability preferences of CDM stakeholders have used a small 
sample of stakeholders. Nussbaumer [79] and Sutter [108] used a sample of 11 and 30 
people respectively. According to Sutter’s recommendations, we will add a group of 
local residents, especially the grass-roots level into the stakeholder survey, so the 
stakeholder include both a group of experts and a group of local residents. For ensuring 
a well balance between these two groups, we will survey 40 experts and 56 local 
residents. Finally, the list of organizations participating in this research is shown in 
Table 9.5 and 9.6. 
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Name Organization Type 
Agrinergy (Thailand) Co.Ltd. Private – CDM Business 
South Pole Carbon Asset Management 
Ltd. (Thailand) 
Private – CDM Business 
The Department of Alternative Energy 
Development and Efficiency 
Government - Regulator 
Energy Policy and Planning Office Government - Regulator 
Regional Energy Coordination Office 6 
(Surin) 
Government - Regulator 
Office of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Policy and Planning 
Government - Regulator 
Ram Tambon Administrative 
Organization 
Government - Regulator 
Prasart Tambon Administrative 
Organization  
Government - Regulator 
Burusi Tambon Administrative 
Organization  
Government - Regulator 
Energy for Environment Foundation NGO – Research 
Northeast Development Foundation  NGO – Energy Policy 
Walailak Energy Research Unit Government – Research 
Local Environmental Watch Network NGO – Environmental Policy 
Chaipakoom Temple Local resident 
Surin Electricity Co. Ltd. Private – CDM Business 
Agriculture Office of Surin Government – Regulator 
Metropolitan Electricity Authority State Enterprise – Energy Business 
Public Relation Office of Surin Government – Regulator 
Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand 
State Enterprise – CDM and Energy 
Business 
Provincial Electricity Authority State Enterprise – Energy Business 
Khanom Electricity Generating Co. Ltd. Private – Energy Business 
Surin Sustainable Energy Working Group NGO – Energy Policy 
 
Table 9.5:  List of stakeholder organizations 
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Name Organization Type 
Bannburusi School Government – Academic 
Bannbutom School Government – Academic 
Ramwittaya Rachamunghalapisek School Government – Academic 
Bannsamednoi School Government – Academic 
Mungcharoen Green Power Private – CDM Business 
The Clean Energy Fund Committee NGO – Energy Policy 
Silpakorn University Government – sustainable development 
policy 
Charoen Energy and Water Asia Co. Ltd. Private – CDM Business 
EM Group Co. Ltd. Private – CDM Business 
Carbon Partners Asiatica (Thailand) Co. 
Ltd.  
Private – CDM Business 
Foxsys Co.,Ltd. Private – CDM Business 
Khon Kaen Sugar Power Plant Private – CDM Business 
Local residents in Bannsamednoi Village 56 local residents around CDM project 
area 
 
Table 9.6: List of stakeholder organizations (Cont.) 
 
From Table 9.5 and 9.6, a group of experts include 15 government organizations, 5 
NGOs, 3 state enterprises, and 10 private organizations. We have interviewed at least 
one representative from these organizations (Table 9.5 and 9.6). For the group of local 
residents, we have selected the residents who live near the CDM project area (less than 
2 miles from the CDM project area). Therefore, Bannsamednoi Village was selected as 
the representatives of local residents. This village was most directly affected by the 
CDM project (both positive and negative impacts). Bannsamednoi village is located 
behind Mungcharoen Green Power, about 2 miles away from the project. It is very 
difficult to go to this village without the help of local residents. The Regional Energy 
Coordination Office suggested us to call to Mr.Wichai Laithong, one of the Clean 
Energy Fund Committee, who lives in this village for leading us to the village. We 
found that this project is the second group to assess the project area (The first group is 
NHK Television who came to see local stakeholders). Surprisingly, Thai DNA never 
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goes to assess the project area, so the regulators do not know whether the expected SD 
benefits and the social costs described in the PDD are actually realized.   
 
9.5 Country Context: The Kingdom of Thailand 
 
The issue of CDM’s contribution to sustainable development will be addressed in the 
context of a case study conducted in Thailand. We have selected a biomass (rice husk) 
CDM project as a case study. The Kingdom of Thailand is located in the heart of the 
Southeast Asian mainland, and covers an area of 513,115 square kilometres. Its size is 
equivalent to the size of France and California. Thailand has seventy-six provinces that 
are further divided into districts and sub-districts. The country is divided into five main 
geographical regions: the North, the Central Plain, the Northeast, the East, and the 
South. Unlike the provinces, the five regions have no administrative character, but are 
used for geographical purposes only. The map of Thailand can be shown in Figure 9.1. 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Map of Thailand 
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Thailand has a tropical climate and three seasons: rainy season (June to October), cool 
season (November to February), and hot season (March to May). According to Thailand 
Board of Investment, the population of Thailand reached 64.86 million in 2004, of 
which eight million people live in Bangkok and its vicinity.  
Thailand is a middle-income country. Thailand is one of the most successful developing 
countries. Thailand was known as one of Asian tiger economy with rapid economic 
growth beginning in 1985, followed by an economic crisis beginning in 1997. Bangkok 
is an economic centre of Thailand and heavily dominates the national economy. 
Thailand has had success with reducing poverty headcount ratio from 42.21% in 1988 
to 8.48% in 2007. In other words, the number of poor people in Thailand has dropped to 
5.4 million in 2007 from 22.1 million in 1988 (see Table 9.7). In 2007 national poverty 
line is THB1,443/head/month (GBP22/head/month). Poverty is expected to continue to 
fall in 2008 with farm incomes continuing to rise sharply as a result of the recent rise in 
crop prices.  
 
Poverty Index 1988 1990 1992 1998 2004 2006 2007 
Poverty line 
(Bath/head/month) 
633 692 790 1,130 1,242 1,386 1,443 
Poverty headcount ratio (%) 42.21 33.69 28.43 17.46 11.16 9.55 8.48 
the number of poor people 
(million) 
22.1 18.4 15.8 10.2 7.0 6.1 5.4 
 
Table 9.7: Thailand Poverty Index; (source: [114]) 
 
Agriculture was traditionally the major economic activity of Thailand. However, the 
acceleration of economic growth in the boom period (1985-1996) caused rapid changes 
in Thailand’s economic structure. Currently, Thai economy is largely dependent on 
manufacturing and services (see Table 9.8) 
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Sector GDP by sector (%) Labor force by occupation (%) 
Agriculture 8.8 38.8 
Manufacturing 39.6 15.8 
Wholesale and Retail trade 13.6 15.6 
Services 37.9 23.4 
 
Table 9.8: Thailand’s economic structure in 2007; (source: [115])   
 
Manufacturing has created Thailand’s rapid economic growth. According to Bank of 
Thailand, the manufacturing’s share of GDP rose from 22% in 1980 to 39.6% in 2007. 
However, manufacturing employed only 15.8% of the labor force in 2007. Major 
manufacturing include motor vehicles and parts, food processing, electronics, textiles 
and clothing, and petroleum. Thailand is becoming a centre of automobile 
manufacturing for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations market.  
The service sector is another economic sector which helps Thailand to achieve rapid 
economic growth. The service sector includes financial services, education, restaurants, 
and hotels. The service sector has shifted from low-skilled jobs to high-skilled jobs in 
financial services, trade, and management. In 2007 the service sector contributed 37.9% 
of GDP and employed 23.4% of the labor force. Tourism is a major activity within 
Thailand’s service sector. According to Tourism Authority of Thailand, 14.46 million 
international tourists visited Thailand in 2007 and generated THB547,782 million 
(GBP8,425 million) in revenue for Thailand in 2007. 
Agriculture becomes less important in Thailand today. The agriculture’s share of GDP 
fell from 23% in 1980 to 8.8% in 2007. However, agriculture accounts for the highest 
share of the labor force. As of 2007, 38.8% of the labor force is employed in agriculture. 
Rice is still the Thailand’s most important crop. Thailand is the world’s leading exporter 
of rice. Other major crops include rubber, coconuts, corn, soybeans, sugarcane, and 
other tropical fruits. 
 
9.6 Thailand’s Energy Policy and Situation 
 
Thai economy quickly rebounded from the crisis period of 1997 - 1999. Indeed, 
Thailand’s growth recovery was driven largely by the growing exports and the growing 
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investments. In the period of 2000 - 2006 Thailand’s annual real GDP growth averaged 
5%; whereas world’s annual real GDP growth averaged 3%. The national energy 
consumption increases in line with this growth. Therefore, the energy consumption keep 
rising after the crisis period of 1997 – 1999. From 1984 to 2008, final energy 
consumption has grown annually at 6%.  
In 2009, the final energy consumption in Thailand was 66,339 ktoe (kilo-ton-oil-
equivalent) with the rate of increasing 0.7% from the previous year (DEDE [20]). The 
total value of the final energy consumption was 1,032 billion Baht (or about GBP21 
billion; exchange rate: GBP1 = THB50.00). Considering the final energy consumption 
by economic sector, industrial sector accounted for the largest proportion of the total 
final energy consumption (36.6%), followed by transportation sector (35.7%), 
residential sector (14.9%), commercial sector (7.6%), and agricultural sector (5.2%). 
Thailand is a net energy importer and largely depends on crude oil imports for power 
generation. More clearly, crude oil accounted for 67.66% and 68.15% of the total 
energy imported in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Therefore, Thailand is affected severely 
by oil price volatility. This will also make Thailand face a huge foreign currency loss. In 
2009, the total energy imported was 59,386 ktoe with the rate of decreasing 0.1% from 
the previous year, while the total energy exported was 12,712 ktoe with the rate of 
increasing 8.5% from the previous year. The commercial energy (petroleum products, 
crude oil, electricity, natural gas, and coal) accounted for about 99% of both total 
energy imported and total energy exported. In 2009, crude oil played the greatest 
proportion or 67.50% of the total energy imported.  
Considering the fuel consumption for electricity generation, fuel oil and diesel oil 
accounted for the largest proportion or 59.8% of the total fuel consumption of electric 
generation in 1981, but the share of fuel oil and diesel oil for electricity generation was 
continuously decreased while increasing that of other fuel types such as natural gas, 
coal, lignite, nuclear, etc. In 2009, fuel oil and diesel oil accounted for only 0.7% of the 
total fuel consumption of electric generation. According to Thailand Power 
Development Plan (PDP) during 2008 – 2021, the share of fuel oil and diesel oil for 
electricity generation will be reduced to 0% by 2021 (Chongpeerapieng [15]) (see Table 
9.9). On the other hand, natural gas accounted for the largest proportion or 73.7% of the 
total fuel consumption of electric generation in 2009.  
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 1981 1987 1998 2008 2016 2021 
Natural gas 10.0 54.5 53.8 70.0 63.4 47.1 
Lignite 10.9 23.4 18.1 12.6 7.8 5.9 
Imported coal - - 0.5 8.2 15.0 15.0 
Hydro 19.3 14.2 5.5 4.7 2.7 2.0 
Fuel oil 58.4 7.6 19.2 1.0 - - 
Diesel 1.4 0.2 1.1  0.2 - - 
Renewable energy - - 0.2 1.4 2.7 2.3 
Nuclear - - - - - 5.3 
Imported electricity from 
other countries 
- - 1.8 1.9 7.0 9.7 
 
Table 9.9: Share of fuels used for power generation in Thailand; (source: Chongpeerapieng [15])  
 
In Thailand, there are many renewable energy resources such as biomass, solar, and 
hydro, but Thailand so far exploits only a small portion of the full potential of these 
resources. However, the percentage share of renewable energy is continuously rising 
because there are many policies to encourage the production and use of renewable 
energy.  In 2009, Thailand’s renewable energy consumption was 5,861 ktoe with the 
rate of increasing 21.7% from the previous year. Of this amount, renewable energy 
consumption as electricity energy, thermal energy, ethanol, biodiesel, and NGV 
(Natural Gas Vehicle) accounted for 8.8% of the total final energy consumption. The 
electricity consumption produced from renewable energy was 279 ktoe. The thermal 
consumption was 3,537 ktoe. The biofuel consumption as ethanol was 334 ktoe, and 
478 ktoe as biodiesel. Finally, NGV consumption was 1,233 ktoe. However, the 
increasing use of renewable energy has caused the rising price of biomass residues. 
Figure 9.2 showed the historical prices of biomass residues. The price of rice husk rises 
to 1,200 Baht per tonne in 2010 from 500 Baht per tonne in 2006, showing an increase 
of 140%. Moreover, the price of oil palm shell rises to 1,500 Baht per tonne in 2010 
from 1,100 Baht per tonne, representing an increase of 36% [46]. According to 
Gervasoni [31], the increased price of the rice husks will significantly raise the income 
of farmers. We will discuss this effect on the farmer’s income in the next chapter.  
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The historical prices of biomass residues
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Figure 9.2:  The historical prices of rice husk and oil palm shell; (source: [46]) 
 
As discussed above, Thailand largely depends on imported energy, especially fossil 
fuels. In order to minimize dependency on imported energy and simultaneously reduce 
the environment impact of using conventional fossil fuels, Thailand has recently 
announced the 15-year Alternative Energy Development Plan (AEDP) during 2008 – 
2022. The AEDP’s target is to increase a share of alternative energy mixed to be 20.3% 
of the country final energy demand in the year 2022 [20]. This target is equivalent to 
total oil consumption of 19,799 ktoe. Moreover, this target will help Thailand avoid the 
addition of 42 MtCO2e GHG emissions per year. The objectives of the AEDP are: 
 
i )   To utilize alternative energy as a major energy supply of the country for    
replacing oil import. 
ii )    To   increase energy security of the country. 
iii )    To promote an integrated green energy utilization in communities. 
iv )    To enhance the development of alternative energy technology industry. 
v )    To research and encourage high efficiency alternative energy technologies. 
 
In the AEDP, Thailand has an estimated renewable energy potential of around 57,210 
MW for electricity generation. Of this potential, Thailand has the highest potential for 
solar power, followed by biomass, and wind energy (see Table 9.10). Solar power has 
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the potential to provide 50,000 MW for electricity generation of which only 32 MW has 
been developed. The majority of electricity generated by renewable energy comes from 
biomass. This is because Thailand is an agricultural country and has many agricultural 
residues such as rice husks, bagasse, coconut husks and shells, palm oil fibre, etc. 
According to the AEDP, biomass has the potential to provide 4,400 MW for electricity 
generation of which 1,610 MW has been developed. Considering the wind power, its 
estimated potential is 1,600 MW of which only 1 MW has been developed. Based on 
the estimated renewable energy potential, the 15-Year ADEP is divided into three 
phases (see Table 9.10):  
 
(1) The short term from 2008 to 2011 
The short term is emphasized on the promotion of commercial alternative energy 
technologies and the high-potential renewable energy resources such as biofuels and 
thermal energy from biomass and biogas with full financial support. The short term goal 
is to develop renewable energy to a level equivalent to 10,961 ktoe or 15.6% of the total 
energy consumption (see Table 9.10).   
 
(2) The mid-term from 2012 to 2016 
The mid-term aim to: (1) promote the renewable energy technology industry; (2) 
support the new renewable energy technology prototype development in order to make 
it economically sound; and (3) encourage new technologies in the biofuels production, 
the green city model development, and the strengthening of the local energy production. 
The mid-term goal is to develop renewable energy a level equivalent to 15,579 ktoe or 
19.1% of the total energy consumption (see Table 9.10).   
      
(3) The long term from 2017 to 2022 
The long term aim to: (1) enhance utilization of new available alternative energy 
technologies such as hydrogen, bio hydrogenated (BHD), etc.; (2) extend the green city 
model throughout Thai communities; and (3) promote Thailand as the ASEAN biofuels 
and renewable technology export hub. The long term goal is to develop renewable 
energy equivalent to a level 19,799 ktoe or 20.3% of the total energy consumption (see 
Table 9.10).     
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 Potential 
MW  
Existing 
MW 
2008 - 2011 2012 - 2016 2017 – 2022 
MW ktoe MW ktoe MW ktoe 
Solar 
Wind  
Hydro 
Biomass 
Biogas 
Solid waste 
Hydrogen 
50,000 
1,600 
700 
4,400 
190 
400 
32 
1 
56 
1,610 
46 
5 
55 
115 
165 
2,800 
60 
78 
6 
13 
43 
1,463 
27 
35 
95 
375 
281 
3,220 
90 
130 
11 
42 
73 
1,682 
40 
58 
500 
800 
324 
3,700 
120 
160 
4 
56 
89 
85 
1,933 
54 
96 
1 
Total  1,750 3,273 1,587 4,191 1,907 5,608 2,313 
Thermal ktoe ktoe  ktoe  ktoe  ktoe 
Solar 
Biomass 
Biogas 
Solid waste 
154 
7,400 
600 
1 
2,781 
224 
1 
 5 
3,660 
470 
15 
 18 
5,000 
540 
24 
 38 
6,760 
600 
35 
Total  3,007  4,150  5,582  7,433 
Biofuel m lt/d m lt/d m lt/d ktoe m lt/d ktoe m lt/d ktoe 
Ethanol 
Biodiesel 
Hydrogen 
3.00 
4.20 
1.24 
1.56 
3.00 
3.00 
805 
950 
6.20 
3.64 
1,686 
1,145 
9.00 
4.50 
0.1 
2,447 
1,415 
124 
Total  6.00 1,755 9.84 2,831 13.50 3,986 
Total energy consumption 66,248  70,300  81,500  97,300 
Total energy from 
renewable energy (ktoe) 
4,237  7,492  10,319  13,709 
Renewable energy ratio 6.4%  10.6%  12.7%  14.1% 
NGV (mmscfd – ktoe) 108.1 393.0 3,469 596 5,260 690 6,090 
Total energy from 
renewable energy and NGV 
(ktoe) 
  10,961  15,579  19,799 
Alternative energy ratio   15.6%  19.1%  20.3% 
 
Table 9.10: Goals of the 15-Year ADEP; (source: [20]) 
 
In order to achieve the goals of these three phases, biomass energy is expected to 
provide a share in excess of 60% of alternative energy mix, reflecting the fact that 
Thailand is a country highly dependent on the agricultural sector and hence has access 
to the large amounts of the waste agricultural residues. 
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9.7 CDM Implementation in Thailand 
 
Thailand signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in June 1992 and the Convention was ratified on December 1994. The 
ratification went into effect in March 1995. Later, Thailand signed the Kyoto Protocol 
on 2 February 1999 and ratified it on 28 August 2002. After the ratification of the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, Thailand developed the Principles of climate change 
policy which was based on the objectives of stabilizing GHG emissions, and, at the 
same time, recognizing economic development needs (IGES [49]). The principles of 
Thailand’s climate change policy are concluded in Table 9.11. 
 
No-regret 
option 
Thailand should participate and cooperate with other parties to achieve the common 
objective of reducing GHG emissions, but the same time it should recognize economic 
development needs. 
Precautionary Thailand should take precautionary measures against the potential adverse impacts of 
climate change. 
Common but 
differentiated 
responsibilities 
As a non-Annex I country, Thailand does not have emission reduction target 
obligations under the UNFCCC. Thailand anticipates that Annex I countries will take 
the lead in GHG emissions reduction both domestically and abroad. Sufficient support 
provided for voluntary action and public participation is preferred.  
Equity It should address inequalities in health status and access to adequate food, clean water, 
and others due the adverse effects of climate change. 
 
Table 9.11:  The principles of Thailand’s climate change policy; (source: IGES [49]) 
 
As a non-Annex I country, Thailand has no commitment to reducing GHG emissions 
under the Kyoto Protocol and is eligible to host the CDM projects. The Thailand 
Greenhouse Gas Management Organization (TGO) was established under the Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Environment to work as the Designated National Authority 
for CDM (CDM-DNA). TGO is the newly established autonomous governmental 
organization. The Objectives and duties of TGO include: (1) analyzing and screening 
the CDM projects for issuance of the Letter of Approval (LOA) and monitoring the 
projects; (2) promoting CDM projects and the carbon market; (3) being the National 
Information Clearing House of Greenhouse Gas; (4) managing all information regarding 
the approved CDM projects and CERs’ value; (5) enhancing the capacity building of the 
government and private sectors on greenhouse gas management; (6) promoting public 
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outreach regarding greenhouse gases; and (7) promoting and supporting all activities 
related to climate change mitigation. 
As Thailand’s energy policy aim to increase the use of renewable energy in order to 
prevent an energy shortage, the top priority will be given to the following CDM project 
types: 
 
• Energy sector including energy production and energy efficiency improvement 
projects such as fuel switching, conversion of industrial waste to energy, 
improvement of cooling system effectiveness, improvement of energy efficiency 
in buildings, etc. 
• Environment sector including production of heat and electricity from municipal 
solid waste and wastewater treatment for energy production. 
• Transport sector including improvement of fuel efficiency and demand side 
management. 
• Industrial sector including emission reductions from manufacturing process. 
 
In order to ensure the projects’ contribution to SD in Thailand, the TGO Board of 
Directors developed the procedures for screening, evaluating, and approving CDM 
projects. The CDM project approval procedures are shown in Figure 9.3.   
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Figure 9.3:  CDM Approval Procedure in Thailand; (source: [113])  
 
Briefly, the CDM project approval procedures are as follows: 
 
i ) Project proponent submits the PDD and all documents related to CDM project to 
TGO 
ii ) TGO checks the completeness of these documents and send these to the relevant 
Ministries which will evaluate the project eligibility. 
iii ) TGO uses comments from the relevant Ministries to evaluate whether the Letter 
of Approval shall be issued. 
iv ) Finally, TGO reports the final decision to the project proponent. If a project 
candidate contribute to SD in Thailand and meet all the evaluated requirements, 
it will be approved and get the Letter of Approval. 
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The above procedures are regulated to complete within 180 working days. The Letter of 
Approval (LOA) is to be signed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment. 
 
9.8 The Sustainable Development Criteria and Indicators for Assessing CDM 
projects in Thailand 
 
A duty to assess the sustainability of CDM projects is assigned to a host country, so a 
host country must develop its own criteria for ensuring the SD benefits of CDM 
projects. In Thailand, the SD criteria for assessing CDM projects are developed by 
TGO. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Thailand is categorized as country with well defined 
sustainability criteria in Asia-Pacific. The SD objectives of CDM project are grouped in 
four categories covering environmental, social, economic, and technological objectives. 
These four objectives are translated into 24 criteria. These objectives and criteria have 
been defined as follows: 
 
9.8.1 Environmental Objective: This objective is translated into 15 criteria as follows: 
 
1) Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions: This criterion is assessed by the amount 
of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions compared with baseline. This criterion 
is scored between 0 to +1. 
2) Reduction of air pollutant emissions: Standards concerning air pollutants and air 
additives should be in compliance with the laws announces by authorities such 
as the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, the Pollution Control 
Department, the Department of Industrial Works, etc. This criterion is scored 
between -1 to +1. 
3) Noise pollution: This criterion is assessed by sound level in the project site. This 
criterion is scored between 0 to +1. 
4) Odour pollution: Odor pollution control should be in compliance with the laws 
announces by authorities such as the Department of Industrial Works, Ministry 
of Public Health, etc. This criterion is scored between 0 to +1. 
5) Wastewater quality: Standards of wastewater quality should be in compliance 
with effluent standards stipulated by relevant authorities such as the Department 
 220
of Industrial Works, Harbor Department, etc. This criterion is scored between 0 
to +3. 
6) Waste management: In this criterion, waste means material which cannot be 
reused and is a burden of management. This criterion is assessed by waste 
output per raw material input. This criterion is scored between -1 to +2. 
7) Soil pollution: Soil pollution standards should be in compliance with the 
government standards. This criterion is scored between 0 to +1. 
8) Groundwater contamination: This criterion is scored between -1 to 0. 
9) Reduction of hazardous waste: Hazardous waste should be in compliance with 
the laws announces by authorities such as the Department of Industrial Works, 
the Pollution Control Department, etc. This criterion is scored between -1 to +1. 
10)  Water demand and efficiency of water usage: This criterion is scored between -
2 to +2. 
11)  Soil, coastal and river bank erosion: This criterion is scored between -1 to 0. 
12) Increase in green areas under the project’s initiative: This criteria aim to promote 
the development of green area. Green area means any vegetated land managed 
according to silviculture and landscape principles. Green areas can be located 
inside or outside the project site as long as it is the project’s initiative. This 
criterion is scored between 0 to +3. 
13) Ecosystem diversity: This criterion is scored between -1 to +1. 
14) Species diversity: This criterion is assessed by population size and species of 
flora and fauna. This criterion is scored between -1 to +1. 
15) Usage of GMO and/or alien species in the project site: This criterion is scored 
between -1 to 0.   
 
9.8.2 Social Objective:  This objective is translated into 3 criteria as follows: 
 
1) People’s participation: This criterion is assessed by the level of organized 
participation. This criterion is scored between -1 to +2. 
2) Activities promoting social development, culture, and sufficiency economy 
philosophy: This criterion is assessed by many activities such as protection of 
natural and cultural heritage; scholarship award; religious, arts, and cultural 
activities; healthcare support; activities based on sufficiency economy 
philosophy; child nursery care, etc. This criterion is scored between 0 to +3. 
 221
3) Workers’ health and surrounding community health: This criterion is assessed 
by workers’ health and community health plan. This criterion is scored between 
0 to +2.   
 
9.8.3 Technological Objective: This objective is translated into 3 criteria as follows:   
 
1) Technological development: This criterion is assessed by the usage of 
appropriate technology. This criterion is scored between -1 to +2. 
2) Post project implementation plan: This criterion is assessed by post project 
implementation plan or post crediting period plan as outlined by a project. This 
criterion is scored between 0 to +1. 
3) Capacity building: This criterion is assessed by the number of well skilled 
employees. This criterion is scored between -1 to +1. 
  
9.8.4 Economic Objective: This objective is translated into 3 criteria as follows: 
 
1) Increasing income of stakeholders: This criterion is assessed by workers’ annual 
income and income of other stakeholders. This criterion is scored between -1 to 
+1. 
2) Energy: This criterion is assessed by the amount of alternative energy usage and 
percentage of energy usage efficiency. This criterion is scored between 0 to +1. 
3) Increasing in usage of local content: This criterion is assessed by the proportion 
of local content compared to import content. This criterion is scored between -1 
to +3. 
 
The score used for evaluating each criterion range from a negative score to a positive 
score, with a middle value at zero. A positive score (+1, +2, +3) indicates positive 
impact to the area. A zero score indicates no impact to the area or equivalent to the 
baseline scenario. A negative score (-1, -2) indicates negative impact to the area. 
Thailand allow the project candidates to have a negative score for any single criterion, 
however the project candidates must have the total positive score in each group of 
criteria. In order to receive the Letter of Approval from Thailand, a project candidate 
must have the total positive score (more than zero). Finally, the SD objectives and 
criteria developed by TGO are summarized in Table 9.12.     
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Objectives Environment Social Technology Economic 
Sub-
objectives 
• Reduction of GHG 
emissions 
• Reduction of air 
pollution 
• Reduction of noise 
pollution 
• Reduction of odor 
pollution 
• Reduction of soil 
pollution 
• Reduction of 
hazardous waste 
• Wastewater quality 
• Waste management 
• No groundwater 
contamination 
• Efficiency of water 
usage 
• No soil, costal, and 
river bank erosion 
• Increase in green 
area 
• Ecosystem diversity 
• Species diversity 
• No use of GMO 
and/or alien species 
• Public 
participation 
• Activities 
promoting social 
development, 
culture, and 
‘sufficiency 
economy’ 
philosophy 
• Public health 
quality for workers 
and surrounding 
communities 
 
• Technology 
development 
• Implementation 
plan for post-
project life or post-
crediting period 
• Capacity-
building activity 
 
• Increasing 
income of 
stakeholders 
• Increase in 
energy efficiency 
and usage of 
alternative 
energy 
• Increase in 
usage of local 
content  
 
 
Table 9.12:  Thailand’s objective hierarchy for CDM project; (source: [116]) 
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9.9 Background on a Case Study: Biomass CDM Projects in Thailand 
 
According to UNEP-Risoe [126], as of July 2010, there are 122 CDM projects in 
Thailand. These projects are at different stages: 36 projects have been registered; 83 
projects are in validation and 3 projects have requested registration. These 122 CDM 
projects are expected to generate 6,817,000 Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). 
Currently methane avoidance projects account for the largest number of CDM projects 
in Thailand (74 projects). Globally biomass CDM projects are concentrated in Asia. 
Thailand has fifth largest number of biomass CDM projects in the world (22 projects). 
Thailand is a major producer of rice and the majority of biomass projects are based on 
rice husks (11 projects).  These projects are concentrated in rice producing areas (the 
central, north, and northeastern of Thailand).    
The PDDs of these 11 biomass CDM projects, state that the technology for rice husk 
power plant is unavailable in Thailand. Consequently, these projects depend on 
imported technology. The principal technology components are: (1) a combustion 
system to generate thermal energy from the rice husk; (2) a boiler to generate steam 
from the thermal energy; and (3) a steam turbine generator to generate electricity using 
the steam. A low calorific fuel means the boiler system is large in terms of its fuel and 
ash handling capability. As the rice husk has a high silica content, the boiler combustion 
chamber is large relative to fossil fuel boilers. This results in a higher initial investment 
for rice husk boilers.  Fly ash is removed from the flue gases using an ash separator that 
is composed of pre-separator system (Multi-Cyclones) and electrostatic precipitator 
(ESP). This technology can eliminate up to 99.6% of dust (> 0.1 micron). 
In Thailand the baseline assumption used by biomass (rice husk) CDM projects is that 
any biomass residue that was not used for heat generation was dumped, left to decay or 
burnt in an uncontrolled manner prior to the project implementation. Before the 
implementation of biomass CDM projects, the existing rice husk power plants received 
subsidies from different sources and therefore have a different initial financial situation 
than biomass CDM projects. For example, Roi-Et Green Power Plant received funds 
from the Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) and the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), whereas PRG Granary Co., Ltd. received subsidies under the Energy 
Conservation Promotion Fund. This implies that without subsidy biomass (rice husk) 
power is not viable.  This is due to high initial investment costs and a high cost of 
electricity production. According to Prasertsan and Sajjakulnukit [93], financiers 
 224
consider bioenergy projects as high risk investments mainly because transaction costs 
are high. CDM projects need the sale of CERs to overcome these financial barriers. 
The increasing use of renewable energy has caused the price of rice husk to rise. This 
has increased the cost of electricity production from rice husks. The collection and 
transportation costs of rice husks are also high because rice husks are bulky and widely 
dispersed. The high price of rice husks and the high collection and transportation costs 
will decrease project Internal Rates of Returns (IRR). Consequently, the sale of CERs 
will help the projects to overcome this barrier. Finally, the expected value of CERs 
generated by these 11 rice husk projects is about 24.8 million Euros per year (CER price 
is about €12.00 per tonne of CO2e). 
 
9.10 Study Area 
 
In this study we have selected Mungcharoen Green Power Project (Figure 9.4) in 
Thailand as a case study. Mungcharoen Green Power (MGP) was awarded “the Best 
ASEAN Renewable Energy Project” and “the Best Thailand Renewable Energy 
Project” in 2008 by the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and the Thai 
government. By these awards, it is noted for its operation with the most environmentally 
friendly and social responsible manner. MGP is the first large scale biomass project 
developed by a rice mill owner in Thailand. MGP use rice husks, which are wastes by-
product from the rice milling process, as fuels for 9.9 MW power generation. It is 
located in Surin province (Figure 9.1), northeastern province of Thailand, about 286 
miles away from Bangkok. The province covers a total area of 8,128 square kilometers 
and the project covers approximately 240,000 square meters of land. 
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Figure 9.4.  Mungcharoen Green Power Project 
 
Surin province is one of the major producers of rice and is particularly well known for 
its jasmine rice. Therefore, rice is a major crop grown in the project area and farmers are 
the major stakeholders of the project. This project converts the agricultural waste into 
eco-friendly electricity.  MGP aims to reduce GHG emissions by displacing part of 
electricity from the national power grid whose electricity is predominantly derived from 
fossil fuels. The project activity is expected to reduce 38,033tCO2/annum over a 
crediting period of 7 years. MGP sell electricity to the Electricity Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) under the contract of the Small Power Producer Program (SPP) for 21 years. 
As previously noted, Bannsamednoi Village was selected as the representatives of local 
residents because it is located behind CDM project (Figure 9.5 and 9.6), about 2 miles 
away from the project.  
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Figure 9.5:  Bannsamednoi village behind the CDM project; (source: author’s survey) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.6:  Bannsamednoi village behind the CDM project; (source: author’s survey) 
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Figure 9.7: Rice growing area behind the CDM project; (source: author’s survey) 
 
There are around 100 households in Bannsamednoi village. The village was 
predominantly occupied by rice landowners, who cultivated their own land. Therefore, 
CDM project is surrounded by rice growing area (Figure 9.7 and 9.8). Their ancestor 
came form Cambodia, about 40 miles away from this village. Therefore, most villagers 
still speak Cambodian (Khmer language). In in-depth interviews, we therefore must hire 
local translator to communicate with the local residents. The villager has had on average 
only 9 years of schooling (a minimum of nine years' school attendance is mandatory in 
Thailand). The average personal income in this village is about GBP100 per month.  
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Figure 9.8: Rice growing area behind the CDM project; (source: author’s survey) 
 
Most residents are farmers who have a close relationship with the project owner. This is 
because the project owner has his own rice mill and all farmers in this village sell the 
rice paddy to the project owner. More importantly, the project owner is a national 
politician who works closely with the local residents. One villager said “If the villagers 
need the money, they can borrow the money from the project owner. Moreover, the 
project owner always supports the money to the villagers when they organize a 
religious ceremony such as the wedding ceremony, the funeral ceremony, a Buddhist 
ordination ceremony, etc.” This evidence shows the Patronage System (sometime 
known as “Spoil System”) in Thai society. In the Patronage System, Thai politician 
always strongly support the local people by giving the money, giving a job, etc. 
Therefore, the villagers in this area have an excellent relationship with the project 
owner. In this village, the major institutions include:  
 
1) Chaipakoom Temple (Figure 9.9): This temple is the centre for villagers to 
organize social meeting. Thai people always go to a temple to make a merit. 
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There are four monks in this temple. All participate in the in-depth interviews. A 
Buddhist always pays respect to a monk. The monks always give a social 
consultancy to villagers. When the villagers have a problem, they always go to 
the temple for consulting with the monks. This temple is the centre for 
communication between the project owner and villagers. The project owner will 
inform the project’s activities affecting the life of residents through the two 
stereo speakers inside this temple. This temple provides a place for public 
consultation in the process of CDM implementation. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.9:  Chaipakoom temple; (source: author’s survey) 
 
2) Bannsamednoi School (Figure 9.10): There are about ten teachers and 200 
students in this school. This school provides six years of primary education. The 
villagers always pay respect to the teachers who provide the knowledge to their 
children.  
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Figure 9.10:  Bannsamednoi School; (source: author’s survey) 
 
3) A nursery school (Figure 9.11). This school take care of children between the 
ages of 2 to 6 years. There are about 50 children in this school, but only one 
teacher manages all activities. This school charge only GBP0.4 (40 pence) per 
day for taking care of children. All villagers take their children to stay in this 
school.   
 
   
Figure 9.11:  A nursery school; (source: author’s survey) 
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The next chapter will describe how the CDM project affects these major institutions. 
The villagers use a two-lane concrete road (Figure 9.12) for their transportation and a 
motorcycle is the major vehicle for them.   
 
 
 
Figure 9.12:  A two-lane concrete road in the village; (source: author’s survey) 
        
When considering about the environmental condition in this village, all villagers agree 
that the environmental condition is excellent before the CDM implementation. There are 
two ponds in this village. Before the CDM implementation the villagers can use these 
ponds for drinking and taking a bath. Like the water condition, the air condition is 
excellent because there is no dust in this village. The next chapter will describe how the 
CDM activities can affect the environmental condition in this village.    
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Chapter 10 
 
Research Results: The Sustainability of CDM Projects in Thailand: A 
Case Study of Biomass (Rice Husk) Project 
 
 
This Chapter presents the research results from the in-depth interviews conducted 
between January and March 2010. Both qualitative data and quantitative data derived 
from the face-to-face interviews. More than 30 organizations participated in this survey. 
This research employed a mixed methodological approach to study the sustainability of 
CDM projects. We will therefore present both qualitative and quantitative results. This 
chapter first discusses whether the expected SD benefits and the social costs described 
in the PDD are actually realized and how these benefits and costs are allocated. Then, 
we present the quantitative outcomes related to the sustainability preferences of CDM 
stakeholders.  
 
10.1 Qualitative Analysis and Results 
 
According to Schenk et al. [100], the aim of qualitative research is not to obtain a 
representative sample, but rather to gain insights into the subject. Between January and 
March 2010, we conducted in-depth interviews with 21 stakeholders (see Table 10.1 for 
details). The in-depth interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Finally, 
qualitative results are presented in five themes.      
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No. Sex Organization Professional/occupation 
1 m Government Energy 
2 f NGO Energy and environment 
3 m Private CDM consultant (Biomass project) 
4 m Local resident Farmer 
5 f Local resident Farmer 
6 m Local resident The Clean Energy Fund Committee 
7 m Local resident teacher 
8 m Private CDM project manager 
9 f Private CDM project manager 
10 m Private Employee in CDM project 
11 m Government Community development 
12 m Government University lecturer 
13 f Local resident teacher 
14 m Local resident farmer 
15 m Government Energy (Biomass technology) 
16 m Local resident farmer 
17 m Local resident farmer 
18 m Local resident farmer 
19 m Private CDM project manager 
20 m Government Energy  
21 m Private CDM consultant (Gold Standard) 
 
Table 10.1: Overview of the participants 
 
10.1.1 Theme I: Generating Extra Income for the Farmers 
 
The PDDs of 8 (out of 11) projects based on rice husk stated that their project will give 
an extra income to Thai farmers by paying a price premium for the rice husks. This 
benefit involves three groups of CDM stakeholders: (i) project developers; (ii) rice 
mills; and (iii) farmers.  
Thailand is one of the major world producers of rice. Agriculture is economically, 
socially and cultural importance to the country and this is reflected in the common Thai 
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saying that “Farmers are the backbone of Thailand”. However, Thai farmers are the 
least powerful group in the rice supply chain.  
New harvested rice is known as ‘paddy rice’ or ‘rough rice’. Paddy rice still has its hard 
protective husk. The rice husk is removed by milling which requires large machinery 
which individual farmers cannot afford. Therefore, most farmers will sell the paddy rice 
to the rice mills which are often owned and operated by a wealthy elite in the local area. 
The rice mill owners have more negotiation power than the farmers and they determine 
the buying price. After milling, we obtain white rice and rice husk. Rice husk is the 
main by-product of milling rice. For every one tonne of paddy rice milled about 0.22 
tonnes of rice husk is produced (EFE [24]). When the rice mills buy the paddy rice from 
farmers, the price reflects only the value of the white rice, not including the value of the 
rice husk. The rice mills control the rice husk resource.  
In the past rice husks were used for low value agricultural purposes: e.g. animal bedding 
or compost. It is also used as fuel for cooking in rural households. Traditionally demand 
for the rice husks was very low because it was not used for industrial purposes. 
Although farming households can utilize rice husk, they are poor and not prepared to 
pay for it. Rice mills generally got rid of the rice husks by giving it away or burning it 
in open fields. Most Thai people are familiar with the saying, “Poor people eat the rice 
husk”.  Indicating a popular belief that rice husk is worthless.   
Papong et al. [87] found that about 30.8% of the rice husk is not used and the remaining 
69.2% is used for various purposes such as fuel, fertilizer, soil conditioner, animal feed 
etc. Currently, the rice husk has a monetary value as an important raw material for many 
industries. Rice husks are currently used for steel making, building, generating 
electricity, etc. Considering the commercial use of rice husks, the sellers of rice husks 
are the rice mills, not farmer. We found that the rice husks are sold to the local buyers 
near the rice mill because of the transportation costs.  
Although the rice mills can sell the rice husks to these industries, they still have not paid 
a price premium for the rice husks to farmers. Rice husks are currently traded between 
$32 and $39 per tonne [46]. The details of historical prices of rice husk and white rice 
are shown in Figure 10.1. Clearly, the price of rice husk is positively correlated to the 
price of white rice (see Figure 10.1). 
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Figure 10.1:  The historical prices of rice husk and white rice; (source: [46], [47]) 
 
Therefore, CDM projects based on rice husk have created a new business opportunity 
for rice mills as one participant said: 
 
“The rice mills see rice husks as their treasures that god gives to them. They get a free 
rice husk from the milling process and they can make profit by selling the rice husks 
with no costs. Please imagine how large the profit can be made….” (No. 6) 
 
It is very clear that CDM projects based on rice husk does not give an extra income to 
farmers- 19 interviewees (90%) agreed that this benefit, described in the PDDs, is not 
actually realized, 1 interviewee disagreed and 1 interviewee declined to discuss this 
issue. One participant noted: 
 
“Rice husk project does not give an extra income to the farmers in the form of a price 
premium. Surprisingly, it gives an extra income to the rice mills (rich people) rather 
farmers (poor people).” (No. 1) 
 
Indeed rice husk projects make local people lose benefits because of the withdrawal of 
free rice husk. As one participant noted: 
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“In the past farmers can request a free risk husk from the rice mills, but now farmers no 
longer get the rice husks for free. The rice husk was utilized by poor people in the past, 
but now it is used by rich people. Currently the rice husk is not the symbol of poverty, 
but it is the symbol of wealthiness. Therefore, low income people cannot use the rice 
husks as fuel for cooking and as fertilizer for their crops.” (No.13) 
 
One consequence of rice husk CDM projects is that poor farmers are losing a previously 
unpriced resource and the wealthy elites who control rice mills are gaining an extra 
income.  It is clearly arguable that the redistribution of the rice husk resource has 
increased inequality in rural Thai society. 
Given these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that Biomass CDM projects 
cannot give an extra income to the farmers by paying a price premium for the rice 
husks. Surprisingly, it gives an extra income to the rice mills (rich people) rather 
farmers (poor people). Therefore, this benefit described in the PDD is not actually 
realized. We have wondered why many project developers and CDM consultants stated 
this benefit in the PDDs. So we discussed this point with Mr.Sittisak Sugsaisakon, the 
CDM consultant of Agrinergy (Thailand) Co.Ltd. Mr.Sittisak said, “All project 
developers and CDM consultants know that this benefit is not true in Thai society, but 
we must write this benefit in the PDDs in order to meet the SD criteria of Thai DNA.”        
However, in exploring the sustainability of Biomass CDM project in Thailand, 
Gervasoni [31] found that the increased price of the rice husks will significantly raise 
the income of farmers. On the other hand, we found that the increased price of the rice 
husks will significantly raise the income of the rice mills, not farmers. Consequently, 
this research result presented here contradicts the result of Gervasoni.     
 
10.1.2 Theme II: Employment Creation 
 
In terms of SD benefits, employment creation is the most visible benefit to local people. 
The PDDs of all 11 Thai rice husk projects stated that their project created jobs. All 
CDM projects are located in rural areas and create temporary jobs in the construction 
period and permanent jobs in the operating period. The Buasommai Biomass CDM 
Project hired 150 local workers during construction and thereafter 20 local people as 
permanent employees. In the first instance these projects offer jobs to local people. One 
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rice husk project gave a chance for local people to set up their own business to serve the 
CDM. As one participant noted: 
 
“My project can really create the new jobs for the local people. For example, the local 
people have formed the security guard company in order to do the business with my 
project. This company is owned many local residents in the project area.” (No.9) 
 
We visited two biomass CDM projects including Mungcharoen Green Power Project 
(MGP) and Surin Electric Project (SEP). We requested MGP and SEP to see their 
employment policies. Their employment policies clearly state that the first priority for 
the job is given to the local people. Clearly, Mr.Poramin, the project manager of SEP, 
said:  
 
“My CDM project gives a chance for the local people to work in their hometown. My 
project hired 15 truck drivers, 10 security guards, 5 maids, and 20 clerical officers. All 
these positions are new employment resulted from the implementation of CDM project.” 
  
Finally, all 21 interviewees agreed that this benefit is actually realized as described in 
the PDDs and the local people get many benefits from the employment creation as one 
participant said: 
 
“The project created new jobs for local people. The villagers can get the jobs in their 
hometown, so they can stay close to their family. If there is no project, the local people 
may go to find the jobs in Bangkok.” (No. 5) 
 
However, we found that the new employment for local people is limited to the low-level 
jobs such as truck drivers, security guards, maids, clerical officers, etc. These positions 
require the basic education (below the bachelor’s degree). More surprisingly, all three 
CDM project managers we have interviewed came from Bangkok, not local people. 
These managers stated that most power generation engineers also came from Bangkok. 
One participant said: 
 
“I cannot find the local people to work in the high positions such as project manager, 
power generation engineers, etc. My project is located in the rural area far from 
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Bangkok, so the educational institutions don’t offer the programs in the power 
generation or the renewable energy. We always hire people from Bangkok to work in 
these positions.” (No.9) 
These confirmed that the positions requiring expertise in power generation were taken 
by people from Bangkok, not local people. This is because the local people don’t have 
the sufficient knowledge and experience in the field of power generation and renewable 
energy. 
 
10.1.3 Theme III: Increasing the Usage of Renewable Energy and Transfer of 
Knowledge in Renewable Energy 
 
As previously noted, the 15-year AEDP aims to increase the share of alternative energy 
mixed to 20.3% of the country’s final energy demand by 2022. Biomass CDM is one of 
the tools being used to achieve this target. This will result in an increasing usage of 
renewable energy in Thailand. According to a survey done by the office of agricultural 
economics, Surin produces about 1,289,249 tons of rice in 2009, making it to be the 
second largest rice producing province in Thailand. Therefore, the rice husks are 
abundant in Surin. This means Surin has the high potential for biomass-based electricity 
generation. According to the Ministry of Energy , the province has the highest potential 
for solar power (259,734 ktoe), followed by biomass (97.23 ktoe), and biogas (12.27 
ktoe) in 2006 [117] (see Table 10.2). Considering only biomass energy, the rice husk 
has the highest potential for electricity generation.  
 
Type Potential (ktoe) 
Solar 
Hydro  
Biomass 
Biogas 
259,734 
0.50 
97.23 
12.27 
 
Table 10.2: Renewable energy potential in Surin; (source: [117]) 
 
All participants completely agreed that biomass CDM projects can increase the usage of 
renewable energy and local content in Surin. Mr.Bandit Chusap, the power plant 
manager of MGP, stated that they use about 85,000 tons of rice husks in Surin per year. 
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Moreover, he said that around 185,000 tons per year of rice husks from Surin were 
transported to other provinces for electricity generation. One participant said; “Surin 
now become Thailand’s export hub for the rice husks.” (No.11) 
However, increasing usage of renewable energy is leading to competition for rice husk. 
This in turn is leading to conflict between the CDM projects and the rice mills. The 
project developers of biomass (rice husk) CDM projects are often rice mill owners. 
Therefore, the project developers act as both buyers of rice husks (from other mills) and 
sellers of rice (from their own mill). These developers are in competition with the other 
rice mills because of their rice business. When they act as sellers of rice, they tend to 
compete against each other in order to get the highest market share. Our qualitative 
interviews found that A.T. Biopower CDM project has such a conflict with other rice 
mills in its province because of the competition in rice business5. The other rice mills 
collectively refuse to sell their rice husks to this CDM. Now this CDM has shut down. 
One participant said: 
 
“One CDM project based on rice husk decided to shut down because of the shortage of 
the rice husks. Therefore, this project cannot deliver the carbon credits to the buyer as 
it promised. I was surprised with the project’s inability to find the rice husks because 
this project is located in the major area of rice growing and rice milling. Finally, I 
found that this CDM has a conflict with many rice mills. Therefore, these mills refuse to 
sell the rice husks to this CDM.” (No.15) 
 
There is a possibility that this conflict may occur again in other project areas. This could 
be a barrier to the further development of biomass CDM projects in Thailand. The Thai 
government has created many policies to increase renewable energy development, but it 
does not address anti-market behavior resulting from these policies. At the moment it is 
not clear how the government will develop the market for biomass residues 
guaranteeing the supply of rice husks to the biomass power plant. These results are 
consistent with ONEP [82] who reported that the lack of a biomass commodity market 
is one of the barriers to biomass energy implementation in Thailand.     
                                                 
5
 Interview with Mr.Yaowateera Achawangkul, The Department of Alternative Energy Development and 
Efficiency, Ministry of Energy, Thailand. 
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The final benefit relates to biomass CDM projects and their potential for transfer 
knowledge in renewable energy. According to ONEP [82] and Prasertsan and 
Sajjakulnukit [93], lack of public support is one of the barriers to biomass energy 
implementation in Thailand. There is a lack of confidence and misperceptions of 
biomass technology among Thai people. The public image of biomass power plant is 
not good and there’s regular opposition to biomass power plant in many parts of central 
Thailand. The protesters are almost always the villagers from the project area. They are 
deeply concerned about the project’s potential effects on their health and environment. 
This is because they are not confident of the technology or environmental management. 
However, their protests have little impacts on the biomass power plant. Protesters can 
only deter the developers from building on their lands, but not stop the project 
implementation. We are aware of only one opposition which successfully stopped a 
project. The Nam Song villagers protested against an A.T. Biopower CDM project 
proposal leading to the withdrawal of the project application in October 2007. However, 
the project was successfully constructed in the community of Sa Luang. 
In order to remove this barrier, the biomass project developers need to transfer 
knowledge and information on biomass technology to local people. This may help build 
the confidence of local communities in biomass energy (ONEP [82], Prasertsan and 
Sajjakulnukit [93]). All 21 interviewees agreed that the rice husk CDM projects could 
help address public opposition through knowledge transfer. As one participant pointed 
out that:  
 
“We have two biomass CDM projects in our province [Surin province]. Now our 
province is widely accepted as the learning center of renewable energy in Thailand. 
Before the construction of the biomass power plants in other provinces, the project 
developers always take the villagers to see these two CDM in order to build the 
confidence in biomass technologies. So the CDM can definitely spread the knowledge to 
many stakeholders.” (No.11) 
 
A good example is the Mungcharoen Green Power Project (MGP), which is widely 
accepted as the best CDM project in terms of the knowledge transfer. The MGP project 
tries to engage with stakeholders at local, regional, national, and even international 
levels. This includes local people, students, researchers, government officers, project 
developers, and businessmen. Japan’s NHK Television, visited this project to produce a 
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TV program in the topic of Asian biomass power plant. The MGP annual report 
indicates that there were a total of 4,161 visitors from 2007 to 2009. There were 956 
visitors, 1,191 visitors, and 2,014 visitors in the years 2007, 2008, and 2009 
respectively. This indicates that CDM projects can be successful in knowledge transfer  
10.1.4 Theme IV: Environmental Risk 
 
Despite the fact that rice husk CDM biomass projects provide carbon neutral energy 
new proposals have difficulty gaining acceptance from communities because of 
negative fears about environment impact (ONEP [82]). Most PDDs of the rice husk 
projects stated that their stakeholders were worried about the problem of dust and waste 
disposal. Meetings with Bannsamednoi villagers revealed that they face the dust 
problem from the CDM project. One villager said: 
 
“We used face the dust problem resulted by the project. The dust came from two major 
sources including: (1) rice husk; and (2) ash. Both rice husk and ash were dispersed by 
the strong wind. This problem affected the quality of water, so we cannot drink the 
water from the public well. Finally, the project installed the public water purifiers in 
front of the well in order to improve the quality of water. Currently, villagers can drink 
the water from this well by using the public water purifiers.” (No.6) 
 
The PDD of Buasommai Biomass CDM Project revealed similar problems receiving a 
negative score (-1) on air quality [9]. These results also agree with general observations 
by Kolshus et al. [59], confirming that biomass CDM projects regularly have a negative 
impact on air quality.  
More recently, Gilbertson [33] found that A.T. Biopower CDM project dumped the rice 
husk ash from the power plant next to the residents’ houses. Moreover, Tangwisutijit 
[111] found that rice husk ash from Buasommai Biomass CDM project is dispersed into 
the houses near the project. According to Gilberson, rice husk ash contains silica that is 
known to cause silicosis, an irreversible lung disease. After silica particles are inhaled, 
the smallest particles work their way to the lower respiratory tract. Once in the lungs the 
particles cause acute toxicity damage to the lung cells. The silica particles are quickly 
attacked and ingested by the body's defense releasing enzymes and radicals. This release 
of these by products can result in death of the lung and white blood cells cell which 
causes inflammation which can result in silicosis. Silicosis is classified into three types: 
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chronic /classic, accelerated, and acute (WHO [141]). 
 
• Chronic Silicosis occurs after long term exposure (over 10 years) of low 
concentrations of silica dust. This type of the disease severely hinders the ability 
of the body to fight infections because of the damage to the lungs, making the 
person more susceptible to other lung illnesses, including 
tuberculosis.Accelerated silicosis can occur after 5–10 years of high exposures 
to respirable crystalline silica. Symptoms include severe shortness of breath, 
weakness, and weight loss.Acute Silicosis occurs after heavy exposure to high 
concentrations of silica. The symptoms can develop within a few weeks or as 
long as 5 years after the exposure.  Symptoms of acute silicosis include severe 
disabling shortness of breath, weakness, and weight loss, which often leads to 
dead. 
 
Consequently, this will affect the health of local people if the project developers do not 
manage the ash disposal properly. Gilbertson found that biomass (rice husk) CDM 
projects in Thailand never address the health risk caused by silica. In our case study the 
Bannsamednoi villagers complain about the health impacts from silica including 
respiratory problems and aggravation felt in their skin. 
These findings clearly supported that there are at least three CDM projects in Thailand 
(A.T. Biopower CDM project, Buasommai Biomass CDM project, and Mungcharoen 
Green Power project) increasing the health risk. Although these three CDM projects 
based on rice husks claim that rice husk ash will be used for many purposes: (1) soil 
improvement; (2) cement production; and (3) steel production, they do not sell rice husk 
ash to these users. Finally, we find that there is limited demand for rice husk ash and the 
buyers of rice husk ash are often distant from the projects6. The project developers 
cannot transport it to the end users because of high transportation costs and buyers are 
not prepared to absorb the transportation costs. Therefore, in Thailand the supply of rice 
husk ash exceeds the demand for it. These projects try to get rid of rice husk ash with 
least costs, so they dump it in the open fields near the project (see Figure 10.2 and 10.3). 
This indicated that the project developer does not manage the ash disposal properly. 
 
                                                 
6
 Interview with Mr.Yaowateera Achawangkul, The Department of Alternative Energy Development and 
Efficiency, Ministry of Energy, Thailand. 
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Figure 10.2: The ash dumped in the open field; (source: author’s survey) 
 
 
 
Figure 10.3: The ash dumped in the open field; (source: author’s survey) 
 
As previously discussed, Bannsamednoi villagers face the dust from rice husk and ash. 
All villagers stated that they cannot drink the water from the wells (see Figure 10.4 and 
10.5) and rain water collected from the roof because the water is contaminated with 
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high levels of dust from rice husk and ash. Moreover, many villagers complained that 
they need to clean their houses more frequently because of dust problem. 
 
   
 
Figure 10.4: The first pond in the village; (source: author’s survey) 
 
 
 
Figure 10.5: The second pond in the village; (source: author’s survey) 
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As discussed in the chapter 9, there are three public institutions in this village including: 
(1) Chaipakoom Temple (4 monks); (2) Bannsamednoi School (10 teacher; 200 
students); and (3) a nursery school (1 teacher, 50 children). All these institution faced 
the dust problem. The dust came from two major sources including: (1) rice husk; and 
(2) ash. Both rice husk and ash were dispersed by the strong wind. Considering the rice 
husks, this project uses the rice husks for electricity generation and it has a poor system 
to stockpile these raw materials. The storage space in the plant doesn’t have any cover. 
This results in rice husk dispersion. Moreover, the transportation of rice husks from the 
mill’s storage and from other mills nearby to the plant also results in rice husk 
dispersion. Considering the rice husk ash, the project developer dumps the large amount 
of ash in the open fields of the village (See Figure 10.2 and 10.3). They expect the 
farmers to come to the open field and quickly take ash to their rice growing areas, but 
the large amount of ash is still left in the open field. This indicated that the project 
developer does not manage the ash disposal properly. Finally, ash is dispersed by the 
wind, making it to be the dust problem. The dust was dispersed throughout the 
classrooms. The teachers were worried about the health of their students, especially 
children under 6 years old in the nursery school. Moreover, the teachers stated that it 
was very difficult for the students to study in this poor environment, but we cannot stop 
teaching or postponed the class. In order to solve the dust problem for these schools, 
they hang black nets around the buildings to block out the dust from rice husk and ash. 
One participant said: 
 
“The black nets were erected around the building to prevent the dust dispersion. 
Normally we use black nets in the plantation system but now we need them to protect 
human.” (No.7)       
 
As for the drinking water, the villagers must buy the drinking water with their own 
money. They spend GBP4.00 per month on the drinking water. Moreover, they need to 
pay a higher water meter bill because they use more water for cleaning their house and 
taking a bath. Therefore, only villagers who have a low income must absorb these social 
costs, while the project developer who has a high income does not absorb any social 
costs. In order to improve the quality of water, the government installed the public 
water purifiers in front of the well (see Figure 10.6). The money for the installation of 
these purifiers came from the Clean Energy Fund which aims to solve the 
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environmental problems caused by the power plants. Currently, villagers can use these 
public water purifiers and do not buy the drinking water (see Figure 10.7).  
 
 
       
 Figure 10.6: The public water purifiers installed in the village; (source: author’s survey) 
 
 
      
Figure 10.7: Villagers were taking the drinking water from the public water purifiers; (source: author’s 
survey) 
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However, this environmental situation tends to get better in the future. In order to 
prevent the dust dispersion, the project developer decided to plant Eucalyptus trees in a 
long line behind the power plant. Hopefully, this can prevent the dust dispersion in the 
future.  
Considering the noise pollution, it is not a main problem. The noise pollution occur 
occasionally when the project developer perform an engine flush. The project will flush 
its engine around two or three days per year. At this time the villagers will hear the loud 
noise from this operation. The villagers suggested that the project developer should 
remind the villagers about the loud noise from the flushing operation in order to protect 
themselves from this pollution. Therefore, this social cost is actually realized, but the 
villagers face noise problem only two or three days per year.  
There is another social cost raised by the local residents. This problem is the rising price 
of the land around the project site. The project developer needs to buy the large land 
area for building the power plant. The project developer bought the lands from many 
local landlords. Therefore, the high demand for land areas caused the rising price of 
land. When land is expensive the villagers cannot afford to buy it. They believe that the 
next generation will not be able to afford the price to purchase land anymore. 
Finally, Mr.Payut and Mr.Yaowateera concluded that the dust problem is not caused by 
the biomass technology but by the management of the project developer. They said: 
 
“Biomass technology itself is environmentally friendly and does not cause the dust 
problem, but the project developer does not have a proper dust management plan.”  
       
Ultimately, we have to conclude that these social costs (dust problem, waste disposal, 
noise pollution) is actually realized. The allocation of these social costs is unfair. Only 
villagers who have a low income absorb these social costs, while the project developer 
who has a high income does not absorb any social costs. Indeed, CDM project has 
changed their way of life.     
 
10.1.5 The Roots of Environmental Problems Generated by Biomass CDM Projects 
 
We tried to investigate why biomass CDM projects cause the environmental problems 
including dust, ash disposal, and noise pollution. As discussed above, Mr.Payut and 
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Mr.Yaowateera concluded that all problems are not caused by the biomass technology, 
but by the inappropriate management of the project developer. Finally, we found that 
not all CDM projects are required under Thailand’s environmentally related laws and 
regulations to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). EIA is a well 
established systematic process which should identifiy environmental impacts and 
options mitigate these problems. EIA is an important first step towards ensuring that 
projects are developed in a sustainable an environmentally responsible manner.  
Without the information contained in an EIA it is difficult for any regulator to make an 
informed decision about environmental (or social) impact.  According to Thai 
regulations, an EIA is required for projects with an installed capacity of 10 MW or 
larger and these projects must submit the EIA report to the Office of the Natural 
Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP), under the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment, for review and make any necessary 
recommendations. Unlike the GS, all GS CDM projects are required to conduct an EIA 
if the stakeholders indicate significant environmental impacts. According to Sterk et al. 
[105], there were only two counties that apply an EIA to all CDM projects. These 
countries are Nicaragua and El Salvador.   
Consequently, an EIA exemption for projects with an installed capacity below 10 MW 
gives an opportunity for project developers to avoid performing an EIA. Two experts 
stated that some CDM projects look likely to avoid conducting an EIA by designing 
their installed capacity close to 10 MW. According to UNEP-Risoe [125], as of 
December 2009, there are three biomass CDM projects which have an installed capacity 
of 9.9 MW (very close to 10 MW). Most villagers agree that the SD assessment by 
Thailand DNA is not sufficient to guarantee the SD benefits of CDM projects. As 
previous discussed in the previous chapter, this project is the second group to assess the 
project area (The first group is the Japan’s NHK Television). This indicate that the 
government relating to CDM activities never goes to assess the polluted village, so the 
regulators do not know whether the expected SD benefits and the social costs described 
in the PDD are actually realized. Finally, the villagers need an EIA as the additional 
assessment to ensure the sustainability of CDM projects. Therefore, Thailand should 
cancel an EIA exemption and apply it to all CDM projects.   
 
 
 249
10.2 Quantitative Analysis and Results 
 
The survey conducted between January and March 2010 resulted in 96 usable 
questionnaires from 40 experts and 56 local residents. In order to ensure the consistency 
of the pairwise comparisons, a consistency ratio of 0.10 (10%) or less is considered 
acceptable. The analysis of our responses, revealed ten responses (2 experts and 8 local 
residents) with a consistency ratio of more than 10%. The results and analyses 
undertaken in the following section were completed with the 86 remaining responses. 
 
Benefits and Costs Expert Local Resident Aggregated 
SD benefits 
(1) Employment 
(2) Extra income 
(3) Promoting renewable energy 
(4) Technology transfer 
(5) Emission reductions 
Social costs 
(1) Dust 
(2) Waste disposal 
(3) Noise problem 
 
16.38% 
20.25% 
26.40% 
17.81% 
19.16% 
 
47.03% 
40.05% 
12.92% 
 
21.29% 
17.79% 
25.86% 
20.12% 
14.94% 
 
57.64% 
26.82% 
15.54% 
 
19.12% 
18.88% 
26.10% 
19.10% 
16.80% 
 
52.95% 
32.66% 
14.39% 
 
Table 10.3: The priority weights for the SD benefits and social costs 
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Figure 10.8: Comparison of the priority weights for the SD benefits by stakeholder group 
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Figure 10.9: Comparison of the priority weights for the social costs by stakeholder group 
 
10.2.1 Stakeholder Preferences towards the SD Benefits 
 
Data for pairwise comparisons were analyzed using Microsoft Excel. Table 10.3 shows 
the priority weights for the SD benefits and social costs generated by biomass CDM 
projects. Considering the priority weights by experts, increasing the usage of renewable 
energy was ranked as the highest priority with a mean weight of 26.40%, followed by 
generating extra income (20.25%), and emission reductions (19.16%). As for local 
residents, they ranked increasing the usage of renewable energy as the highest priority 
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with a mean weight of 25.86%, followed by employment (21.29%), and technology 
transfer (20.12%). Finally, the aggregated weights by all stakeholder groups showed a 
similar trend with the priority weights by local residents (see Table 10.3). Clearly, both 
experts and local residents considered increasing the usage of renewable energy and 
local content as the most important SD benefits of CDM projects.  
The preference towards increasing the usage of renewable energy (26.10%) is 
substantially higher than other benefits. Both experts and local residents gave us their 
reasons for ranking this benefit as the highest priority. Local residents noted how the 
rise in oil prices during 2007-2009 affected them personally with a substantial increase 
in their living costs. Therefore, local residents agreed that Thailand should reduce 
dependency on crude oil. These local people considered increasing the usage of 
renewable energy (and the price stability they believe it would bring) as the most 
important SD benefit.  
The experts interviewed suggested that an increase in the use of renewable energy could 
help Thailand gain a surplus in balance of payments by reducing oil imports. They 
stated that a deficit in balance of payments resulted in Thailand’s economic crisis during 
1997 – 1999. Therefore, Thailand should promote the use of renewable energy in order 
to reduce its dependency on imported energy. Like local residents, they believed that 
Thailand has high potential for biomass resources and they ranked this benefit as the 
highest priority.          
Although emission reduction is one of the twin objectives of CDM projects, most local 
people ranked it as the lowest priority. This is because most local stakeholders view 
climate change as a distant problem not affecting them personally. Emission reductions 
were more strongly supported by experts, than local residents. Experts allocated 19.16% 
of their weights to emission reductions, making it the third highest preference; the local 
residents allocated 14.94%, making it the lowest priority (see Figure 10.8).  
Experts and local residents have different views about employment generation. Local 
residents ranked employment generation as the second highest priority with a mean 
weight of 21.29%, while experts recorded 16.38% making it their lowest priority.  
These results are similar with the results of the survey on the sustainability preferences 
of CDM stakeholders in South Africa and India conducted by Sutter [108]. Sutter found 
that Indian stakeholders rate reducing dependency on fossil fuels as the highest 
preference, whereas South African stakeholders rate employment generation highest.  
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10.2.2 Stakeholder Concerns in the Social Costs 
 
Both experts and local residents considered the dust problem as the most important 
social cost (see Table 10.3). Experts expressed the highest concern about the dust 
problem with a mean weight of 47.03%, followed by waste disposal (40.05%), and 
noise (12.92%). Local residents ranked dust as the most important problem with a mean 
weight of 57.64%, distantly followed by waste disposal (26.82%), and noise (15.54%) 
(see Figure 10.9).  
 
10.2.3 Test of Statistical Differences 
 
This section aims to evaluate the difference in the perception of SD benefits and social 
costs between experts and local residents Following Ananda and Herath [3] we used the 
paired sample t-test to compare the mean weights. This was computed using SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). Table 10.4 shows the results. 
 
Benefits and Costs t-statistic Significance 
Employment (local) – Employment (expert) 
Income (local) – Income (expert) 
Renewable energy (local) – Renewable energy (expert) 
Technology transfer (local) – Technology transfer (expert) 
Emission reductions (local) – Emission reduction (expert) 
Dust (local) – Dust (expert) 
Waste disposal (local) – Waste disposal (expert) 
Noise (local) – Noise (expert) 
2.035 
-1.484 
0.257 
1.509 
-2.309 
4.217 
-4.854 
2.775 
0.049* 
0.146 
0.799 
0.140 
0.027* 
0.000** 
0.000** 
0.009** 
** Significant at P < 0.01 level; * Significant at P < 0.05 level 
 
Table 10.4: The statistically significant mean weight differences 
 
All social costs were statistically different in the preference weights expressed by expert 
group and local resident group at the 99% confidence level (see Table 10.4). Local 
residents gave higher importance to dust and noise problems than experts. Local 
residents are directly affected by dust and noise from the project, while experts rarely 
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visit the village. Consequently, these two groups may have different views on an 
importance of these social costs.  
Only two of the five SD benefits - emission reductions and employment generation - 
had statistically different preference weights (at 95% confidence level).  Face-to-face 
interviews with local residents revealed the belief that climate change problem is 
subjective and that global warming will not affect them personally. Consequently they 
ranked the reduction of GHG emissions as the lowest priority. On the other hand, 
experts believed that climate change is real and will affect all individuals irrespective of 
location.    
Many local residents in this village have been offered employment by the CDM project. 
Moreover, the projects allow local people to work in their hometown and stay close to 
their families. They see this benefit more clearly than experts. Experts were of the view 
that the new employment created is limited to low-value jobs. Therefore, this makes 
local residents rank this benefit as the second most important SD benefits, while experts 
consider it as the lowest priority.  
These differences indicated an information gap between the experts and the local 
residents. The government which is expert in the science and impacts of climate change 
should inform local residents how climate change affects them personally. Conversely, 
the local residents should inform the experts how they benefit from the employment.  
Finally, we investigate how the types of criteria (subjective or quantifiable) affect the 
differences in the preference weights. Strager and Rosenberger [107] found that most 
criteria that are subjective or are difficult to measure will be statistically different in the 
preference weights expressed by different stakeholder groups. Conversely, in this 
research most quantifiable benefits and costs were found to be statistically different in 
the preference weights. Therefore, the results of this research are different from those 
reported by Strager and Rosenberger [107]. 
 
10.3 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Clearly, biomass CDM projects under this study do not contribute significantly to SD in 
terms of extra income and avoidance of danger from the burning of biomass residues. 
Moreover, the allocation of extra income is unfair. However, CDM stakeholders rank 
these two benefits as the low priority. These results contradict Gervasoni [31] who 
found that these two benefits are actually realized in Thailand. Considering other SD 
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benefits, we found that biomass CDM projects can contribute significantly to SD in 
terms of promoting renewable energy, employment, technology transfer, and emission 
reductions. These benefits (except emission reductions) were ranked as the top three 
highest priorities. These results indicate that biomass CDM projects can generate the SD 
benefits which are the most important to CDM stakeholders.  
Considering the social costs, biomass projects create a potential negative impact on air 
quality. The dust and noise problem are actually realized in Thailand. Dust was ranked 
as the most important social costs. Therefore, the results of priority weights for the 
social costs are consistent with the real environmental problem we found in the project 
area. In our case study we found that the dust problem is mainly caused by the ash and 
rice husk. The project developer has a poor system to stockpile these raw materials and 
this results in rice husk dispersion. Moreover, the project developer does not manage the 
ash disposal properly by dumping it in the open fields near the project. Finally, both rice 
husks and ash are dispersed by the wind, making it to be the dust problem. This finding 
is consistent with Gilberson [37] and Tangwisutijit [111] who found other two rice husk 
CDM projects generating the dust problem from the rice husk ash. Finally, it is apparent 
that the burden of social costs is unevenly speead. Only low income villagers bear these 
social costs, while the project developer who has a relatively high income does not 
absorb any social costs. 
All these results strongly support the conclusion that host countries cannot guarantee the 
SD benefits of CDM projects. Moreover, the quality of PDD is poor in terms of the 
description of actual SD benefits. Although the contribution to SD is one of the twin 
objectives of CDM projects, most PDDs do not give comprehensive details of SD 
benefits and social costs. Worse than this, some SD benefits described in the PDDs are 
not actually realized. There is an incentive for project developers to ignore the social 
costs and do not describe these in their PDDs. Therefore, we cannot rely on the data 
given in the PDDs to give an accurate assessment of SD benefits. However, we found 
that the PDDs of GS CDM projects give enough details of SD benefits and social costs. 
Moreover, the PDDs of GS CDM projects show both positive and negative impacts of 
CDM projects. This concurs with the findings of Castro and Michaelowa [13], and 
Curtius and Vorlaufer [18], who found examples of poor project PDDs which did not 
give accurate details of sustainable development benefits. Instead of reviewing PDDs to 
assess SD benefits, our research strongly suggests that future studies into the 
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sustainability assessment of CDM projects should use the in-depth interviews and site 
visits.  
Finally, our results suggest that host countries should be required to assess the 
sustainability of CDM projects using, inter alia, in-depth interviews with a range of 
stakeholders supported by project site visits. This is particularly important in areas that 
may be affected by negative impacts. Moreover, an EIA should be required for all CDM 
projects as this would better inform the PDD process.  
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Chapter 11 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
This thesis is a systematic attempt to increase the understanding of the SD benefits of 
CDM projects, by directly involving CDM stakeholders involved at various levels in the 
process. Consequently, this study has covered various points of view including those of 
international stakeholders, local stakeholders, and carbon market stakeholders. This 
thesis has sought to meet the five key objectives: 
 
1. Create an understanding of the concept of sustainable development applied to 
CDM projects and the methodology for assessing the sustainability of CDM 
project; 
2. To classify CER buyers according to their attitudes towards and involvement in 
CDM sustainability labels; 
3. Investigate the value of sustainable development benefits generated by CDM 
projects through the willingness of buyers to pay a price premium for CERs with 
CDM sustainability label; 
4. Identify the factors influencing buyers’ willingness to pay a price premium for 
CERs with CDM sustainability labels; 
5. Investigate the contribution of the CDM to sustainable development. 
 
Finally, we connect the research results to the research objectives mentioned above and 
draw the following conclusions and recommendations:   
 
11.1 Conclusions 
 
 
11.1.1 The Concept of SD Applied to CDM Projects and the Contribution of the CDM 
to SD (Objective One and Objective Five) 
 
The Kyoto Protocol designed the three flexibility mechanisms under the concept that 
GHG emission reductions taking place anywhere in the world will have the same 
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environmental effects. The CDM is one of the three flexibility mechanisms which 
allows Annex I countries to invest in emission reduction projects in developing 
countries. In each CDM host country a Designated National Authority (DNA) is directly 
responsible to ensure that CDM projects attain two objectives: (1) to assist Non-Annex I 
countries achieve SD; (2) to assist Annex I countries achieve their emission reduction 
targets in a cost effective way. Although the CDM is generally considered a success in 
the number of registered projects and the credits generated, the CDM’s contribution to 
SD is being questioned. Finally, we found that the CDM is facing three major problems 
related to the concept of SD. These problems are identified as follows: 
 
i ) An ill-defined definition of SD 
The application of SD is within to CDM projects, it is still an elusive and ill defined 
concept. CDM projects’ contribution to SD is interpreted and assessed by the host 
country designated authority. However, there are no common international standards for 
the host country approval processes and/or the development of SD criteria. As CDM 
project is a market-based mechanism operating at the project level, the SD criteria for 
CDM projects should also be developed for application at the project level. 
Consequently, the clear defined sustainability criteria should incorporate clearly 
identified and quantifiable indicators to be relevant at the project level. In Chapter 5 we 
reviewed the recent CDM sustainability criteria defined by the Asia-Pacific host 
countries. We found that 12 countries have their own specific SD criteria for assessing 
CDM projects. However, 7 countries do not have specific CDM sustainability criteria 
with significant room left for interpretation. Consequently, it is very difficult to 
understand the preferences of these countries towards the SD of CDM projects. Even 
China and South Korea hosting a large number of CDM projects still have no specific 
sustainability criteria for assessing CDM projects. These results are consistent with 
Brown et al. [8], Schneider [101], and Sterk et al. [105], confirming that the SD criteria 
were not clearly defined by host countries. Currently, we found that CDM sustainability 
labels, especially the Gold Standard label, can clearly define the concept of SD applied 
to CDM projects. All CDM sustainability labels have well defined sustainability criteria 
for assessing CDM projects.  
However, we found that having the clear defined sustainability criteria does not mean 
that host countries can guarantee the sustainability of CDM projects. This is reflected in 
the Thai case study (Chapter 10). Although Thailand has well defined sustainability 
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criteria (26 specific indicators), we found that biomass CDM projects in Thailand can 
create potentially negative impacts on air quality. Furthermore some SD benefits that 
are described in the PDDs of these projects are not realized in practice. These results 
also reflect that the quality of PDDs is poor in terms of the assessment and verification 
of SD benefits. Some project developers write unreal benefits in the PDDs and hide the 
negative impacts of their projects in order to meet the SD criteria of Thai DNA. We 
cannot rely on the data given in the PDDs. In order to ensure the sustainability of CDM 
projects, the real practice of host country to assess CDM projects is therefore more 
important than the SD criteria designed by host country.      
   
ii ) The poor method of sustainability assessment applied by host countries 
The methods for assessing the sustainability of CDM projects are not clearly defined; in 
contrast to GHG emissions whose assessment and monitoring are standardized. 
Therefore, host country practices for sustainability assessment vary widely. We found 
the three weaknesses of host country practices for sustainability assessment and 
approval processes. Firstly, most host countries assess the sustainability of CDM 
projects by a desk review of the PDDs and an interview with the project developers. 
This means that host countries really trust the data provided by the project developers. 
This practice may encourage project developers to put some unreal benefits into the 
PDD in order to easily meet the SD criteria of host countries.  
Secondly, CDM projects are not required to conduct an EIA in most host countries. 
Currently, there are only two counties (Nicaragua and El Salvador) that apply an EIA to 
all CDM projects (Sterk et al. [105]). Unlike the Gold Standard (GS), all GS CDM 
projects are required to conduct an EIA if the stakeholders indicate significant 
environmental impacts. Consequently, we found some projects create a potential 
negative impact on environment. Lastly, it appears that the DNA rarely visits the local 
areas around the project site. After the commissioning of CDM projects, DNA never 
visits the local areas. This reflects poor monitoring of the SD benefits. Currently, host 
countries are required to conduct only one sustainability assessment of CDM project 
before the operation of the project. Consequently, DNA record ex-ante potential 
benefits, not the ex-post actual benefits. This contrasts sharply with the rigorous 
monitoring of GHG emission reductions. Ex-post SD benefits are not required to be 
monitored during the operating period.  
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These three weaknesses are reflected in the Thai case study. In Thai case study, we 
found that we are the second to assess the village affected by the project (the Japan’s 
NHK Television is the first), whereas DNA never visits this area.   
  
iii ) The lack of sustainability additionality applied to CDM projects 
The results of the literature review show that the requirement of additionality as defined 
in the Kyoto Protocol does not cover the sustainability. The concept of additionality 
focuses on GHG emission reductions, whereas the SD benefits do not appear in this 
concept. Additionality is used as criteria to determine whether GHG emission 
reductions are real, measurable, reasonable, and in addition to what would have 
happened. However, the concept of additionality is not used as criteria to assess the 
sustainability of CDM projects. Moreover, a baseline is used to determine only the 
volume of GHG emission reductions from project activity, not the SD benefits. We 
found only environmental additionality, financial additionality, and technical 
additionality addressed in the PDDs, whereas sustainability additionality does not 
appear in the PDDs. Finally, the lack of sustainability additionality resulted in the 
difficulty in monitoring the real SD benefits of CDM projects. 
 
iv ) A conflict between the simultaneous objectives of “ensuring cost-effectiveness of 
GHG emission reductions” and “promoting sustainable development” 
The results of the literature review shows that there is a conflict between the 
simultaneous objectives of “ensuring cost-effectiveness of GHG emission reductions” 
and “promoting sustainable development”. Each ton of GHG emission reduction is 
given a monetary value through the CERs, but the CDM’s contribution to SD is not 
given a monetary value. The missing value of SD benefit has resulted in a trade-off 
between the CDM target of supplying cheap emission credits and the promotion of SD 
making projects with high SD obligations unattractive to investors. On the other hand, 
the monetary value placed upon carbon reductions arouses investors interest in CDM 
projects which deliver large volumes of CERs. There is a widespread perception that 
projects that deliver large volumes of CERs cannot deliver other SD benefits. In 
particular, industrial gas projects (HFCs, N2O, PFCs) can generate high CER volumes, 
but do not create many jobs or contribute directly to community development. 
Consequently, these two objectives of the CDM cannot be achieved simultaneously. 
However, this research found that the Gold Standard label can solve this conflict by 
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giving a monetary value to the objective of promoting SD (Chapter 7). Moreover, we 
found that CER buyers are becoming more concerned with ethical behavior in 
purchasing carbon credits by giving the first priority to high quality carbon credits in 
terms of SD benefits.     
Finally, these four problems affect the CDM’s contribution to SD. The first two 
problems are directly related to host countries and these two problems make host 
country cannot guarantee the SD benefits of CDM projects. In every era of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Conference of the Parties focuses on the Protocol's exemption of 
developing countries from binding obligations, not the SD issue. Now is the time to 
raise an issue of CDM’s contribution to SD. The existing CDM framework should be 
reformed in order to guarantee the SD benefits.        
     
11.1.2 Classification of CER Buyers: One CER Two Markets (Objective Two) 
 
Sutter [108] suggested that CDM sustainability labels can differentiate the market for 
CERs into two (i) normal CERs, and (ii) premium CERs. However, there is no research 
to validate the concept of a premium market. This thesis is the first to validate this 
concept. Finally, we found that CER buyers can be classified into two distinct groups: 
(1) buyers favoring CERs with sustainability labels; and (2) buyers favoring non-
labelled CERs. This result confirms that the carbon market is separated into two 
markets: a premium market; and a normal market or may be defined as “One CER Two 
Markets”.     
The first cluster of buyers has a strong preference for CERs with CDM sustainability 
labels. These buyers have negative attitudes towards the host countries’ capacity to 
assess CDM projects, so they require the additional standard to ensure the sustainability 
of CDM projects. They have high involvement in past purchase and purchase intention 
of CDM sustainability labels. These buyers have a high level of knowledge in CDM 
sustainability labels. They believe that CERs with sustainability labels differ from non-
labelled CERs in terms of SD benefits. They were positive about the importance of 
labeling and the image of SD labels. Most buyers in this group apply “an ethical 
purchasing policy” for purchasing carbon credits by giving the least project priority to 
the industrial gas projects. This group is mainly comprised of, non-profit organizations 
and companies with small paid up capital (< 100 million Euros)..  
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The second cluster of buyers has a strong preference for non-labelled CERs. These 
buyers have low involvement in past purchase and purchase intention of CDM 
sustainability labels. Moreover, they have a low level of knowledge about CDM 
sustainability labels. They believe that CERs with sustainability labels are the same as 
non-labelled CERs in terms of SD benefits and ROI. They were negative about the 
importance of sustainability labels, but have positive attitudes towards the host 
country’s duty to assess CDM projects. This group is mainly comprised of private 
companies with large paid up capital (≥100 million Euros).        
These findings clearly agree with Sutter’s recommendation, that CDM sustainability 
labels can be used to differentiate the carbon market. Based on buyers’ attitudes towards 
and involvement in CDM sustainability labels, the present carbon market is clearly 
separated into two markets: a premium market, and a normal market. These buyer 
profiles will be useful in developing targeted marketing strategies in order to increase 
the market share of a premium market.  
 
11.1.3 The Willingness of Buyers to Pay a Price Premium for CERs with CDM 
Sustainability Label (Objective Three and Objective Four) 
 
According to Sutter, if CDM sustainability labels can attract a price premium, it will 
induce project developers to develop projects with high levels of SD benefit. A price 
premium for high SD CERs would create a strong inventive for project developers to 
invest in CDM projects with sustainability labels. This would help the CDM achieve its 
SD objective. However, the willingness to pay a price premium for SD labelled CERs 
was unclear. Our research results clearly show that CDM sustainability labels can attract 
a price premium. We found that 56.4% of the buyers were willing to pay a price 
premium, whereas the remaining 43.6% were not willing to pay. The charity groups and 
the governments have a greater percentage of “yes” WTP responses than the private 
sector group. Paying a price premium as the tool for public relations and branding and 
paying a price premium as the reward for the project developers are the main reasons 
for the willingness to pay. Meyrick [73] and Sutter [108] made an assumption that 
buyers may pay a price premium because they may use it for public relations activities. 
Therefore, our findings proved that their assumption about this reason for willingness to 
pay is correct. Considering the reasons for the unwillingness to pay, the main three 
reasons are: (1) not believing that paying a price premium can help CDM projects 
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achieve SD objectives; (2) they are not interested in SD benefits, but they would like to 
pay a price premium for Gold Standard CERs in recognition of its other benefits such as 
low methodology risk, low Post-Kyoto risk, etc. and (3) paying a price premium will 
result in higher costs of acquiring carbon credits.           
Considering WTP value, the mean WTP was €1.12/tCO2e with a standard deviation of 
€0.65 and the median WTP was €1.0/tCO2e. However, we found that a price premium 
for GS CERs varies widely. This may be because the SD is an elusive concept. 
Consequently, different views on the SD benefits may make buyers give different 
monetary values to SD benefits of CDM projects. There was no difference between 
European countries and Non-European countries in the amount of money that they were 
willing to pay. As expected, charities showed the highest mean WTP, but the mean 
WTP of government was lower than that of the private sector group.  
In this study, most participants have a strong intention to buy CERs from the GS label 
in the future. Moreover, most buyers were becoming more concerned with ethical 
behavior in purchasing carbon credits by giving the least project priority to the 
industrial gas projects. This result implies that future market demand for CERS 
generated by industrial gas projects may decrease. We found that the key strengths of 
the GS label are its positive image and its contribution to SD. Although the past 
research results clearly show that the SD profile of the labelled projects is better than 
the non-labelled projects, some buyers did not know about this. Consequently, some 
buyers believed that the expected SD benefits generated by project with GS label are the 
same as or lower than similar non-labelled project. These results indicated an 
information gap among buyers and this resulted in the differences in buyers’ WTP. 
Finally, we found that buyers’ knowledge in each CDM sustainability label is 
substantially different. Clearly, the majority of buyers have a high level of knowledge in 
the GS label, but they have a low level of knowledge of other labels e.g. the CCB 
Standards. Therefore, we see that the GS label is a market leader in the CDM 
sustainability labels, others labels only have a small market share in the compliance 
market. Knowledge level is therefore an important factor that helps CDM sustainability 
labels succeed in the compliance market.                     
Finally, we apply a binary logistic regression to investigate which factors might 
contribute positively and negatively to the probability of the willingness to pay. The 
regression results showed that the probability of the willingness to pay a price premium 
is affected positively by the four factors. These factors are: 
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• Buyer’s perception of the SD benefits: Buyers who have a positive perception of 
the SD benefits generated by CDM sustainability labels are more likely to pay a 
price premium than those who have a negative perception.  
• Buyer’s perception of ROI: Buyers expecting high ROI of CERs with CDM 
sustainability labels have a higher probability of the willingness to pay a price 
premium than those expecting low ROI. 
• An involvement in CDM sustainability label: With more involvement in CDM 
sustainability labels the probability of the willingness to pay a price premium 
increase. 
• Buyers’ attitude towards an importance of CDM sustainability labels: With a 
more positive attitude towards an importance of CDM sustainability labels the 
probability of the willingness to pay a price premium increase.   
 
These four factors are useful for CDM sustainability labels trying to develop marketing 
strategies to increase market penetration. Finally, these findings support Sutter’s 
recommendation to use CDM sustainability labels for giving the monetary value to the 
SD objective. Moreover, these findings may induce project developers to develop 
projects with high SD benefits in order to get a price premium as Sutter suggested. 
      
11.1.4 The Disparity between the Claimed Carbon Emission Reductions and the SD 
Benefits: A Synthesis of Results from the Contingent Valuation and Cluster 
Analysis (Objective Two and Objective Three) 
 
We found that CDM sustainability labels only gives a clear reward to sellers, not 
buyers. Based on the reasons for willingness to pay and unwillingness to pay, we found 
that CER buyers get a small benefit from buying CERs with sustainability labels. The 
only direct benefit that the buyers get from buying labelled CERs is making their 
organization to have a better image. However, we found that using labelled CERs as a 
tool for public relations is not an effective tool for promoting the company compared to 
other eco-friendly marketing tools such as Fair trade label, Eco-friendly label, etc. 
When buyers pay a price premium for labelled CERs, they will get the same CERs as 
non-labelled CERs that can be claimed for one tonne of CO2e. Therefore, they feel that 
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buying a labelled CER resulted in the higher costs of acquiring carbon credits. Finally, 
this small benefit may not cover the high cost of acquiring labelled CERs. This is an 
obstacle to promote the premium carbon market. On the other hand, the sellers (the 
project developers) get a significant price premium from selling labelled CERs (based 
on the results of WTP). Consequently, CERs with CDM sustainability labels may be 
unattractive to buyers. These benefits can be illustrated in Figure 11.1. 
 
 
Figure 11.1: The benefits of buyers and sellers in the premium carbon market 
 
Clearly, CDM sustainability labels can give a monetary value to the SD objective. In 
order to promote a premium market, the UNFCCC should give a direct benefit to 
buyers. Currently, the reward is given to only sellers, not buyers. This reward may be 
given to the buyers in form of the claimed carbon emission reductions. As the labelled 
projects generate more SD benefits than the non-labelled projects, labelled CERs should 
be different from non-labelled CERs in terms of the claimed carbon emission 
reductions. Now each CER (labelled CER or non-labelled CER) is equivalent to one 
tonne of CO2e. Based on the SD profile of labelled CERs, one labelled CERs should be 
equivalent to more than one tonne of CO2e. The UNFCCC should revise the claimed 
carbon emission reductions from the labelled project. Based on our research results, the 
monetary value of SD benefits is about 10% of the CER price without any premium. 
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Consequently, we suggest that one labelled CERs should be more than to 1 tonne of 
CO2e. This will be the benefit given back to the buyers who pay a price premium for 
labelled CERs. Finally, the premium carbon market will induce both buyers and sellers 
to invest in CDM projects with high SD benefits. This will really help the CDM to 
achieve the simultaneous objectives of “ensuring cost-effectiveness of GHG emission 
reductions” and “promoting sustainable development”.         
      
11.1.5 Stakeholder Preferences towards the SD of Biomass CDM Projects in Thailand 
(Objective Five) 
 
We investigate the attitudes of stakeholders for the SD of CDM projects by using a case 
study of a biomass CDM project in Thailand. Following previous research 
recommendations (Sutter [108]), ‘grass-roots’ local residents were included in the 
stakeholder survey. The Thai study clearly answer Sutter’s open question on whether 
the sustainability preferences of experts and local residents differ. Our results 
demonstrate different priorities regarding the importance of: (i) employment generation, 
(iii) emission reductions, (iii) air quality (dust), (iv) waste disposal, and (v) noise. 
Adding a group of local residents into the stakeholder surveys provides a clearer 
understand of sustainability preferences and highlights conflicting opinions. 
Our results revealed a similar pattern of priority weighting to Sutter’s research in South 
Africa and India. Sutter [108] concluded that the specific energy situation in a host 
country will influence the SD priorities of CDM stakeholders’. According to Sutter, 
India which is heavily dependent on fossil fuel imports, ranked the replacement of fossil 
energy with renewable energy as the most important SD benefit.  Conversely in South 
Africa, which has abundant coal reserves, this criterion had the lowest priority. Thailand 
depends heavily on fossil fuel imports and our results showed that Thai stakeholders 
give the highest priority to increasing renewable energy production. This suggests that 
host countries dependent on fossil fuel imports should include ‘increasing the use of 
renewable energy’ as a criterion for assessing CDM projects. Finally, we agree with 
Sutter’s conclusion that SD of CDM projects can only be properly understood at the 
level of the case study. These results will be useful for Thai Government to apply these 
importance weights to assess the sustainability of Biomass CDM projects. 
The qualitative results indicate that some SD benefits described in PDDs may not be 
realized in practice. Specifically: (i) rice husk CDM projects may not give an extra 
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income to farmers and the allocation of this benefit is unfair; (iii) rice mills stopped 
burning rice husks before the implementation of the CDM; and (iii) rice husk CDM 
projects can have a negative impact on air quality (dust problem and waste disposal). In 
theory rice husk ash can be used for many purposes: (1) soil improvement; (2) cement 
production; and (3) steel production, but in reality it is very difficult for CDM project 
developers to find buyers. In Thailand there is very small demand for rice husk ash and 
the buyers of rice husk ash are very far from the projects. Therefore, some CDM 
projects dispose of rice husk ash with least costs by dumping it in the open fields near 
the project area. However, projects do contribute significantly to SD in terms of:  (i) 
employment generation; (ii) increase in renewable energy; and (iii) transfer of 
knowledge and technology.  
Clearly, these results confirm that the quality of PDDs is poor in terms of the 
assessment of SD benefits. According to Sterk et al. [105], most host countries assess 
the sustainability of CDM projects by desk-based review and an interview with the 
project developers. Consequently, the results of a sustainability assessment conducted 
by host countries may be incorrect. This conclusion is supported by the Thai case study, 
suggesting an inability of host countries to ensure the sustainability of CDM projects. 
 
11.1.6 Integrating Stakeholders’ Views on the Sustainability of CDM Projects 
 
As previous noted, this study tried to increase the understanding of the SD benefits of 
CDM projects, by directly involving CDM stakeholders involved at various levels. 
Consequently, CDM stakeholders’ views on the SD benefits of CDM projects are 
concluded in Table 11.1. 
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Stakeholder Group View on the Sustainability of CDM projects 
The Host Country Designated 
Authority 
• According to our review of the SD criteria used by 
Asia-Pacific countries, we found that the SD 
benefits are equally important in the specific 
context of project type.  
• According to our qualitative interviews with Thai 
CDM stakeholders, we found that the 
sustainability of CDM projects can be assessed by 
a desk review of the PDDs and an interview with 
the project developers. 
Carbon Credit Buyers • Based on the quality of carbon credits in terms of 
SD benefits, the carbon market is separated into 
two markets: a premium market; and a normal 
market. 
Local Stakeholders • The SD benefits are not equally important in the 
specific context of project type. 
• Based on a Thai case study, local stakeholders 
view that rice husk CDM projects can create 
potentially negative impacts on air quality.  
 
Table 11.1: CDM stakeholders’ views on the sustainability of CDM projects 
 
Host countries have different views on the sustainability of CDM projects. Therefore, 
the sustainability of CDM projects is differently defined by host countries, resulted in 
different SD criteria designed by host countries. Moreover, most host country 
designated authorities view that the SD benefits are equally important in the specific 
context of project type, so we cannot clearly understand the preferences of DNAs 
towards the SD of CDM projects. Finally, they view that the sustainability of CDM 
projects can be assessed by a desk review of the PDDs and an interview with the project 
developers.  
Considering the CER buyers’ views, they view that CERs are different in terms of SD 
benefits, so the carbon market is separated into two markets: a premium market; and a 
normal market. Moreover, they are willing to pay a price premium for the premium 
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CERs in terms of SD benefits, representing how they value the sustainability of CDM 
projects. This clearly shows that the premium CERs should be worth more than the 
normal CERs.  
Finally, local stakeholders view that the SD benefits are not equally important in the 
specific context of project type, opposing the original view of the host countries 
designated authorities. Based on a Thai case study, stakeholders view that rice husk 
CDM projects can create potentially negative impacts on air quality. However, projects 
do contribute significantly to SD in terms of:  (i) employment generation; (ii) increase 
in renewable energy; and (iii) transfer of knowledge and technology. 
  
11.2 Recommendations 
 
11.2.1 Recommendations for International Regulations under the UNFCCC 
 
1) The case study provides further evidence that the quality of PDDs is poor in 
terms of the assessment of SD benefits. This is because PDDs do not give 
enough detail of SD benefits and social costs. Furthermore, some SD benefits 
that are described in the PDDs are not realized in practice. This will affect the 
execution of the host countries’ duty to assess the sustainability of CDM 
projects. Consequently, these results suggest that host countries should be 
required to assess the sustainability of CDM projects inter alia by in-depth 
interviews with a wide range of stakeholders supported by project site visits. 
This is particularly important in areas that may be affected negative impacts. 
2) We found the poor monitoring of the SD benefits by host countries. Currently, 
host countries record only ex-ante potential benefits, not the ex-post actual 
benefits. Ex-post SD benefits are not required to be monitored during the 
operating period. In order to check whether the claimed SD benefits are actually 
achieved, ther should be a requirement to monitor these benefits during the 
operating period. Therefore, we suggest that host countries should be required to 
conduct the two assessments of CDM projects, one before the project 
implementation, and another one after the project implementation. Moreover, the 
sustainability assessment during the operating period should be conducted by 
both DNA and local stakeholders. It should give an opportunity for local 
stakeholders to participate in the monitoring process. 
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3)  The case study provides evidence that biomass CDM projects can create a 
potential negative impact on environment. Currently, CDM projects are not 
required to conduct an EIA in most host countries. Therefore, we suggest that an 
EIA should be required for all CDM projects in order to ensure the 
environmental sustainability of CDM projects. 
4) This study finds that SD of CDM projects can only be properly understood at the 
level of a case study. Moreover, all SD benefits are not equally important in the 
specific context of project type. These results agree with Sutter [108]. Before 
DNAs use SD criteria to assess CDM projects, each SD criterion should be 
given a weight based on its importance by CDM stakeholders. In other words, 
DNAs should use the weighted criteria to assess the sustainability of CDM 
projects. DNAs should develop specific sets of weighted criteria for each 
specific type of CDM project. The weighted criteria give better results than the 
unweighted criteria. The weighted criteria can help the host countries to choose 
projects that maximize the social welfare. Weighting the SD criteria may be 
easily conducted through the stakeholder consultation process where a wide 
range of stakeholders are invited to discuss. 
5) We found that the requirement of additionality defined in the Kyoto Protocol 
does not cover sustainability. Consequently, we suggest that the concept of 
additionality should be applied to determine whether SD benefits are real, 
measurable, reasonable, and in addition to what would have happened. The 
UNFCCC should add the aspect of SD into the concept of additionality. Finally, 
the concept of additionality should be applied by the project developer to 
measure the change in SD benefits observed when comparing the benefits in the 
baseline scenario with the benefits in the project scenario. The concept of 
sustainability additionality will help the project developer provide clearer details 
of SD benefits. Moreover, it will help DNAs monitor the SD benefits during the 
operating periods. 
6) As previously noted, there is a disparity between the claimed carbon emission 
reductions and the SD benefit. Currently, labelled CERs and non-labelled CERs 
are the same in terms of the claimed carbon emission reductions, but these two 
types of CERs are different in terms of SD benefits. Buyers pay a price premium 
for labelled CERs, but these CERs can be claimed for the same amount of 
emission reductions as non-labelled CERs. This resulted in the high cost of 
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acquiring labelled CER. In order to promote the premium market, our results 
suggest that the UNFCCC should revise the claimed carbon emission reductions 
from the labelled project. Based on WTP value, we suggest that one labelled 
CERs should be more than 1.0 tonne of CO2e. This will help high quality carbon 
credits to gain more market share.  
7) Based on the results of cluster analysis, the two buyer clusters exist with distinct 
profile patterns, confirming that the carbon market is currently divided into two 
markets: the premium market; and the normal market. The premium market will 
help the CDM achieve its SD objective. Consequently, the concept of two 
carbon markets should be applied to set the CERs portfolio of buyers. We found 
that governments tend to be the members of the premium market. Therefore, it 
may be easy to require the government of Annex I countries to set a minimum 
quota of labelled CERs in their portfolio. As for the private organizations, they 
may use their commitment in a minimum quota of labelled CERs in their 
portfolio to promote the corporate social responsibility (CSR).        
 
11.2.2 Recommendations for Thai Government 
 
1) This study finds that most local stakeholders consider emission reductions as the 
least important benefit. Most local stakeholders view the climate change as a 
distant problem that will not affect them personally. Therefore, Thai 
Government should launch public relation campaign to help the local 
stakeholders understand and realize the climate change problem. Moreover, the 
government should inform these people how CDM projects can help solve the 
climate change problem. 
2) Although Thailand has well defined SD criteria for assessing CDM projects, 
each SD criterion is not given a weight based on its importance. This is because 
Thailand view that all SD benefits are equally important. However, this study 
finds that all SD benefits and social costs are not equally important in 
stakeholder viewpoints. Finally, this research shows an importance weight of 
each SD benefit and social cost. Based on this result, we suggest that Thai 
Government should apply these importance weights to assess the sustainability 
of Biomass CDM projects. 
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3) This study finds that CDM projects based on rice husk does not give an extra 
income to farmers and the allocation of this benefit is uneven. The financial 
benefits are allocated to the rice mills, but the local people lose local benefits 
due to their inability to use a free rice husk. We suggest that farmers could form 
cooperatives that would force the price of paddy rice to the mills higher, i.e. to 
include the true value of the rice husk in the price paid. 
4) The Thai Government has created many policies to increase the use of 
renewable energy, but it has not created a biomass commodity market to support 
the high demand for the rice husks resulted by these policies. The lack of a 
commodity intermediary is resulting in anticompetitive behavior with some 
biomass power plant unable to source enough rice husks to generate electricity.  
This could result in a small number of companies monopolizing the market. 
Therefore, we suggest that the Government should consider developing a 
biomass commodity market to support the high demand for the rice husks 
created by Thailand’s renewable energy plan. 
5) This study finds that biomass projects create a potential negative impact on air 
quality and the dust problem is mainly caused by the rice husk ash dumped in 
the open field. Therefore, we suggest that Thai government must act as regulator 
and force the power plants to find a better disposal method. 
 
11.2.3 Recommendations for CDM Sustainability Labels 
 
Although CDM sustainability labels have significant strength in their image and 
contribution to SD, some buyers do not know about this. Except for the GS label, most 
buyers have a low level of knowledge in CDM sustainability labels. This reflects the 
information and knowledge gap among the buyers. Therefore, some buyers have a little 
confidence in CDM sustainability labels and have a negative attitude towards an 
importance of labels. We found that both buyers’ perception of the SD benefits and 
buyers’ attitude towards an importance of labels have a positive influence on the 
probability of the WTP and participation in the premium market. Consequently, the 
labeling organizations should undertake marketing to improve knowledge levels about 
labels throughout the carbon market. In particular, any public relation campaign should 
target buyers helping them understand the strength and importance of labels.  
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11.2.4 Recommendations for Further Study 
  
1) Most existing research into the sustainability assessments of CDM projects has 
been based on a desk review of the PDDs. As previous noted, the quality of 
PDD is poor in terms of the details of actual SD benefits. A desk review of the 
PDDs is not a suitable research method. Therefore, we suggest the future 
research on sustainability assessments of CDM projects should use the in-depth 
interviews with a wide range of stakeholders. 
2) In order to clearly understand sustainability preferences and see the conflicting 
opinions, we suggest the future research on the sustainability preferences of 
CDM stakeholders should include both a group of experts and a group of local 
residents. 
3) The AHP method has proven to be a helpful tool for revealing stakeholder 
preferences towards the sustainability of CDM projects and it can be used for 
developing policy with respect to establishing local acceptance. However, we 
found problems when implementing the AHP. The first problem is that it is very 
difficult for local residents to remember the definition of the traditional 9-point 
scale. The second problem is that stakeholders cannot spend too much time 
completing the pairwise questionnaire. Therefore, we suggest the future research 
on AHP should design user friendly pairwise questionnaire concerning these two 
problems. However, we found that participants’ involvement in designing the 
pairwise questionnaire help us to get a good response rate. Therefore, we 
suggest the future research should give an opportunity for the local stakeholders 
to comment on the questionnaire.   
4) We suggest the future research on the sustainability assessments of CDM 
projects should implement similar study in other CDM project types in order to 
fully understand the CDM’s contribution to SD at project level. 
5) We suggest the future research should implement similar study of the WTP for 
the GS Voluntary Emissions Reductions (VERs)  in order to compare the results 
with this study and more fully understand the value of SD benefits of the carbon 
offset projects. As the carbon credit buyers tend to be busy all the time, we 
suggest that the WTP questionnaire is not too time-consuming to complete and 
should be the multiple choice format. Moreover, the online survey should be a 
method for data collection. 
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